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While many scholars have analysed the impact of culture, beliefs and norms on foreign 
policy, few have connected domestic political identities to international politics.  This 
thesis makes this agenda explicit by showing how domestic policy sources directly 
impact upon a state’s external security policies.  Rather than focusing on material factors 
(such as military expenditure or economic growth), I instead combine work concerned 
with constructed identities in international relations with accounts from social 
psychology of how identities develop and evolve over time.  Relying upon empirical 
evidence from party documents and extensive interviews with over 60 members of 
India’s security community, this PhD thesis investigates how the identities, norms and 
ideologies of different political parties have influenced India’s foreign policy behaviour. 
 
Employing an analytical framework consisting of multiple composite norms, I find that; 
 
1) there has been a consistent approach to how Indian foreign policy has developed 
since 1947;  
2) the 1998 to 2004 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance 
inculcated several substantive changes to India’s security policy, especially 
relating to nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, greater regional 
pragmatism and the use of realpolitik; 
3) these normative changes continued into the post-NDA period, and produced an 
irrevocable gear shift in India’s accepted and evolving security practice. 
 
By confirming and explaining the impact of domestic political identities on India’s 
foreign policy behaviour, this research makes a significant original contribution to the 





Parts of this thesis have been published as journal articles, primarily Chapter 4 (see 
Ogden (2009) ‘Post-Colonial, Pre-BJP: The Normative Parameters of India’s Security 
Identity, 1947-1998’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 17 (2): 215-237), as well as parts of 
Chapters 3, 7 and 8 (see Ogden (2010) ‘Norms, Indian Foreign Policy and 1998-2004 
National Democratic Alliance’, The Round Table - The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs, 99 (408): 303-315).  Other parts have been collectively published as book 
chapters; principally the sections on India’s nuclear technology and weapons (see Ogden 
(2011) ‘India and Nuclear Weapons’, in Scott, David (ed.) Handbook of India’s International 
Relations (London: Routledge), pp.290-300), and on India’s great power aspiration (see 
Ogden (2011) ‘International “Aspirations” of a Rising Power’, in Scott, David (ed.) 
Handbook of India’s International Relations (London: Routledge), pp.3-13). 
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library.  Lastly, I am indebted to the solidarity of my fellow students over the years 











This thesis is entirely the result of my own work.  Material from the published and 
unpublished work of others which is referred to in the thesis is credited to the author in the 
text.  This research has not been submitted for any other degree or professional 
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Chapter 1:  
 
‘Introduction: Identity, Indian Security Policy and the BJP’ 
 
‘we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies 
… (only) our interests are eternal and perpetual’ 
(Palmerston, 1848) 
 
‘foreign policy should not be considered the policy of one party 
… (it) affects the fundamental interest of our society 
and has to be conducted … over an extended period of time’ 
(Kissinger, 2005: 215) 
 
‘Self: that invisible chain that snaps tight whenever we stray’ 
(Lababidi, 2008: 72) 
 
While many scholars have analysed the impact of ideational factors such as culture, 
beliefs and norms on foreign policy, few have connected domestic political identities to 
international politics (for exceptions, see Hopf, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Nau, 2002; 
Walker, 2009).  I make this research agenda explicit by showing how domestic policy 
sources directly impact upon the construction of a state’s external security policies.  This 
thesis investigates how the identities, norms and ideologies of political parties in India 
influence its security and foreign policy making and behaviour.  My approach 
emphasises the primacy of ideational over material factors (such as military expenditure 
or economic growth), and synthesises predominantly social constructivist work within 
International Relations (IR) theory concerning norms with identity-driven accounts 
from Social Psychology.  Such an inter-disciplinary and multi-faceted approach aims to 
comprehensively develop IR and security studies research (especially on strategic 
culture), by offering new perspectives on how norms, identities and history impact upon 
the formation of a state’s security practice and doctrine. 
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1.1) - THE PUZZLE:  
 
Just as individual identities develop as a result of historical interaction, experience and 
precedent, the same is true for national security.  By constructing an analytical 
framework (“security identity”) which scrutinises multiple norms simultaneously, this 
thesis asks whether there has been a regular pattern to India’s security policy since the 
state’s independence in 1947.  This security identity has three essential features –  
 
a) it spans different political generations and changes to the international structure;  
b) it is reflective of national security discourses; and  
c) it is a key determinant of India’s security policy and behaviour.   
 
As such, the resultant security identity highlights the historical experiences of India’s 
security community in terms of how they perceive Indian national security.  This 
approach largely differs from IR theory accounts (principally neo-realism) that focus 
upon the primacy of the system for delineating international relations, whereby states 
are all uniform entities.  Instead, there is an insistence upon the consideration of 
ideational factors (including history, interaction and experience) as being more critical to 
our understandings of continuity and change in a state’s security policies. 
 
From this basis, I analyse whether or not this security identity limited the impact of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) Hindu nationalist orientation when they led the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1998 to 2004.  Based around a right-
wing Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) stance, the BJP’s ideology differs from previous 
Indian Congress Party (Congress) governments.  These previous regimes had been 
primarily secular, socialist and religiously inclusive, and had dominated Indian domestic 
politics from independence until the early 1990s.  In contrast, the BJP are regarded as 
being more communal, pro-capitalist and religiously exclusive - differences that suggest 
a different (foreign and domestic) policy orientation.  As this research will show 
however, for example concerning Pakistan and China, the BJP’s ideological basis 
appeared constrained once in power.  I therefore ask why, despite a different ideological 
orientation, were the BJP not radically different concerning Indian security when they 
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were in power through the NDA government?  I argue that India’s security identity was 
central to this constraint. 
 
The BJP-led NDA government acts as a test case for the security identity approach and 
as an examination of continuity and change in international relations.  The research 
tackles this specific empirical puzzle through a comparative analysis of the policy beliefs 
and actions of different Indian governments, in order to explain the BJP’s behaviour.  
In turn, given their own values and normative beliefs, the BJP are also a dynamic 
influence on India’s security policy.  We will therefore see how the BJP-led NDA 
constituted a “gear shift” in Indian security as they effectively rearranged the hierarchy 
of India’s security priorities and practices.  Such a gear shift is analogous to a car leaving 
a highway for an expressway - signifying not a change in direction but a stepping up and 
acceleration.  Such a shift was aided in the 1990s by India having greater (economic) 
resources, as well as the decline of the Soviet Union - factors that helped to both speed 
up her trajectory and remove obstacles from her path.  This empirical journey will be 
carried out by analysing the beliefs and values (collectively defined as norms) 
underpinning India’s security community.  The consensus of this community and its 
composite actors is what informs and produces India’s security policy and behaviour.  
Appendix 1 lists and pictures the various Indian security actors cited in this thesis. 
 
Through this analysis, I aim to conceptualise a link between the study of national 
security, identity and political parties in India by focusing on their shared normative 
basis.  This research will produce the first ever in-depth analysis of the BJP’s foreign 
policy both before and during their time in power.  As such, it is also a case study of the 
first non-Congress Party or non-Congress Party affiliated government to last a full five-
year term.  In addition, it will provide indicators for future Indian security policy 
behaviour.  Given India’s rising and expanding international profile, this research 
therefore poses ‘a question that is “important” in the real world’ (King et al., 1994: 15).  
Furthermore, because of the ideological contrast between the BJP and previous 
governments, the research fits in with Bechhofer and Paterson’s observation that 
‘researchers need to develop an eye for events, patterns and groups of people which are 
in some way anomalous and do not fit accepted theories and arguments’ (2000: 2).  
 4 
Critically, security identity must be understood as a heuristic analytical tool not as a 
generalisable theoretical model. 
 
1.2) - LOCATING SECURITY IDENTITY: 
 
As an analysis of the BJP’s ideational impact on Indian foreign policy and security, this 
thesis is firmly placed within debates between constructivism and realism in IR theory 
(Baldwin, 1993; Kegley, 1995)1.  The starting point of these debates is that for 
constructivists, ideational and social factors shape international relations through 
interaction.  These factors are largely perceptual, such as beliefs, threats and fears (Legro 
& Moravcsik, 1999; Onuf, 1989).  Constructivists also stress the importance of identity, 
culture and learning in foreign policy, whereby identities are socially and 
intersubjectively constructed via a system of norms and values (Checkel, 1998; Wendt, 
1992; 1994).  These perceptions can have far-reaching effects, becoming shared social 
norms that shape foreign policy and security over time, and which are dependent upon 
relevant (national) identities (Hopf, 2002).  Therefore, norms and their identities inform 
interests, which then motivate their actions and policy.  There is consequently a 
normative basis to a state’s foreign policy that is driven by domestic political ideals and 
ideologies.  By extension, there can be normative assumptions and structures (identities) 
within national security policy, socially constructed through international interaction. 
 
Constructivism is juxtaposed with neo-realism, which primarily understands foreign 
policy through rationalist balance of power calculations based upon military or 
economic power (Waltz, 1979).  Such an approach is both structural through its stress 
upon the state as the key denominator of international relations, and essentialist through 
its emphasis on (relative) material factors (Krasner, 1992; Rose, 1998).  Broadly, for 
realists, the same set of interests continually drives state interaction and remains fixed 
(Glaser, 1994/95; Zakaria, 1992).  Such a basis negates the influence of both identities 
and domestic politics, which realism regards as being irrelevant to the distribution of 
material power (Brooks, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996).  It also negates history and ideational 
mechanisms of continuity and change (Koslowski & Kratochwil 1994).  In turn, it is the 
                                                
1 A full non-monolithic evaluation of the different strands of realism will be undertaken in Chapter 2 
(including classical realism that acknowledges the value of normative beliefs). 
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make up of the international system that impacts on states rather than vice versa - an 
approach that is outside-in compared to the constructivists’ inside-out viewpoint.   
 
As an analytical tool, constructivism therefore pushes identities and domestic politics to 
the forefront of IR research.  It also considers questions of continuity and change 
through the creation of social norms and a consideration of history and precedent 
(Adler, 2002; Gaddis, 1992; Walt, 1998).  All these elements contrast it with the mainly 
static, state-based, resource-driven calculations of neo-realism.  Thus, analysing Indian 
security from a predominantly constructivist perspective can allow us to isolate the 
specific impact of the BJP’s political (domestic) identity on Indian foreign policy 
(Farrell, 2002; Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994).  A purely realist position would not 
allow for such an analysis of the BJP-led NDA government and would only reveal 
differentials in India’s material power relative to other states.  Further still, the ideology 
of the BJP and that of its predecessors would be regarded as purely domestic and 
irrelevant.  Within the security identity framework, I will thus show both the presence of 
different domestic policy norms and their impact on India’s foreign policy and security 
behaviour. 
 
With reference to Indian foreign policy, these debates have been touched upon by some 
theorists (Chaulia, 2002; Chiriyankandath, 2004; Das, 2003; Hewitt, 2000; Misra, 2001), 
but rarely in analyses done in an explicit or holistic manner.  Other existing literature 
concerning identities (Hewitt, c.2001; Jaffrelot, 2002; Malik, 2002; Puri, 1995) and 
perceptions (Koithara, 2004), have also failed to fully explore the links between 
domestic policy and foreign policy.  Few of these works have contended that domestic 
political ideologies significantly impact upon foreign policy.  A theoretical orientation 
based on constructivism therefore aims to fill some of these empirical gaps.  In addition, 
it will broaden our analysis of the BJP away from its traditional focus on the domestic 
tenets of Hindu nationalism (Hansen, 1999; Hansen & Jaffrelot, 2001; Zavos, 2002).  
Such perspectives allow us to achieve a more mature analysis and understanding of the 
BJP, especially concerning their long-standing beliefs and policies concerning Indian 
security.  Despite the focus upon domestic factors, my analysis will remain largely 
focused on India’s external security practice and relations.  It will thus not fully contend 
with issues such as internal terrorism. 
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I also build upon the work of various scholars who have studied the trajectory of Indian 
security over the last 60 years.  These include Kanti Bajpai (2003) on the presence of 
multiple ideological persuasions in India (including Nehruvian, Gandhian and Hindutva), 
Perkovich on how ‘India’s national identity and normative assumptions have shaped 
nuclear policy choices’ (1999: 448), and Nayar and Paul concerning India’s ‘enduring 
and deep-rooted aspiration’ (2004: 3) to be a great power.  I wish to challenge Mohan’s 
analysis of Indian foreign policy fundamentally shifting in the 1990s ‘from porcupine to 
tiger’ (2005: 260).  Rather than seeing this change as purely structural (primarily the end 
of the Cold War), this research explores more nuanced and alternative arguments that 
such change occurred due to ideational and internal factors (such as the rise to power of 
the BJP and their influence within the NDA).  The influence of Cohen concerning the 
temporal development of India from emergent (with Park, 1978) to emerging (2002), 
also informs the themes of continuity and change that underpin this research.  Many of 
these accounts are very fine-grained and dependent upon primary materials - an 
approach that I hope to emulate. 
 
1.3) - SECURITY IDENTITY AND INDIA: 
 
Within constructivism, security identity serves as a potentially invaluable tool with which 
to assess how the normative basis of Indian foreign policy and security has developed 
over time under the influence of domestic political identities.  It is defined as the tacit 
consensual norms existing across political parties, within strategic and analytical 
communities, inside academic environments and via mass media.  Here, “norms” are 
defined as a long-standing behaviour, value or belief.  In turn, these groups are 
collectively defined as a state’s “security community”.  The fundamental defining points 
of this consensus produce a topography of Indian security and foreign policy that 
defines India’s international outlook.  Foreign policy interactions and experiences 
between India and other states also feedback into this topography and serve to hone 
and redefine its normative content.  Rather than acting as a culture that is overly 
deterministic, security identity is instead indicatory and signifies when, where and by 
whom foreign policy has developed.  I define “security” as how a state ensures its 
survival through the protection and advancement of its interests.  “Security practice” is 
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defined as the accepted and habitual behaviours associated with how a state carries out 
its security policies. 
 
The ideational side of the security identity framework is derived from social 
psychological constructs of identity.  Based upon values, practices and norms, such 
constructs enable us to understand history as an experiential mechanism that builds up 
and engrains beliefs.  Within the realm of national security and foreign policy, these 
beliefs concern how security policy has been and should be.  These values are often 
deeply enshrined attitudes formed and entrenched over time.  In the Indian context, 
these values concern issues such as the status of Kashmir, India’s position in the world 
and the state’s secular democratic basis.  The norms that collectively form India’s 
security identity are argued to originate from, and to be influenced by, two specific 
political identities - predominantly (although not exclusively) that of the Congress Party 
from independence in 1947 to the 1990s and potentially by that of the BJP when they 
were in power from 1998 to 2004. 
 
The security identity framework entails three major normative sources and the 
consensuses within them that have become normalised through India’s historical 
international interaction.  The three sources are –  
 
! the political - defined as the ideological and social basis of the Indian state;  
! the physical - India’s geographical nature and strategic location; and  
! the perceptual - how India’s leaders and external others regard India in the 
international system. 
 
The three sources are independent variables that impact upon the dependent variable of 
security identity.  These sources also attempt to draw the analysis of Indian security 
away from its relative traditional myopia centred on Kashmir (Bose, 1997; Ganguly, 
1994; Puri, 1995; Schofield, 2002).  They also constitute the mechanism with which to 
study normative change on the domestic, regional and international levels, thus 
capturing the full spectrum of Indian security.  Unpacking the history of Indian security 
is a critical part of this procedure, as it enables the construction of the three different 
sources and a holistic analysis of India’s security identity.  This unpacking shall first be 
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done for Indian security from 1947 to the 1990s and aims to confirm the embedded 
normative structures present in Indian security.  Such an approach will then set up the 
analysis of the BJP’s impact upon these structures.  
 
As a way of combining security studies with identity studies, security identity declares 
that a state’s foreign and security policy has an entrenched ideational and normative 
basis.  In turn, by combining political ideology and identity formation with national 
security and foreign policy, security identity acts as an analytical framework that 
accounts for both continuity and change.  Consisting of deep-seated beliefs, security 
identity limits the scope of a state’s security policy behaviour.  It is posited that the BJP-
led NDA will act within these limits from 1998 to 2004.  However, as an ideational 
factor themselves, I further argue that the BJP are also capable of influencing India’s 
security identity by being in government and having responsibility for carrying out 
India’s domestic and foreign policies.  This ideational influence has the potential to 
accelerate or decelerate parts of the pre-1998 security identity, and to replace or add new 
norms to it.  It is envisaged that the BJP’s pro-Israel sentiment or pro-nuclear weapons 
bias could have such effects, for example, and will constitute a gear shift in India’s 
security policies and behaviour. 
 
From this basis, I will consider the following three questions in this thesis concerning 
Hindu nationalism and the evolution of Indian security – 
 
1) how do concepts of security identity help to explain the BJP-led NDA’s security 
policy? 
2) did India’s security identity constrain the BJP-led NDA’s desired policy norms? 
3) did the BJP-led NDA influence the norms structuring India’s security identity? 
 
1.4) THESIS OUTLINE AND STRUCTURE: 
 
Following this introduction (Chapter 1), this thesis consists of eight core chapters and a 
final conclusion.  Chapter 2 introduces notions of norms and normative change within 
IR, as well as their theoretical and empirical usefulness for this thesis, and includes a 
literature review of traditional explanations of Indian security.  In turn, Chapter 3 
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defines notions of security identity, facilitating a conceptualisation of security that is 
based upon continuity and change.  It is focused upon how norms, values and practice 
are formed.  Chapter 4 then applies this analytical framework to the development of 
Indian foreign policy from 1947 to 1998.  Through the three key sources (political, 
physical and perceptual), it analyses the interaction of both domestic and foreign 
influences on this development.   
 
Continuing to employ the security identity framework, Chapter 5 sets out the often 
contrasting political origins, ideologies and agendas of the BJP concerning India’s 
domestic and foreign policies.  This contrast is especially apparent concerning their 
Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) ideology and their links to the Sangh Parivar.  Consequently, 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in turn analyze the impact of the BJP-led NDA on each of the three 
sources of India’s security identity.  These chapters compare the behaviour of the BJP-
led NDA with previous regimes to ascertain patterns of continuity and change in Indian 
security.  In order to assess whether the changes witnessed in the previous three 
chapters remained in place after the BJP-led NDA left office in 2004, Chapter 9 then 
analyses the policies of the successor United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government 
from 2004 onwards.  So as to draw clear conclusions, this chapter’s analysis terminates 
at the end of 2009.  Chapter 10 then concludes the thesis, details four core findings, and 





‘Analyzing Security: Pathways to a Norm-Based Approach’ 
 
‘(history is) some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of 
thought and reveries have been inscribed … all of them exist 
together in our conscious or subconscious selves … (and) build up 
the complete, mysterious personality of India’ 
(Nehru, 1994: 59) 
 
‘India’s foreign policy is a projection of the values which we have 
cherished through the centuries, as well as our current concerns’ 
(Gandhi, 1972) 
 
‘foreign policy does not sit static’ 
(Interview A19, 2008)2 
 
How can themes of continuity and change both be measured concerning the security 
practice of a state?  If security practice develops and solidifies but then evolves, how can 
these processes be explained simultaneously?  An identity-driven account of 
international relations provides an answer to these questions by isolating and analyzing 
the “normative” beliefs underpinning state security practice.  Compared with more 
conventional accounts (that emphasize material and structural factors), mine instead 
stresses the primacy of ideational factors in determining international relations.  It will 
be argued that these ideational factors (primarily identities and their composite norms) 
provide a superior understanding of (Indian) security by highlighting the impact of 
temporal factors, and successfully linking domestic ideology with foreign policy.  In this 
chapter, I investigate how these themes have featured in the analysis of Indian security, 
where are they located within International Relations (IR) theory, and my approach for 
their measurement. 
 
                                                
2 Interview with leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 19 2008.  Please refer to the Bibliography to 
see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
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2.1) - CURRENT APPROACHES TO INDIAN SECURITY: 
 
I study the impact of a political ideology (Hindutva) on the dominant historically-based 
beliefs inherent to Indian security (its security identity).  Such an analysis demands an 
eclectic approach encompassing the analysis of domestic factors, India’s relations with 
her neighbours and India’s interaction with the world, as well as an appreciation of 
identity as a driver of security policy.  This analytical approach is dependent upon an 
appreciation of events and their historical chronology, an understanding of foreign 
policy making within India and a comparison of political (and security) ideologies.  
Analysts have touched upon several of these themes but have rarely treated Indian 
security as a product of the interaction between the domestic and international or as 
something that is identity-driven.  Carrying out this review therefore serves to locate my 
approach within existing literature and to identify the gaps it will fill.  
 
India-Pakistan, South Asia and Global Structures 
 
Much analysis of Indian security has solely dealt with some dimension of the conflict 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Engineer, 1991; Lamb, 1991; Puri, 1995; 
Schofield, 2002).  These analyses have often rested upon detailed blow-by-blow 
accounts of the historical origins and development of the conflict (Jha, 1996; Ganguly, 
1994; Wirsing, 1995), with some citing conflict resolution ideas (Bose, 2003; Chari et al., 
2008; Kabir, 2002).  Other scholars have focused upon the insurgency in Kashmir, its 
ongoing relationship to both India and Pakistan, and how it is a threat to South Asian 
stability (Bose, 1997; Ghosh, 2003; Malik, 2002).  In turn, many analysts have explicated 
discernible patterns and repercussions within Indo-Pakistani relations, including 
regarding Kashmir as a proxy war with Pakistan and how it impacts upon India’s 
internal stability (Bloeria, 2000; Dixit, 2002; Ludra, 2002; Rudra, 2003).  The impact of 
the Kashmir conflict on India’s international influence has also been noted, especially in 
terms of becoming a major power (Ganguly, 2006; Thakkar & Kulkarni, 1999).   
 
Many scholars have also linked the India-Pakistan conflict to regional and international 
structures, serving to show its relevance to regional stability and the impact it has on 
alliances and global power dynamics.  These approaches have investigated South Asia as 
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an imminent nuclear flashpoint and, in particular, its importance to the US and China 
(Chellaney, 1993; Cohen, 2002; Mansingh, 1998; Masood, 2004; Sathasivam, 2005).  The 
nuclear theme has also driven many other accounts of Indian security (Chengappa, 
2000; Karnad, 2002; Ganguly, 2000; Perkovich, 1999; Sagan, 2000).  The majority of 
these accounts show little regard for domestic factors, employing a largely state-
international structure emphasis often in terms of global proliferation.  In turn, others 
have highlighted how changes in extra-regional structural (rather than domestic) 
conditions have influenced India-Pakistan relations, such as the end of the Cold War 
and the impact of 9/11 (Hewitt, 1997; Jones, 2003; Rizvi, 1993; Sawhney, 2002).  
 
Discreet and specific analyses of India’s relations with other states and multinational 
institutions have also been a recurring theme in the literature.  These have included a 
number on India-China relations, mainly focused upon (realist) contentions of inevitable 
competition, potential engagement and border issues (see respectively Garver, 2001; 
Frankel & Harding, 2004; Hussain & Karki, 1977).  The analysis of India-US relations 
has also been amply covered, often situated in terms of common democracy, emergent 
power politics or nuclear capabilities (see respectively Bertsch et al., 1999; Cohen, 2000; 
Ganguly, 2003; Kux, 1992).  India’s relationship to multilateral institutions has also been 
investigated, such as her role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Allison & 
Williams, 1990; Goya, 1986; Sengupta, 1979), as well as those based in South Asia such 
as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Chaudhury, 2006; 
Jha, 1986; Sinha, 2007).  While many of these accounts have utilized historical 
approaches, the majority of them rarely employ an analysis that accounts for India’s 
perception of herself (and desired status) in the world or in the South / South-East 
Asian region. 
 
Analyzing Foreign Policy (Making) and Utilizing Identities 
 
Several analysts have produced research looking at Indian foreign policy and security as 
a whole (Bajpai & Mallavarapu, 2004; Harshe & Seethi, 2005; Mohan, 2003; Sinha, 
2005), with some focusing upon conceptions of India as an emerging or potential great 
power (Cohen, 2002; Nayar & Paul, 2004).  One downside of all such analyses is that 
they focus only on the immediate short-term repercussions of an event at that time rather 
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than investigating how that event impacts throughout history.  Through such presentism, 
there is consequently little recognition of the dynamism of history, particularly in terms 
of how it is remembered and how this impacts on present and future self-conceptions.  
Indeed, most analyses insist upon the criticality of a certain singular event - the end of 
the Cold War or India’s 1991 balance of payments crisis, for example - as a particular 
“turning point” in India’s security practice.  Such approaches contrast to 
conceptualizing the ongoing influence of history as a whole on India’s security policies, 
and explaining Indian security as being in response to domestic influences - both of 
which are core aims of this thesis’ security identity approach.   
 
In terms of empirical analysis, there have however been many investigations of Indian 
foreign policy detailing the minutiae of policy decisions by generations of Prime 
Ministers, either singularly or collectively (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990; Khilnani, 1995; 
Panda, 2003; Shivam, 2001).  Many of these examinations acknowledge domestic 
influences on India’s security policy, highlight the impact of (individual and political) 
identities on security, and appreciate continuity and change in Indian security as a whole 
(Appadorai, 1981; Prasad, 1979).  These works have included analyzing the decision-
making processes underpinning foreign policy, as well as the role of domestic executives 
and legislatures.   As such, these approaches reflect my concern with investigating 
domestic influences on security practice, along with conceptualizing normative 
formation and change within it.  My research compliments such analyses but in a more 
inter-connected manner by looking at how Indian foreign policy and security practice 
has formed across different political leaders and different political generations.  
 
Identity has also been regarded as a driver of conflict (Koithara, 2004) - especially in 
India-Pakistan relations, which Cohen regards as a “paired-minority” conflict (2002: 
198-199) - and also as part of nationalist outlooks (particularly in Kashmir, see Ganguly, 
1994, 2001; Hewitt, 2001; Malik, 2002).  Other scholars have carried such an identity-
based approach into foreign policy analysis by looking at the ‘dynamic interaction 
between domestic and international change’ (Hewitt, 2000), and have often compared 
Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party BJP security policy.  Thus, Chiriyankandath (2004) 
found that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) had a limited impact on 
nuclear weapons policy and India’s links with the United States (US), while Chaulia 
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(2002) revealed the robustness of the Nehruvian approach concerning nuclear 
proliferation, relations with Pakistan and ties with the US during the same period.  In 
contrast, Das (2003) suggested a need to redefine Indian security because of the BJP-led 
NDA, and Misra (2001) showed how the Indian government’s policy towards Kashmir 
and Pakistan changed once the BJP entered political office, as did nuclear policy versus 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) (Hewitt, 2000). 
 
Other studies have also analyzed strategic culture in India - nominally defined as 
‘enduring beliefs and attitudes’ (Latham, 1999).  These have concerned the influence of 
Kautilya (Uz Zaman, 2006); weapons of mass destruction and threat assessment (Lantis, 
2006); proliferation (Latham, 1999) and nuclear policy choices (Das, 2009).  Other 
analyses have been carried out by Tanham (1992) based upon geography, great power 
status and colonial experiences, and by Bajpai (1998) based upon territorial sovereignty, 
foreign policy autonomy and national power.  I acknowledge the influence of all these 
analyses but aim to expand the scale of investigation beyond a singular theme to include 
multiple dimensions of Indian security simultaneously.  By looking at multiple dimensions, 
I will be able to see how different factors (for example India’s physical makeup and self-
perceptions) inter-relate, thus producing a synthesized account of India’s security 
practice.  To capture how these themes have developed, I apply a longitudinal lens to 
the study of Indian security (as will be carried out for the Congress-dominated period 
from 1947 to 1998 in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 through an analysis of the 
solidification of BJP policy attitudes over time).  I will also broaden the object of 
analysis to enable comparison along three sources - the political (India’s political system 
and domestic affairs), the physical (India’s relations with her immediate neighbours) and 
the perceptual (India’s worldview of itself and others) - delineating a historically 
contingent national-level (security) identity. 
 
2.2) - LOCATING NORMS IN IR THEORY: 
 
Analyzing India’s security identity complements some existing research concerning 
Indian security but also revolves around several distinct key factors.  These are the 
influence of domestic politics on security; recognizing the continuous impact and 
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dynamism of history; and acknowledging self (and other) perception in international 
relations.  Such factors focus our attention on ideational factors, for example on the 
presence of identity-based structures within security, and how this identity is temporally 
constructed and reconstructed along normative lines.  The following section locates 
these approaches within International Relations (IR) theory in order to highlight their 
theoretical origins and efficacy.  Rather than insisting upon a comparison with liberalism 
- predominantly based upon economic cooperation, multilateralism and maximization 
of interests (Baldwin, 1993; Brown, 2005; Weber, 2004), this section looks at realism 
and constructivism.  This comparison is carried out because alternative accounts of 
(Indian) security predominantly utilize realism as their analytical and theoretical basis.   
 
Realism: Multiple Definitions and Apparent Counterfactuals 
 
In general, proponents of realism share several assumptions about the nature of 
international relations (Donnelly, 2000).  First, realists state that the international system 
is anarchic based upon the primacy of sovereign states and that these states are 
constantly vying against each other as rational unitary actors based upon their own self-
interest (primarily national security).  In turn, relations between states are determined by 
comparative levels of power (mainly military and economic).  Within realism’s common 
attributes, there are several dominant competing strands - predominantly classical and 
structural realism.  Classical realism chiefly argues that man’s selfishness in statecraft 
places interests over ideologies (Hobbes, 1996; Kautilya, 1929; Machiavelli, 1981; 
Thucydides, 1943).  Thus, human nature is an important driver of international relations 
that helps determine how interaction is carried out between states. 
 
In turn, structural realism (also often referred to as neo-realism), primarily focuses upon 
the international system and the struggles between the great powers within it.  Here the 
international system has primacy, impacting upon states and the agency of individuals in 
those states, as summed up in the levels of analysis (Waltz, 1959) and structure-agency 
debates (Carlsnaes, 1992; Dessler, 1989; Suganami, 1999).  Structural realism is itself 
split into two sub-strands - offensive and defensive (Brooks, 1997).  Offensive realists 
believe that states are primarily aggressive, seeking hegemony through a maximization of 
aggregate power (Gilpin, 1986; Mearsheimer, 2001).  Defensive realists believe that due 
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to the anarchy of the international system, states are obsessed by security (Jervis, 1999; 
Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979).  In addition, neoclassical realism combines structural realism 
and classical realism by adding intervening domestic variables between the international 
system and the state (Rengger, 1999; Schweller, 1998; Zakaria, 1998).  
 
Beginning with structural realism, several of my research arguments concerning the 
study of security in the Indian context appear to be incompatible.  Firstly, structural 
realists view states as ‘undifferentiated and unitary actors’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 23) 
disregarding any consideration of state identities and their construction.  Such realists 
believe that ‘states view each other as “black boxes” (and) focus on other states’ 
observable behaviour’ (Glaser, 1994/5: 55) rather than their type of government, 
decision-making processes or the beliefs of their political parties or leaders.  Therefore, 
realism ‘it is not a theory of foreign policy of individual states’ (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 250; 
Wittkopf & McCormick, 1999).  Not only does such an largely approach negate 
ideational (that is identity and normative) sources of security but it also gives primacy to 
the international structure as providing motivational force rather than each state or actor 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 13).  Although scholars such as Putnam (1988) note the existence of 
multi-level games whereby domestic influences affect international negotiation 
strategies, primacy is still given to structural factors.  In these ways, structural realism 
challenges any analysis that involves competing identities (India’s security identity and 
Hindutva [defined as constructed Hindu nationalism]), as well as any focus upon the 
influence of domestic politics on security policy-making.  Security principles based upon 
Hindutva, or indeed Nehruvian concerns [as pertaining to India’s first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru], would be mainly irrelevant to a structural realist account. 
 
Following on from these arguments, the emergence of offensive-defensive theory 
within structural realism led to greater conceptualisations of the importance of balancing 
either through alliance or deterrence (Walt, 1998: 31).  These contentions have led to 
empirical problems for realists, especially when dealing with states that are neither great 
powers nor necessarily drawn into balancing arrangements.  These arguments are 
especially true for India in the 1950s and early 1960s, when its leaders specifically sought 
to avoid great power competition and alliances, and disregarded her military build-up.  It 
is therefore accurate to state that structural realism ‘only captures a fraction of empirical 
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reality with its assumption that different distributions of power tend to produce 
different propensities towards balancing behaviour by great powers’ (Hopf, 2002: 271).  
Concerning India and its nuclear programme, such assertions do not adequately explain 
the state’s early security policy, as India failed to significantly accelerate its nuclear 
programme even after China defeated India in 1962 and tested nuclear weapons in 1964 
(Basrur, 2001: 188).  These actions largely defy (structural) realist self-help accounts.  
 
Furthermore, as structural realists ‘ignore human nature’ (Walt, 1998: 31), they bypass 
the issue of national and regional identities by assuming a blanket definition of identity 
that makes it irrelevant to inter-state relations.  By focusing upon ‘variation in the 
distribution of objective material power capabilities’ (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999: 34), 
interests appear as exogenous to state practice, emanating from the system to the state.  
Interests are thus generalized across states and ‘formed prior to any social interaction or 
historical evolution’ (Oros, 2008: 29).  Such arguments fail to acknowledge the role of 
competing nationalisms for determining the fractious India-Pakistan relationship, 
especially concerning Kashmir, which can be seen far more clearly in ideational rather 
than material terms.  Indeed, Palit has described the various India-Pakistan wars as 
‘”communal riots with armor”’ (quoted in Cohen, 2002: 224).  Additionally, structural 
realists cannot account for BJP desires for a nuclear bomb that pre-dated the Chinese or 
Pakistani nuclear threats that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  My research argues that 
such a desire instead rests upon an ‘ideologically-driven notion’ (Vanaik, 2002: 323). 
 
Due to its determinacy and focus on fixed states and interests, realism in general cannot 
adequately account for change and evolution in IR (Copeland, 2000: 190).   Defensive 
realism in particular is distinctly ahistorical, holding that ‘the substance and style of 
international politics remain strikingly constant’ (Zakaria, 1992: 195; Cox, 1986).  In 
addition, structural realists assume that the international system has no normative 
content (Katzenstein, 1996: 25) and regard norms as lacking causal force (Checkel, 1998: 
327; Kowert & Legro, 1996: 460).  Realism therefore functions in a cultural-neutral 
manner, eschewing identity and any possible non-unitary normative content and 
difference, as ‘culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of 
capabilities and have no independent explanatory power’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 17).  Apart 
from raising issues such as the failure to foresee the end of the Cold War (Legro & 
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Moravcsik, 2001), for any analysis of identity-driven security principles (including how 
India regards itself and other states), such a lack of normative content underlines the 
inappropriateness of realism for this thesis. 
 
Through its general disregard of state identities and normative content, its insistence on 
the primacy of the international system rather than domestic politics, and its dismissal of 
history, structural realism appears incompatible with the aims of this research.  
However, to refute any influence from realism is inaccurate, particularly given classical 
realism’s insistence on human nature informing values and interests, and how it regards 
human beings as consisting of social groupings (Barkin, 2003; Brown, 2001: 212; Gilpin, 
1986: 305).  Classical realists acknowledge how ‘identities and values (a)re more 
important determinants of policy than the constraints and opportunities of the external 
environment’ (Jackson et al., 2004: 346).  As we shall see below, these are areas 
traditionally seen as the preserve of constructivism.  For these reasons, Dannreuther 
notes how classical realism (and defensive realism) appear contrary to the rationalist 
assumptions of structural realism, and are thus part of the constructivist (and historical 
sociological) slant within IR theory (2007: 35).   
 
Constructivism I: History, the Ideational and the Domestic 
 
In contrast to most realist theory, constructivism is concerned with ideational factors 
(such as identities and norms) rather than with objective or material conditions.  It is 
founded upon ‘a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and 
interests are endogenous to interaction’ (Wendt, 1992: 394; Ruggie 1998).  In turn, 
constructivists declare that countries are social constructions based upon historically 
contingent conceptions of the self, the international system and their mutual 
relationship.  As Onuf asserts; ‘we make the world what it is … by doing what we do 
with each other and saying what we say to each other’ (1998: 59).  Therefore, the social-
psychological milieu is of ongoing significance to international relations, as are its 
incumbent identities and norms which are constructed and reconstructed through 
enduring social interaction.  This man-engendered, man-constituted, identity-based 
social constructivism is what Wendt (1992) refers to when he states that “anarchy is 
what states make it”. 
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Intrinsic to this approach is the importance of exogenous and endogenous change 
whereby the historical facts of the system’s previous interaction cannot be seen as 
‘ahistorical givens’ (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 232) but as precedents and 
normalising forces.  Critical to constructivist methodology is ‘the historical 
reconstruction of social facts’ (Adler, 2002: 109), recognising the importance of 
continuity and change, particularly concerning identity formation and evolution.  Thus, 
the interests and identities of states are not only specific to each state but are malleable 
through the temporal process of history.  We will see such factors present in the 
development, entrenchment and solidification of Indian security along norms which are 
specific to India and which arise from India’s international interaction.  Furthermore, 
self-conceptualisation is central to constructivist understandings of international 
relations, especially concerning how identities are created and then shape a state’s 
behaviour. 
 
Critically, constructivism ‘assumes, a priori, that identities are potentially part of the 
constitutive practices of the state, and so, productive of its actions at home and abroad’ 
(Hopf, 1998: 193).  Conceptualizing of an identity underpinning Indian security practice 
will help indicate the inter-relationship between domestic and foreign policy in India.  
Further still, identities and interests are regarded by constructivists as intertwined, co-
constitutive and dependent (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9).  Therefore, constructivists 
endeavour to find alternative understandings of the international system and the states 
which form it, often by focusing upon how states have interacted and the beliefs 
underpinning this interaction.  Overtly concerned with ‘the social construction of 
knowledge’ (Adler, 2002: 95), constructivism also focuses upon discourse as establishing 
accepted behavioural norms - processes that are observable in the development of both 
India’s security identity and the ideology of the BJP. 
 
Through this emphasis on identity and the role of history, constructivism has the ability 
to theorize and analyze change by focusing upon ‘the dynamic, contingent and culturally 
based condition of the social world’ (Adler, 2002: 96).  Thus, human nature is not 
reducible to one notion singularly applicable to all states but can include many attributes 
and can be studied in a multi-faceted manner.  This argument is the basis for carrying 
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out a holistic examination of Indian security along multiple parameters, and across 
different political ideologies.  Through ideas of precedent, interaction and experience, 
history has an indicatory strength along with an ability to isolate and explicate change 
rather than asserting a unitary realist viewpoint (Snyder, 2004: 61).  Henceforth, 
constructivists show how ‘something we cannot directly observe (culture) shapes 
something we can (behaviour)’ (Farrell, 2002: 62).   
 
Constructivism therefore deals with subjective reality and ‘function(s) along behavioural, 
structural and evolutionary axes simultaneously’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 55), providing rich 
identity-led accounts of security.  Furthermore, constructivism links and concurrently 
analyses domestic and international change (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 234; 
Zakaria, 1992: 188), allowing in this research for the analysis of variables such as 
Hindutva.  Again, by emphasising endogenous aspects of security, constructivism 
counters a weakness of structural realism, according to Ruggie, that ‘”power may predict 
the form of the international order, but not its content”’ (quoted in Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998: 365).  In turn, levels of analysis and agency-structure debates are seen as 
relational and co-constitutive rather than oppositional forces (Checkel, 1998: 325; Hay, 
2002: 127, 191), again stressing interaction and change over stasis. 
 
Constructivism II: Identities as Composite Norms 
 
Constructivism uses norms to trace and structure its ideational accounts of international 
relations.  These include regulative norms - norms that order and constrain behaviour 
and ‘are intended to have causal effects (such as) getting people to approximate the 
speed limit’ (Ruggie, 1998: 871).  In turn, constitutive norms ‘define an identity by 
specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it 
appropriately’ (Hopf, 1998: 173).  Additionally, evaluative and prescriptive norms act to 
respectively assess and regulate social behaviour (Axelrod, 1986: 1097).  In this study, 
the emphasis is on regulatory and constitutive norms as encapsulating notions of 
continuity and change rather than any norms that are proscriptive or evaluative 
(moralistic) of practical action.  In general, norms can be defined as ‘intersubjective 
beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the 
possibilities of action’ (Wendt, 1995: 73-4). 
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Central to regulative and constitutive norms is experiential learning that underpins both 
the development and solidification of new or existing beliefs.  Such learning comes 
about ‘as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (Levy, 1994: 283).  
This learning primarily stems from interaction whereby ‘the intersubjective structure is 
the final arbiter of meaning’ (Hopf, 1998: 75) - a factor that is essential for both self-
perceptions and perceptions of others.  In turn, learning is a fluid behavioural guide 
inherent to preference formation, as ‘which behaviours are conceivable, that is which 
norms are accepted, varies over time’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 366).  For this thesis, 
these ideas are central to developing an analytical framework which acknowledges how 
India security has “learnt” from its international interaction, as well as from the type of 
interaction involved (for example war, trade, negotiation or isolation). 
 
Therefore, ‘norms constitute social identities and give national interests their content 
and meaning’ (Adler, 2002: 103), whilst presenting shared ideas as a causal force 
separate from material structures (Copeland, 2000: 189-90).  Both states and the 
international system are thus constructed through interaction.  Furthermore, interaction 
highlights dominant values and beliefs that then become norms, and which in turn 
structure identities.  The frequency of this interaction also determines the relative 
“strength” of a norm - for instance I argue that repeated conflict in 1947, 1962, 1971 
and 1999 between India and Pakistan has strongly entrenched conflict with Pakistan as a 
normative belief in Indian security mindsets.  From this basis, and as Hopf notes, ‘”by 
providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty”’ (quoted in Duffield et al., 1999: 167) 
and act as ordering mechanisms essential for the understanding of their constitutive 
norms. 
 
Mixed with these arguments is a sense of a dependent relationship.  Even as changes in 
behaviour can lead to changes in the normative structure, this structure will still be 
dictated by the precedents and experiential limits of its previous interaction.  Therefore 
norms represent ‘a particular set of interests and preferences’ (Hopf, 1998: 175).  
Moreover norm development is cyclical, maintaining old precedents and mixing them 
with new experiences, while being inter-generational and formed over time.  By 
structuring practice, behaviour, interests and threats for states, ‘norms, like genes, are 
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instructional units’ (Florini, 1996: 364).  Consequently, as a way of understanding 
behaviour and the social practices that underpin it (formulated through interaction), 
constructivism offers good leverage for explaining how threats are formed.  
Fundamentally, constructivists argue that norms shape interests - a constitutive 
characteristic not captured by rationalist arguments (Checkel, 2001: 554). 
 
Of particular importance concerning security policymaking is instrumentality as norms 
affect ‘the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices’ (Kowert & Legro, 
1996: 463).  This approach has been applied to foreign policy analysis to determine how 
national norms shape state behaviour, in particular using the cases of Germany and 
Japan (Berger, 1993, 1998; Duffield, 1998; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993).  Such 
research has shown how ‘the preferences of agents are largely shaped by historically 
constructed identity norms’ (Checkel, 1999: 108).  I echo the focus and rationale of this 
approach by analyzing the underlying normative identity inherent to Indian security 
practice.  Social learning is critical in this respect whereby prior experiences and 
worldviews underline continuities in behaviour.  In the Indian context for example, an 
ongoing fear of Chinese invasion would be underlined by India’s comprehensive 1962 
defeat by China.  Therefore, states ‘not only accumulate experience but also learn from 
it’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 16).   
 
This notion of knowledge, where cognitive understanding acts as a learning mechanism, 
indicates how ‘once regimes are established, they may feedback on the basic causal 
variables that gave rise to them in the first place’ (Krasner, 1982: 358).  Hence, states 
can be seen to ‘interpret historical experience through the lens of their own analytical 
assumptions and worldviews’ (Levy, 1994: 283).  These factors are the basis of the 
security identity - an identity that learns from India’s security interactions with other 
states and the international system, and which then interprets new events and 
interactions through this existing experience.  This definition includes understandings 
such as Hacking’s “looping effect”; an ongoing mutually constitutive learning cycle that 
adapts to changes in the norms dominating the interactional process (see Adler, 2002: 
109).   
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Intrinsic to these contentions are assertions that ‘new norms never enter a normative 
vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space’ (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998: 898) and as such, norms are always contested.  As collections of multiple 
composite norms, identities therefore carry the ‘ability to highlight deviations from 
deeply held norms of appropriate behaviour’ (Snyder, 2004: 60).  This ability is essential 
to my thesis’ aim of isolating change and continuity in Indian security between the 
Congress-dominated regimes up to 1998 and the BJP-led NDA from 1998 to 2004.  
Furthermore, we can regard norms as micro processes within these mechanisms, which 
will help us to understand the causal mechanisms at play within identities and their 
incumbent interests and preferences.  Analytically, this ‘require(s) considerable 
sensitivity in historical analysis’ (Farrell, 2002: 57) to deconstruct this process, especially 
as learning will be unique and state-specific (Hopf, 1998: 195).  
 
2.3) - NORMS IN IR: FULCRUMS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
 
The issue of norms has received significant coverage in IR over the last fifteen years, 
resulting in a large body of empirical research that covers many diverse topics and 
issues.  These areas have included analysing non-intervention, women’s suffrage and the 
laws of war (see Herrman & Shannon, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), as well as 
human rights, the territorial integrity of the nation-state, and the dominance of the 
nation-state and its sovereignty (see Donnelly, 1999; Zacher, 2001; Jepperson et al., 
1996).  Other analysts have focused upon the proliferation of conventional weapons; 
chemical weapons taboos (see Eyre & Suchman, 1996; Price, 1997) or the Council of 
Europe; apartheid; and collective security (see Checkel, 1999; Klotz, 1995; Cortell & 
Davis, 1996).  Commonly, these studies have encompassed an emphasis on ‘historical 
particularity’ (Donnelly, 1999: 80) by focusing on specific time periods and 
circumstances, in order to reveal their precise ‘cultural (re. normative) context’ (Duffield 
et al., 1999: 174).   
 
Approaches to Norm Operationalisation and Norm Tracing 
 
Reflecting the variety of norm-based research, analysts have utilised several 
operationalisation strategies to measure normative change and continuity.  First, analysts 
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have detailed criteria for measuring norms themselves.  Legro (2000) highlights three 
central factors; how the norm is codified (specificity), how long it is in effect and how 
strong it has been versus challenges (durability) and how widely it has been accepted 
(concordance).   Other analysts have referred to a norm “tipping point” which then 
develops into a norm cascade dependent upon ‘legitimation, confirmation and esteem’ 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 902).  Relatedly, Zacher refers to the ‘three stages of norm 
development as emergence, acceptance and institutionalisation’ (2001: 236).  Building 
upon these approaches, Florini has carried out research concerning the prominence of a 
new norm in a “norm pool” and how well it fits with the general normative 
environment (1996: 374).  In turn, in their work on human rights, Risse and Sikkink list 
‘instrumental habits, material pressures, argumentation (and) persuasion’ (1999: 37) as 
the criteria for normative change.   
 
Looking at the sources of norms, Cortell and Davis focus upon “norm salience” by 
analysing national discourse, laws and policies to measure norm legitimacy and strength 
(2000: 72).  Axelrod (1986) investigates differing mechanisms for norm strengthening 
ranging from dominance, internalisation, social proof and deterrence to membership, 
laws and reputation.  Who promotes norms has also been a focus of analysis.  Thus, 
Cortell and Davis investigate various socialising forces, along with the role of scientists, 
experts, advocacy networks, non-government organizations (NGOs) and lobbyists in 
gaining acceptance of a norm.  These groups ‘fram(e) their ideas in ways that “resonate 
or fit with the larger belief systems” of the target states’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 83).  
Checkel builds on this point, when he notes that ‘researchers need to pay greater 
attention to the adopter’s “experience, norms, values and intentions” when studying 
diffusion’ (1999a: 86).  In turn, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to actors who help with 
norm diffusion as norm agents or norm entrepreneurs (1998: 895-6). 
 
Other useful approaches present within IR (although not directly concerning norms) 
deal with notions of continuity and change through the investigation of causal pathways.  
One such theoretical undertaking concerns process-tracing which, according to George, 
‘”traces the process - the intervening steps - by which beliefs influence behaviour”’ 
(quoted in Yee, 1996: 77; Haydu, 1998; Kennedy, 1988).  Connected to these ideas is 
path dependence, which rests upon assertions that ‘the relationship of new normative 
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claims to existing norms may also influence the likeliness of their influence’ (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 1998: 908; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000).  Many of these approaches rest 
within the field of historical institutionalism (Ertman, 1996; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 
1999).  In turn, there is also useful research on punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge, 1985) 
and critical junctures (Collier & Collier, 1991; Gaddis, 1992a: 39-40; Hogan, 2006), 
which highlights key shifts in state behaviour.  However, pinpointing when such shifts 
will occur has been especially problematic for scholars. 
 
The majority of the work cited above has looked at norms and their diffusion / 
normalisation from the international to the domestic sphere.  These works analyse 
system-level norms (such as human rights) to see how systemic influences have led to 
each norm’s acceptance or not on the domestic level.  Such analyses do not take 
sufficient account of domestic factors, ignoring ‘significant sub-systemic social 
understandings that can contradict and overwhelm international prescriptions’ (Legro, 
1997: 32).  In contrast, this thesis concerns continuity and change, and looks at norm 
diffusion in terms of (national) security and the identity (the collective normative 
underpinnings) that regulate it.  Therefore, this research includes internal sources of 
foreign policy, in order to determine what is normative in India’s international relations.  
As such, I analyse security norms in a state-specific (Indian) context (Jepperson et al., 
1996).   
 
2.4) - THE NORMATIVE ROOTS OF (INDIAN) SECURITY: 
 
The overarching focus of this research is ‘a concern with explaining the evolution and 
impact of norms on national and international security’ (Farrell, 2002: 72).  Security is 
based upon normative understandings surrounding state behaviour, which evolve as a 
state experiences more international interaction.  My approach to norm 
operationalisation consists of three core elements –  
 
1) isolating and measuring the norms inherent to India’s security identity;  
2) integrating these norms into an analytical framework that reflects the different 
parameters integral to India’s security practice; and  
 26 
3) establishing the various sources (what and who) of the norms present in the 
Indian context.   
 
These elements are integral to norm-based research because ‘conceptual precision is 
essential for both meaningful theoretical debate and defensible empirical work’ 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891).  Overall, this approach enables the analysis of ‘which 
norms matter, why and how’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 236). 
 
Isolating and Measuring Norms 
 
An analysis concerned with tracing norm continuity and change within India’s security 
identity requires effective indicators to isolate and measure these norms.  These 
indicators must reflect how the norms develop, become solidified and are then 
engrained through India’s international interaction and acquired experience.  Essential 
to these understandings is that norms must be considered, as Dore notes, as ‘”flexible 
rigidities”’ (quoted in Katzenstein, 1996: 3).  Norms represent continuous entrenched 
variables which are simultaneously open to change versus competing norms and new 
interactions.  In terms of security, such a view recognises that ‘identities are a congealed 
reputation’ (Hopf, 1998: 190).  Acknowledging the influence of other analysts who 
have measured norms (in particular Legro, 2000), this research will focus upon three 
major indicators - event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance - as 
detailed in Table 2.1 below. 
 
   
EVENT TYPE: EVENT FREQUENCY: EVENT HARMONY / DISSONANCE: 
   
- characteristics of 
an event, action 
or interaction 
- how often an event 
type occurs 
- how complementary an event type 
is with other existing norms 
   
 
Table 2.1: Three Major Indicators for Norm Measurement 
 
We can see the BJP’s (and earlier Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s (BJS’s)) policy towards the 
development of nuclear weapons as showing these three indicators.  Thus, in 1962 the 
BJS first called for the development of nuclear weapons, and this call became a part of 
their manifesto promises for the next 36 years.  Not only did the action have particular 
specific characteristics (event type) but it then became repeated and regularized 
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(indicating high event frequency) and reflected other BJS / BJP aims such as making 
India militarily strong and improving her position in the world (thus showing harmony 
with other existing norms).  In turn, repeated conflict with Pakistan from independence 
onwards also became normalized within India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 in 
the same fashion.  Thus, the same event type (war with Pakistan) became a regular 
(highly frequent) occurrence that reflected (and harmonized with) common beliefs of 
Pakistan as an enemy that threatened Indian sovereignty and territoriality.  In both 
cases, note how only with high frequency and repetition does an event type become a 
norm. 
 
These key indicators are not only of use in structuring historically-contingent and inter-
generational understandings of BJS / BJP security beliefs (Chapter 5) and those of 
India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4) but are also useful as a way to 
understand similarities and differences between their two positions.  Of particular 
importance here is the third indicator - event harmony / dissonance - as a way of tracing 
potential and actual differences between the two perspectives pre-1998 and from 1998 
to 2004 during the BJP-led NDA government.  Thus for example, we will be able to 
analyze potential harmony or dissonance between the BJP’s position towards Pakistan, 
China and the US, and that of India’s security identity.  This approach will therefore 
allow us to analyze the strength of India’s security identity as a constraint on the BJP’s 
security policy while in office.  Overall, these examples indicate how ‘norms become 
relevant and causally consequential during the process by which actors define and refine 
their collective identities and interests’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9).  Furthermore, while 
not traditionally comparative in terms of a state-state analysis, this thesis is comparative 
in terms of comparing the various foreign policy norms of different Indian governments 
and political parties across time.   
 
Three Normative Sources of Security 
 
This thesis is interested in the multiple norms structuring India’s security practice as 
determined by both her domestic nature and her international interaction with other 
states.  As many of these norms relate to similar issues (the nature of Indian democracy, 
threats to Indian sovereignty or Indian self-conceptions of her place in the world), it is 
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worthwhile providing a structure within which to place groupings of composite norms.  
Security is therefore considered to consist of three composite sources –  
 
a) a political source - the principles and foundations of a state’s political makeup;  
b) a physical source - the sovereign and territorial basis of the state; and  
c) a perceptual source - how the state regards itself and how it regards others.   
 
The basic attributes of each normative source can be seen in Table 2.2 below. 
 
   
A) POLITICAL B) PHYSICAL C) PERCEPTUAL 
   
- political system 
- elite beliefs 
- territorial nature 
- global geographic position  
- defining national texts 
- national symbols 
   
 
Table 2.2: Three Normative Sources of Security and their Basic Attributes 
(adapted from Lantis, 2006) 
 
Taken together, these sources enable a holistic understanding of security in a state-
specific context and produce a basic security profile that can be completed for any state.  
These sources can therefore be regarded as “established guiding characteristics” that 
historically structure a state’s security practice.  Alternatively they can be viewed as a 
state’s ‘national proclivities’ (Basrur, 2001: 183).  In addition, it is the key understandings 
regarding norms (as outlined above) that provide the makeup of these characteristics - 
for example, how long a particular political system has been in place, the competing 
elements within that system and importantly, the relationship of these factors to other 
states.  In turn, the three sources are the independent variables that impact upon the 
dependent variable of security identity.  The basic, generalisable attributes of these three 
normative sources of security are defined in Table 2.3 below (note that these attributes 









! type of political system and how that system is organized –  
- political basis (democratic, autocratic, militaristic, communist, 
monarchical) 
- style (liberal, conservative, authoritarian, totalitarian) 
! elite beliefs concerning the –  
- organization (and size) of the economy (capitalist, socialist, 
free market, command) and the military (independent, 
civilian controlled, ruling) 
- social ordering of society (hierarchical, ethnic, religious) 
 
PHYSICAL: 
! territorial nature of a state –  
- physical area  
- topography, nature of borders (mountains, rivers, sea), 
climate 
! global geographic position –  
- number and size of neighbours, continental placement, sea 
access, colonial possessions, embassies 
 
PERCEPTUAL: 
! defining national texts concerning –  
- self-image (status quo, balancer, hegemon, presence / absence 
of grand strategy) 
- desired position (regionally, globally) 
! national symbols –  
- recording interaction (history, memory, myth) 




Table 2.3: Three Normative Sources of Security and their Detailed Attributes 
 
Collectively these three sources can be regarded as expanding circles of influence 
(Interview A3, 2008)3, radiating outwards from a state into the international system.  By 
breaking down the separation between the international system and the domestic 
sphere, and by seeing them in relational terms, a specific exploration of which norms 
explain which policies becomes possible.  Additionally, the three normative sources 
provide a structure by which to study multiple norms concurrently, enabling the 
pinpointing of norm transformation and evolution, which ‘are the main vehicles for 
system transformation … norms shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the 
balance of power are to the realist’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895).  Such an analysis 
will simultaneously and clearly indicate how both foreign and domestic politics 
                                                
3 Interview with former think-tank head and former member of the National Security Advisory Board 
(NSAB), Delhi, April 30 2008.   
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contribute to national security, and the inter-relationship between the two.  The basic 
attributes of India’s three normative sources of security will be outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
Establishing the Empirical Loci of (Indian) Security 
 
Apart from recording norms and collectively structuring them, empirical sources of 
security in terms of who shapes the security policy and practice of a state must be 
isolated.  This research aims to attain Hopf’s goal of ‘a need for greater attention to how 
discourse, identity and social practice … (in order to) provide an additional source of 
empirical evidence for the operation of norms themselves’ (2002: 283).  Norms can 
therefore be regarded as shared, common beliefs, which are communicated and 
entrenched through discourse.  This approach reflects how ‘constructivists emphasize 
that ideas and communicative processes … (aid the) understanding of interests, 
preferences and political ideas’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 7).  Furthermore, the emphasis 
on norms and their delineation are self-serving to the researcher because ‘norms prompt 
justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that 
we can study’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 892). 
 
Three empirical loci of security have been identified.  First, there is the political-
rhetorical locus, analyzing the discursive and language practices as security norms were made.  
Second, there is the temporal-historical locus, focusing on the role of history, precedent 
and memory in recording security norms.  Third, there is the reflexive-individual locus 
investigating the individuals who make/made, shape/shaped a state’s security practice 
and their reflective attitudes and beliefs towards security norms.  The specific empirical sources 
of each locus are detailed in Table 2.4 below. 
 







   
- policy documents 
- speeches / manifestoes 
 - secondary literature 
 - biographies 
 - interviews 
 - autobiographies 
   
 
Table 2.4: Empirical Loci of Security and their Specific Sources 
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These three loci build three axes of analysis; structural, behavioural and evolutionary.  
Furthermore, this approach uncovers the social mechanisms and constitutive social 
rules that make Indian security practice, as ‘social facts depend, by way of collective 
understanding and discourse, on the attachment of collective knowledge to physical 
reality’ (Adler, 2002: 100).  Overall, the use of multiple loci also allows for triangulation 
strategies to be employed in this research, for example, between a party speech, how it is 
recorded in a biography and what the individuals connected with it then say about it. 
 
Loci I: Political-Rhetorical – The Making of Security Norms 
 
Analyzing various speeches, policy documents and manifestoes enables the investigation 
of discursive and language practices that were formulated as security norms were made.  
Discourse is critical to tracing this process as it precedes and accompanies change, 
whilst serving as evidence for the rationale behind any change.  Therefore, ‘one reason 
language is so important to constructivist analysis is that speech binds together is and 
ought’ (Kowert, 2001: 279).  Language constructs and describes reality, and thus serves as 
‘the medium for the construction of intersubjective meanings’ (Adler, 2002: 103).  An 
emphasis on language and discourse is also critical concerning ‘the contestation of a 
norm … (and) the social construction of the meanings of the discursive instruments 
being used in these struggles’ (Hopf, 2002: 279).  Such an emphasis will be essential for 
comparing BJP security beliefs (Chapter 5) with those from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4) in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
 
In these ways, ‘political rhetoric - or persuasive discourse - is a mechanism for 
generating collective understandings’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 76).  Processes of 
repetition and reiteration act as reinforcing strategies and reiterate the key indicators 
(event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance) highlighted above.  
Language is open to manipulation but can also be constraining, acting as both a 
recorded repository and as precedent creating.  Therefore ‘when a norm is salient in a 
particular social discourse, its invocation by relevant actors legitimates a particular 
behaviour or action, creating a prima facie obligation’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 69).  This 
sense of obligation is important in this thesis when tracing the development and 
solidification of certain political beliefs and accompanying policies.  In order to analyze 
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the political-rhetorical locus in the Indian context, I mainly utilize speeches, policy 
documents and election manifestoes from the BJS and BJP, as well as those from 
Congress and other Indian political parties.  I also make use of speeches, policy 
documents and other papers available from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
concerning the actions of all governments who have held power in India.   
 
Loci II: Temporal-Historical – The Recording of Security Norms 
 
The second locus (the temporal-historical) focuses on the role of history, precedent and 
memory in recording security norms.  This locus rests upon assertions that time impacts 
upon behaviour and ‘influenc(es) what happens, even as it provides the chronological 
framework we use to make sense of what has happened’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 38).  Part of 
this process is that of iteration which strengthens norms and, which ‘stresses the passage 
of time and continuity in the environment; … the longer a norm goes unchallenged, the 
more it tends to “solidify”’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 472).  Again, this path to 
reinforcement reiterates the rate and frequency with which a norm is repeated and 
regularized.  In relation to constructivism, this empirical emphasis underlines ‘the 
importance of historical clusters, myths, memories, values and symbols for cultural 
community formation’ (Smith, 1996: 12).   
 
By providing a chronological structure, we are able to monitor norm emergence, 
development and solidification.  Temporal influences thus not only provide analyses 
with notions of ongoing continuity but also indications of change, again reflecting the 
“flexible rigidities” central to norms.  Critically, this is ‘a form of “process-tracing” 
whereby the development of the interpretative frames employed by actors is recounted 
in a historical fashion’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 67).  In this sense, analyzing how India’s 
international interaction has been recalled, tempered and constituted, allows for the 
validation of the constructivist’s concern with achieving ‘the social construction of 
subjectivity’ (Wendt, 1992: 393).  The empirical foundation of this second locus is based 
upon pre-existing secondary literature on all facets of Indian security.  Of particular use 
are those texts and biographies that have analyzing the security practice of different 
Indian Prime Ministers (for example see Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990; Panda, 2003; 
Shivam, 2001).   
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Loci III: Reflexive-Individual – Reflecting on Security Norms 
 
The third locus rest upon investigating the individuals who make/made, shape/shaped a 
state’s security practices, and their reflective attitudes and beliefs towards security norms.  These 
individuals are primarily the senior leaders of nationally recognized political parties 
(both in government and in opposition), as well as senior bureaucratic officials from 
within a state’s civil and diplomatic services.  Other shapers include members of leading 
national universities, the heads and staff of think tanks, journalists, ex-members of a 
state’s bureaucracy and armed services (army, navy and air force), as well as political 
party ideologues and supporters.  These latter individuals collectively form a state’s 
security community, transcend different political generations and represent 
compounded knowledge as per a state’s security practice.  Such a research focus 
acknowledges how decision makers ‘cannot disregard the cultural values and traditions 
of their society, especially those transmitted through successive generations’ (Jha, 2002: 
41).  These actors also act as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895-6) 
and norm transmitters.   
 
Security making in the Indian context is based upon a Prime Minister-centric and 
cabinet-dominated system that need not necessarily consult the Indian parliament (for 
an overview of India’s decision-making apparatus see Cohen, 2002: 66-83).  In practice, 
a small group centered on the Prime Minister, the External Affairs Minister, the Home 
Minister and the Finance Minister are the principal foreign policy-makers.  From 1998, 
this group included the National Security Advisor, a position first introduced by the 
BJP-led NDA.  In turn, there is India’s foreign policy and security bureaucracy, which 
includes the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) who staff the MEA and the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) who staff the Ministry of Defence (MoD).  To these 
groupings can be added India’s external intelligence agency - the Research and Analysis 
Wing (R&AW), and its internal intelligence agency - the Intelligence Bureau (IB), both 
of which report directly to the Prime Minister.  India’s own security community is also a 
key (and growing) dynamic in influencing public debates on security and foreign policy.  
Collectively analyzing these individuals’ beliefs shows how, for one of India’s leading 
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strategic thinkers, ‘the security management of India can be studied’ (Interview A7, 
2008)4. 
 
It is however important to recognize that the normative beliefs of those actors making 
up India’s (and any other state’s) security community will be to a degree, necessarily 
different.  This statement is most readily appreciated concerning the different 
viewpoints of Congress and BJP officials concerning how they view the world (and thus 
conceive of foreign policy) but also applies to any groups or individuals associated with 
them.  Thus, certain academics, think-tank heads, journalists, bureaucrats and so on, will 
argue for particular political viewpoints over others.  This affiliation creates inter-group 
biases towards certain policies and underscores how political leaders will be prone to 
emphasise those opinions that converge with their own and dismiss those that diverge.  
What becomes important is ‘the relation of incoming bits of information to the 
receivers’ already established images’ (Jervis, 1969, 457).  For our analysis, we must be 
aware of different (and shared) cognitive mindsets concerning (Indian) foreign policy.  
Collectively, these mindsets create an implicit hierarchy of interests and biases within a 
security community, which is then stratified from differing political perspectives. 
 
Accessing the discourse presented by these individuals rested upon extensive 
interviewing, as well as analyzing the autobiographies of key actors within and without 
of Indian security (for example see Nehru, 1994; Singh, 1999a; Talbott, 2004).  In 
particular, the research benefited from meetings with Indian politicians, ex-officials 
from across India’s foreign policy and security bureaucracy (especially MEA diplomats 
active at the time of the BJP-led NDA), and retired heads from all three of India’s 
armed services.  I also met former and current heads of India’s leading think tanks, 
academics, and journalists.  I especially benefited from access to former and current 
members of the BJP’s Foreign Policy Cell who help inform the party’s foreign policy 
orientation.  A list of individuals met, where and when can be found in the Primary 
Sources section of the Bibliography.  In the interests of anonymity and confidentiality, 
this list and any references to the individuals on it has been coded.  Overall, this 
empirical locus recognizes that ‘foreign policy is a form of social action … a foreign 
minister is part of the social milieu in which he operates and he cannot disregard the 
                                                
4 Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008. 
 35 
basic values held in his society’ (Appadorai, 1981: 11).  Further details of my 




A norm-based and identity-driven account can be employed to produce a viable 
alternative research path with which to analyse a state’s (India’s) security practice.  While 
recognizing the influence of classical realism, its emphasis on ideational factors and 
composite norms primarily takes place within constructivist debates.  This approach is 
appropriate for an analysis of competing identities and ideologies (the norms 
underpinning India’s security identity and those of the BJP), and also allows for a focus 
on both international and domestic factors.  This chapter has hoped to show that norms 
can be operationalised effectively in order to structure three normative sources of 
security (political, physical and perceptual).  Additionally, using norms will help us to 
investigate internal sources of foreign policy and their influence on security practice, and 
will also link domestic norms to international politics (rather than vice versa).  A norm-
based approach thus emphasizes the domestic in constructivist accounts and reverses its 
dominant international to domestic emphasis (Hopf, 2002: xiv; Koslowski & 
Kratochwil, 1994: 216).   
 
This norm-based approach forms my distinct analytical framework with which to study 
India’s security identity.  By recognizing and recording both continuity and change, an 
analysis of norms will allow us to compare (differing) security practices between the 
BJP-led NDA government of 1998 to 2004 and its Congress-dominated forebears.  
Using this framework will also underline how there are multiple, composite and 
competing norms present within a state’s security practice.  Finally, it will stress the 
primacy of ideational over material factors in the analysis of (Indian) security, and how 
history and interaction is integral to their formation.  The next chapter will continue to 
utilize the norm-based approach in order to define notions of “security identity” (in 
relation to India) through a synthesis of identity construction and the three normative 
security sources.  It also sets out the operationalisation strategy and analytical framework 
with which to trace the presence of multiple norms across political generations and any 




‘Identity Meets Security: Defining (Indian) Security Identity’ 
 
‘the basic objectives of any country 
have been shaped by their physical situation’ 
(Interview B25, 2008)5 
 
‘”ultimately what we really are 
matters more than what other people think of us”’ 
(Nehru quoted in Sen, 1964: 146) 
 
 ‘securing and strengthening this twin India, 
one representing its body, the other its soul … should constitute  
(the) fundamental doctrine of our national security’ 
(Advani, 2005: 5) 
 
How can multiple norms be analysed simultaneously across history and different 
ideologies?  What are the key attributes of an ideational security approach?  Here, I 
present a norm-based and identity-driven analytical framework (security identity) that 
produces an evolutionary analysis of (Indian) security.  Security identity collectively 
utilises three normative sources of security to represent the established guiding 
characteristics or the independent variables inherent to a state’s security behaviour.  
Integral to the framework is an acknowledgment from social psychology of the 
importance of self/other perceptions in international relations.  Fundamentally, I argue 
that it is at the “/” between self and other that security is produced through the 
interaction between the domestic and the international.  Overall, such an analytical 
focus, ‘conceiv(es) of the state in relational terms … investigat(es) the domestic sources 
of foreign policy (and) focuses attention on the degree to which the identities of actors 
are constructed by state-society relations’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 56).  
 
                                                
5 Interview with a senior ex-MEA official and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008.  Please refer 
to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
 37 
A Preliminary Definition of Security Identity 
 
Defined as the symbiosis of identity construction and security, security identity 
transmits composite norms pertinent to the security policy and outlook of a state.  
These norms represent the tacit consensual reference points concerning appropriate 
security policy, which exist across political parties, strategic and analytical communities, 
academic environments and mass media.  Over time, this consensus indicates the 
ongoing, habitual forms of behaviour, understanding and inference that structure a 
state’s attitudes and responses to its security.  Any security identity is reiterated and 
entrenched with the passage of time, whereby continued interaction feeds back into this 
topography and serves to hone and redefine its normative content.  Security identity acts 
‘as an attitudinal and behavioural transmission belt’ (Macmillan et al., 1999: 15), 
constraining actors’ agency.  As an analytical construct, security identity therefore gives 
ideational rather than structural explanations of security choices, mechanisms and 
environments.  Furthermore, rather than being overly deterministic, security identity is 
instead indicatory - indicating when, where and by whom foreign policy has been 
developed. 
 
Security identity uses methods of identity construction as a way to conceptualise the 
construction of composite norms into three normative sources of security (or 
“established guiding characteristics”).  These normative sources encompass political, 
physical and perceptual parameters of security, and include both domestic and foreign 
influences on security behaviour.  As an analysis of security carried out over time, security 
identity allows the simultaneous ‘reinterpretation of past events, current conditions and 
future goals’ (Berger, 1996: 317), in order to trace the basis of a security interest or 
threat.  Such insights are driven by seeing ongoing identity construction as a form of 
learning and by seeing security as being in constant development rather than based upon 
fixed assumptions.  This analysis recognises how ‘structures of constructed meaning, 
embodied in norms or identities, affect what states do’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 66).  
Security identity’s analytical approach helps to determine if security is driven by state-
specific identity-derived norms built up through historical interaction and transferred 
across political generations.  
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Concerning the study of Indian security, security identity provides fresh insights into the 
foundations, characteristics and guiding principles that structure the state’s security 
consensus.  It also specifically allows for the study of continuity and change between 
governments led by different political parties (Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP)) and across different political eras and leaderships.  This thesis’ starting 
investigative point is that ‘elites socialized in different cultural contexts may behave in 
different ways and make different choices, even when placed in similar situations’ 
(Latham, 1999).  Reflecting these concerns, in subsequent chapters I will outline the 
development of key norms in India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4), 
then investigate the norms underpinning BJP foreign policy ideology during the same 
period (Chapter 5), before comparing these two sets of norms within the context of the 
BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1998 to 2004 
(Chapters 6, 7 and 8).  In addition, combining identity building with security studies 
attempts to achieve theoretical pluralism as advocated by several International Relations 
(IR) theorists (Alker & Biersteker, 1984: 123; Wendt, 1999: 33), while successfully 
acknowledging domestic sources of (international) security (Cohen, 2002: 4). 
 
3.1) - CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: 
 
Social psychology informs work on the formation of norms, as well as their role in the 
construction of identity.  Of particular use are conceptions of norms and practices as 
collectively structuring and determining an identity’s constituent principles.  These 
conceptions are important when applied to constructivist accounts where ‘the state is a 
social actor’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 23) embedded within interaction and learning.  
Here, identity can be defined as ‘the lens of a long-standing self-image and a set of 
established behavioural principles’ (Legro, 2009: 51).  Social psychology also offers 
other insights concerning differentiation between identities, as encapsulated by notions 
of self/other.  These insights can help us to understand (security) identity formation as 
situated in the contested space between the self and the other, and between India and 
other states.  Taken together, these concepts indicate how social psychology can help 
explain the interaction between states concerning security policy ‘as a complex, dynamic 
concept’ (Hudson & Sampson, 1999: 667).  Overall, using these approaches ‘yield(s) an 
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account of national identity that explains changing interest and foreign policy behaviour’ 
(Kowert, 1998: 101). 
 
Socializing Forces: Interaction and History 
 
Norms are the core components of identities and specify the practices associated with 
that identity, not only through their recording of interaction and experience but also 
their indication of interests.  Importantly, without the dynamism of interaction, 
identities and their composite norms would not form because of the lack of an 
evaluative or comparative process, and as such they cannot be considered as a natural, 
genetic or an a priori given (Ozkirimli, 2000).  It is interaction that leads to the formation 
of norms, encouraging ‘certain dispositions and orientations whilst opposing and 
delegitimising others, a process that is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally 
hegemonic in its consequences’ (Campbell, 1992: 10).  Continued interaction and 
normative entrenchment, as fulfilled through the key indicators highlighted in Table 2.1 
(event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance), further serve as 
guidance devices that simplify choices and impart ‘“rationality”’ (Kratochwil, 1989: 10).   
 
Consequently, norms are collective meanings which organise actions and behaviour 
between states through an ‘intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and 
interests’ (Weber, 2004: 64).  These collective meanings in turn constitute social 
knowledge that establishes rules and practice for interactions between identities.  State 
identities and interests are thus compound entities, ‘socially constructed by 
knowledgeable practice’ (Wendt, 1992: 392).  As socially conceived conceptions of the 
world, norms are also dynamic and malleable - formed and reformed through continued 
interaction.  By being part of an ongoing synthesis, norms, practices and identities 
become reference points for each other, as ‘encounters are informed by prior 
constructions of identity which in turn are reconstituted in and through the encounter’ 
(Shearman, 2000: 112).  This process is reinforced by notions of “modulation” which 
assert that there are ‘replicable narratives or scripts that govern our actions and enable 
us to find our way in the world’ (Chambers, 2002).  Security identity is such a replicable 
narrative that directs state security policy and interaction.    
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History traces interaction and is the process by which both interaction and experience 
are recorded and recollected.  Formative interaction shapes international history, 
providing the defining inference points of what states are, whilst acting as a potential 
projector of future behaviour.  For example, India’s conception of being historically 
coveted by other nations has been consistently equilibrated with its sustained sense of 
being a great power (Alagappa, 1998).  Reflection and the formation of longstanding 
attitudes are also part of such a process, leading into a history that is ‘built not merely of 
events but of varying perceptions of them’ (Gong, 2001: 3).  Thus, history (and its 
recollection) is the kinetic force behind norm continuity and change.  Collectively, this 
approach emphasises how ‘history is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state 
identity’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 23), and thus on security policy.  By recording shared 
meanings, values and dispositions, history-contingent models of identity produce 
predictable ‘propensities of thought, reaction and action’ (Hudson, 1997: 18).   
 
Importantly, history is not a collection of facts but a collection of interpretations 
whereby meaning and importance are attached to events.  As such, history can often be 
regarded, as Hill sees it, as a ‘”conscious effort to place actions of the past into a 
coherent explanation of use to the present”’ (quoted in Gong, 2001: xii).  Thus, BJP 
policy in the 1950s concerning Pakistan rested upon conceptions of Muslims as 
disruptive fifth columnists intent on vivisecting India, views which stemming from 
centuries-old Muslim invasions of India coupled with Partition in 1947.  During the 
same period, Congress policy towards Pakistan and Muslims rested upon entirely 
different parameters - instead arguing for an inclusive Indian respectful of all religions.  
As an adjunct to history, memory - that is how events are (selectively) remembered - ‘is 
plural and … elastic’ (Pye, 2001: 118) and can be recalled in different ways.  In this 
sense, history and its interpretation can be regarded as a distilled stimulus on identity-
driven accounts of security.   
 
Learning is also part of this process, making norms both resilient to change and 
restraining identities from wholesale alteration (Eckstein, 1998; Hudson, 1997).  Thus in 
the context of security, ‘through the negotiation and adoption of a series of policies and 
precedents, an identity can be created that exerts a presence of its own’ (Oros, 2008: 29), 
delineating a certain modus operandi.  By being within an ongoing historical process, 
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(security) identities and their composite norms are within a continual learning cycle, as 
new interactions legitimate and de-legitimate past experiences.  Thus, as Sandholtz 
remarks, ‘norm change occurs in cycles that are linked, forward and backward, in a 
longer historical dynamic … earlier cycles provide the normative context, and a set of 
precedents, for current disputes.  The outcomes of today’s disputes help to shape the 
context, and the pool of precedents, for later cycles’ (2008: 103).  It is through this 
“feedback” that security identities effectively learn and, through this learning, gradually 
evolve.  Decision-makers drive this learning by facilitating security policy and action, 
and by ‘examin(ing) precedents and establish(ing) analogies with current situations’ 
(Sandholtz, 2008: 107).   
 
The Self/Other Nexus: Capturing Inherent Differentiation 
 
Inherent to social psychology are concepts of self/other that encapsulate differentiation 
between identities in order to show the influence on actors of actual (or imagined) 
others (Allport, 1954).  The Sherifs (1953) used these ideas in their “minimal group 
paradigm” to shows how groups will be in conflict when given an interdependent but 
competing goal, but will be harmonious when cooperating together.  Other scholars 
have noted how individual perceptions fall into line with ‘the state of relations between 
the two groups’ (Wetherell, 1996: 204).  Thus, individuals will enhance the in-group and 
devalue the out-group (Tajfel, 1978).  Often such differentiation stems from a desire to 
aid future recollection and easier social labelling, with this cognitive simplicity resulting 
in the creation of stereotypes (Hawstone & Greenland, 2000).  This research contends 
that it is as a result of the interaction amid the contested space between self and the 
other - at the “/” - that both conflict and cooperation, and therefore security, occur. 
 
Self/other reveals where and how identities diverge whilst offering explanations for this 
process.  An appreciation of the core sentiments of self/other can thus help us to 
conceptualise and pinpoint patterns of differentiation whilst underlining how 
perceptions are built, shaped and remembered.  Several analysts have used these 
understandings within IR research to look at national and international images, belief 
systems and misperception (Boulding, 1956, 1959; Holsti, 1962; Jervis, 1969).  As 
already noted, the self/other dichotomy in this analysis concerning India’s security 
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practice comes from different political norms (Congress versus BJP) but is also 
substantiated by corresponding views within India’s wider security community.  This 
process is affirmatory as ‘decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their 
existing theories and images’ (Jervis, 1969: 455).  It also helps to indicate how once 
opinions diverge, they can be reinforced by similar and supporting viewpoints, adding 
legitimacy to one’s self-image and worldview.  Within IR theory, these perspectives are 
exemplified by the security dilemma and (misperception-led) spiral dynamics, whereby 
differing beliefs are inherently fixated and then over-emphasised (Boulding, 1959). 
 
The importance of self/other to a norm-based account of security is stated by Wendt, 
who notes that it is ‘the medium by which they [state actors] determine who they are, 
what they want and how they should behave’ (1999: 332).  Furthermore, the logic of 
identity requires the ascription of boundaries that enable comparison and difference, 
meaning that no definition of the self can be asserted ‘without suppositions about the 
other’ (Campbell, 1992: 70).  Quintessentially, according to Peterson, this definition is 
exclusionary and adversarial; ‘“us versus them, insiders versus outsiders, citizens versus 
foreigners”’ (quoted in Zalewski & Enloe, 2002: 287).  Applied to this study and the 
notion of security identity, this dichotomy translates into divergent Congress-dominated 
and BJP norms concerning the conduct of Indian foreign policy. 
 
On a more micro-level, self/other also recognizes the presence of divergent worldviews 
within groupings – for example hard versus soft Hindutva worldviews in the BJP (broadly 
LK Advani versus Atal Vajpayee) or secularism versus Hinduism in Congress (for 
Nehru and Gandhi respectively).  It also shows the importance of politicians who 
switched political affiliations (such as KC Pant and the realist Arun Singh (to advise 
Jaswant Singh) who both moved from Congress to the BJP) or were former diplomats 
(such as Brajesh Mishra who was National Security Advisor during the BJP-led NDA).  
The latter two examples are useful for explaining possible policy overlaps and norm 
commonalities between the two parties.  In turn, the former example indicates how 
worldviews within parties are at times hierarchical and often dependent upon the wider 
context.  Thus, hard Hindutva views were predominant around the time of the Ahodhya 
demolition in 1992 and the BJP’s domestic political rise but were de-emphasised prior 
to the NDA when the BJP needed to secure domestic coalition partners. 
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In this research, I apply the notion of self/other to the three normative sources of 
security as expounded in Chapter 2.  While this application is most obvious with the 
perceptual source (splitting it into self and other), it also splits the political (into 
domestic and international) and the physical (into internal and external) sources.  The 
splitting of the three sources of security can be seen in Figure 3.1 below.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Splitting the Three Sources of Security 
 
This splitting further highlights a relational quality within each source, while pinpointing 
the location of security at the “/” between political systems, territorial borders and 
inter-perceptions.  This pinpointing allows for ‘the construction of various mutually 
reinforcing dichotomies’ (Campbell, 1992: 65) that stratify distinctions between actors 
and their related security interests.  Security is also dependent upon how states read the 
internal self-images of other states (Nau, 2003: 220), ideas salient to the formation of 
threat perceptions.  At the same time, comparison investigates similarities and in the 
absence of conflict can lead to cooperation and inter-dependence via mutual 
identification, a process just as open to becoming normalised.  Evidence of shared 
normative beliefs between different identities is emblematic of such mutuality. 
 
Both self/other and norm-based constructions of identity can be applied to national 
(security) identities, as ‘states are themselves institutions whose existence and 
characteristics are dependent on the reproduction of particular sets of practices’ 
(Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 223).  Security policy is one such set of practices, and 
collectively one such identity, present within a state.  “Security identity” therefore 
encapsulates the norms critical to the practice of security in a state’s given geo-political, 















the state is seen as ‘a social formation embedded in a particular set of historical social 
relations, rather than as something outside time’ (Hobden, 1998: 187).  This reasoning is 
readily applicable to the emergence of modern India and Pakistan in 1947, which came 
about as a result of British rule ending in the subcontinent.  Equally too, modern India 
has been variously portrayed as being “discovered” or as an “idea” (see respectively 
Nehru, 1994; Khilnani, 1997).  
 
These perspectives on identity in relation to security also draw upon arguments 
concerning national identity as being a source of legitimacy and demarcation for states.  
This differentiation is certainly the case between states and the international system 
(Alagappa, 1998: 36).  It also relates to the importance of nationalism for group and 
state self-definition, particularly when viewed as ‘a psychological sense of belonging to a 
single community and of shared experiences’ (Shearman, 2000: 83).  These ideas are 
pertinent not only for the perceptual sources of India’s security identity concerned with 
non-alignment and great power status (among others) but also for comparing the 
security policies of the BJP with those of the Congress-dominated regimes up to 1998.  
Anderson’s conception of “imagined communities”, whereby national identity 
represents ‘the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of discrete historical 
forces … to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and 
ideological constellations’ (1991: 4), further backs up considering security identity as 
something historically distinct yet ongoing and flexible.    
 
3.2) - ANALYZING SECURITY: 
 
How do norm-based identity frameworks and the self/other nexus relate to the study of 
security?  Building upon social psychological concepts concerning identity formation, 
here these ideas are located into the analysis of international security.  First, I look at 
traditional approaches used for the examination of security policy and the influence of 
contemporary events upon these modes of analysis.  Then, I review identity-based 
frameworks of analysis (in particular those driven by threat perception and strategic 
culture), in order to further draw out the comparative strength of the security identity 
approach.  Overall, I will affirm the analytical validity of using the concept of security 
identity to trace a state’s ‘set of discursive practices that are historically emergent and 
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orientated towards the creation and maintenance of boundaries, borders and 
distinctions between self and other’ (Chambers, 2002: 4).  
 
Traditional Approaches and the Background to Change 
 
IR theory has been inherently based upon material and structural concepts of the state - 
predominantly realism and liberalism.  To broadly reiterate, realist thought became 
based upon power projection dictated by the strength of a state in an international 
system where anarchy is the prevailing condition, with balance or hegemony the only 
guarantees of stability.  In turn, liberalism, centring on economic losses and gains, 
became based upon mutual co-operation for mutual benefit but still came down to the 
power of each state in competition with each other.  These concepts of inter-state 
competition became the framework for IR theory, reflecting conflict as the historically 
predominant factor in international relations.  This preoccupation continued during the 
Cold War with low intensity proxy wars between the two superpowers and the doctrine 
of mutually assured destruction (MAD).  During this period, ‘bipolar rivalry dwarfed … 
the domestic idiosyncrasies of nations’ (Hudson, 1997: 1) along with ideational 
influences.  
 
For these reasons, and as Patomaki states, ‘”there has been … a tendency to reduce all 
problems of IR to an almost eternal dispute between political realism and liberalism”’ 
(quoted in Barkawi & Laffey, 2001: 118).  Security theory itself has also been largely 
systemic in nature (Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998), visualising a 
world based upon unitary states and their place in the international system.  This vision 
is true of the mental and linguistic conceptualisation of world regions, such as Southeast 
Asia and Northeast Asia, as well as East versus West, and North and South, along with 
multilateral bodies that often bear only an abstract resemblance to what they are 
representing - such as the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (Hemmer & 
Katzenstein, 2002)6.  Overall, this splitting and demarcating embodies the physical and 
mental distinction of regions and people, us and them, self and others to which 
traditional notions of security theory ultimately pertain.   
                                                
6 SEATO member countries were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Republic of 




Such was IR theorists’ preoccupation with realism and liberalism, and despite the work 
of Kennan (1947), it was only in the 1970’s that analysts, such as Snyder (1977), began 
to collectively suggest that different countries could have different strategic approaches.  
This difference rested upon seeing culture as ‘a semi-permanent influence on policy 
shaped by elites and socialized into distinctive modes of thought’ (Lantis, 2006: 7). 
Analysts had also begun looking at ideational influences on security from operational 
codes (George, 1980) to analysing political leadership (Hermann, 1977) and decision-
making (Allison, 1971).  This insertion of identity as a causal, subjective factor behind 
state actions and behaviour ran inimical to general realist assumptions that all states 
have a prior, fixed and preordained identity, seemingly alike in each state.  Such ideas 
formed the basis for constructivism that emphasised social identities made up of norms 
and practice defined by history, and which in turn determined state identity, interests 
and behaviour (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992, 1999).  From this basis, analysts produced 
several state-specific studies of identity continuity and change (Barnett, 1998; Campbell, 
1992; Johnston, 1995; Hopf, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Nau, 2002). 
 
For many scholars, the end of the Cold War marked the triumph of the liberalised 
Western system and solidified IR theory as revolving around the Westphalian-delineated 
logic of the nation-state.  The emergence of an apparently US-dominated unipolar 
international system saw a growth in multilateralism and regionalism, emphasising ideas 
of common interests and agendas.  In turn, the role of ideas was apparent in the ending 
of the Cold War as democracy appeared to surmount communism.  These formations 
were bolstered by emergent globalisation, which increasingly linked internal and external 
spheres of engagement and influence, and reflected the growing complexity of 
international interaction and security.  The September 11 2001 terrorist attacks then 
exacerbated the need for greater cultural engagement and cooperation, as traditional 
ideas of deterrence - based upon massive retaliation - began to have little meaning if the 
enemy was stateless.  In light of these events, there was a move towards less state-based 
analysis and more inclusive approaches, such as constructivism, which ‘direct our 
attention to the ways in which collectively held beliefs and values influence and shape 
actor behaviour’ (Berger, 2003: 407). 
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Bringing Identity into the Study of Security: Threat and Insecurity 
 
An emphasis on the role of self/other emerged in the post-Cold War era as 
‘international politics became the site not of universalistic claims but the realm of 
difference itself’ (Walker, 1993: 117).  Greater emphasis was given to the role of culture 
within security (Hudson, 1997; Tickner, 2002) but also to how danger, threat and 
insecurity were represented by ideational difference.  Any definitions of identity which 
distinguished between self and other thus implied ‘definitions of threat and interest’ 
(Kowert & Legro, 1996: 18-9) through their implicit difference.  Such definitions 
additionally encompassed not only traditional threats to the state - such as to its 
sovereign and territorial integrity - but also to national self-perceptions and beliefs about 
a state’s proper political functioning.  These definitions in turn involved considerations 
of threat based upon how other states conceived of each of these attributes (Nau, 2003: 
220).  Therefore, not only were the domestic politics of a state important to that state’s 
security policy but so too were the domestic politics of other states. 
 
Furthermore, how a state envisions its own physical mass also impacts on its security 
policy - especially if they are neighbours.  This point is most clearly shown in the Indian 
context by Pakistani claims in Kashmir, as well as Chinese claims over Arunachal 
Pradesh and other parts of Kashmir - all of which impinge on India’s territoriality.  Such 
claims relate to Pakistani and Chinese self-perceptions as per either the “correct” extent 
of their territory or their desired position in South Asia or Asia as a whole.  These 
perspectives are not only collectively represented by the three sources of security as laid 
out in Figure 3.1 above, but also indicate their inter-relational quality.  Such perspectives 
are equally apparent in the Indian context, as while appearing nominally independent, 
the three sources are also interdependent.  For example, threats to Kashmir reveal not 
only issues concerning territorial integrity (the physical) but also perceived threats to 
India’s democratic basis (the political) and rising international status (the perceptual).  
The three sources of security can therefore be more accurately represented as 




Figure 3.2: the Three Interdependent Sources of Security  
 
An emphasis on the role of culture within security has also been apparent through 
protagonists of strategic culture.  Strategic culture can be defined as ‘an integrated 
system of symbols that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences 
by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military action in inter-state affairs’ 
(Johnston, 1996: 222).  Acknowledging anthropological work on national character 
(Benedict, 1946; Gorer, 1948), as well as political culture (Dittmer, 1977; Elkins & 
Simeon, 1979; Pye, 1985), analysts initially considered national style in relation to 
strategy.  Many of these focused upon predominantly realist accounts of the (nuclear) 
strategies of either the US or the Soviet Union (Booth, 1979; Gray, 1981, 1986; Jones, 
1990), and included variables such as historical experience, political culture and 
geography (Weigley, 1973).  National styles were understood in historical and 
anthropological terms, arguing that ‘a particular culture should encourage a particular 
style in thought and action’ (Gray, 1986: 35).  Some of these analyses also highlighted 
the risks involved with misperceiving a rival (Booth, 1979). 
 
By including multiple variables that covered factors from technology and geography to 
national character and ideology, this first generation of scholars suffered from an 
imprecision concerning their definitions of strategic culture.  Despite multiple inputs, 
these scholars were also regarded as overly deterministic, with Johnston noting that 
there ‘was little conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic 
choice’ (1995: 37).  The first generation also failed to explain the empirical sources from 
which strategic culture is derived, how it is transmitted across time, and how it can 
develop and evolve (for details on these different generations, see Johnston, 1995).  This 
thesis confronts and answers all of these criticisms through its norm-based approach 

















biographies.  I also detail alternative explanations by comparing constructivist with 
realist accounts from IR theory if order to provide a clearer exposition of non-
normative (and non-security identity) approaches, thus counter-acting a fallibility 
associated with first-generation strategic culture approaches.  
 
A second generation of theorising regarded strategic culture as an instrument of 
domination used by elites to draw support for declaratory, rather than operational, 
strategies.  Strategic culture thus explained how leaders justified and legitimated certain 
behaviour rather than explaining the behaviour itself.  Importantly however, analysts 
focused upon strategic culture as a product of historical experience that by definition 
varied from state to state.  This elucidation of security is something central to my 
security identity approach, as it is both state-specific and historically-specific.  Second 
generation theorists also often noted similar strategic (often realpolitik) preferences as an 
eventual common denominator, regardless of different experiences and backgrounds 
(Hollander, 1985; Klein, 1988).   The security identity approach rejects such a common 
basis, arguing that a state’s security practice rests upon its own actions, interactions and 
behaviour that are specific only to that state.  States may share experiences (for example, 
being allies during a conflict) but will ultimately be conditioned by their own 
(normative) precedents.   
 
In turn, a third generation regarded strategic culture not as being deeply rooted ‘but as 
the product of recent historical military-strategic experience’ (Basrur, 2001: 182).  Other 
strategic culture scholars also used institutionalist approaches in league with 
constructivism to link state identity to foreign policy and IR (Hall, 1999; Neumann, 
1999; Reus-Smit, 1997; Ruggie, 1997).  Linked to these research areas, research has 
carried out explicitly norm-based approaches in relation to national security culture 
(Katzenstein, 1996).  Some of these works have analysed the roots and origins of 
engrained security outlooks (Berger, 1998) or explained intervention in international 
conflicts (Ringmar, 1996).  Others have focused upon investigating ideational influences 
on the formation of military doctrine (Kier, 1996) and military effectiveness (Rosen, 
1995).  A common bond in these works is that structural-materialist accounts do not 
sufficiently explain state behaviour and that norm-based accounts (focusing on beliefs, 
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identities and culture) offer superior explanations for a state’s strategic behaviour.  My 
research echoes this bond. 
 
The importance of culture as an engrained belief plays a major part in these third 
generation works, although again often in terms of military or strategic approaches 
rather than wholesale security policy.  These approaches have continued into research 
concerning the strategic culture of various states and non-state entities.  Variants of 
strategic culture have thus been used to analyse the foreign policy of Germany (Malici, 
2006), Canada (Belanger, 1999), Iran (Davies, 2008) and the European Union (EU) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Cornish & Edwards, 2001).  Recent work 
by Oros (2008) and Singh (2009) has emphasised the role of organisational structures in 
Japan, by considering the possible transformation of Japan’s security practice after the 
end of the Cold War.  Research has also been carried out comparing US and European 
security policies (Lantis, 2004), on the formation of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) (Junemann, 2003), as well as explaining hegemony (Wang, 2003) and 
weapons of mass destruction (Kartchner, 2006).   
 
There have been several elucidations of Indian strategic culture (Bajpai, 2002; Jones, 
2006; Tanham, 1992).  Often these studies have had a timescale of centuries, with Jones’ 
analysis in particular encompassing India’s ‘philosophical and mythological foundations’ 
(2006: 4).  Likewise, Tanham (1992) chose to focus upon geography, great power status 
and India’s colonial experience - eventually finding no discernible strategic culture.  In 
turn, Uz Zaman (2006) has concentrated on connecting the strategic thought of 
Kautilya to contemporary Indian strategy.  These approaches remain very military 
centric.  Thus, Basrur (2001) analyses nuclear weapons in relation to strategic stability, 
while others have looked at nuclear proliferation (Das, 2009; Lantis, 2006; Latham, 
1999).  Jaswant Singh, the first Minister of External Affairs during the BJP-led NDA 
government, has also contributed to strategic culture debates, seeing it in an extremely 
historical fashion, especially concerning India’s armed forces (1999: 61-141).  To these 
ends, Bajpai describes a ‘cognitive map or “operational code”’ (1998: 162) based upon 
India being coveted, needing internal stability and having mediating institutions.  In 
turn, Cohen regards India’s security “style” as a historical mix of being firm, conciliatory 
and didactic (2002: 58-65).  
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Security Identity versus Strategic Culture 
 
Strategic culture initially appears to be congruent with the notions of security identity as 
employed in this thesis.  This congruence is particularly so concerning the focus upon 
‘strategic culture as a product of historical circumstances and national identity’ 
(Kartchner, 2006: 16), as well as seeing how ideational settings limit behaviour 
(Johnston, 1996, 2006).  Further similarities also exist concerning explaining shared 
meanings, and recognising the role of domestic politics and experiential precedents.  
However, strategic culture differs from security identity for two main reasons - namely 
its insistence on analysing strategy and its persistence on the formation of culture.  
These criticisms fit with calls by analysts for the refinement of the strategic culture 
approach, especially concerning the ‘development of more reflexive models’ (Lantis, 
2006: 4), and for greater theoretical rigour ‘in demonstrating the linkage between 
identified cultural traits and actual behaviour’ (Basrur, 2001: 183). 
 
Concerning the strategic dimension, strategic culture has been readily applied to 
situations concerning the ‘goals and tactics and tactics of foreign policy’ (Wittkopf & 
McCormick, 1999: xii).  These situations have mainly included looking at military 
doctrine, warfare and war fighting (particularly nuclear politics).  In contrast, security 
identity is not strategic as it neither represents an outlook nor a plan nor a doctrine.  It 
does not insist that states have a strategic framework or an accompanying grand strategy 
but instead that there is an aggregated consensus within a state’s security establishment 
based upon core beliefs and common reference points.  Equally, this aggregated 
consensus is not solely based upon militaristic rationales but also includes domestic 
ideological influences (such as Hindutva or Nehruvian thought, in the Indian case), as 
well as perceptual influences.  Furthermore, it is event-driven and as a leading Indian 
strategic actor notes, ‘events create consensus’ (Interview B4, 2008)7.  Thus, security 
identity is based solely upon past experience and precedent, producing long-term 
established guiding characteristics. 
 
                                                
7 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat 
in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.   
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Within India, this viewpoint furthermore reflects the dominant attitude of both Tanham 
(1992), and the majority of those interviewed for this project, that there is no pre-
ordained strategic plan or outlook within India.  Typical of this opinion, a strategic 
analyst noted that ‘we don’t have a kind of security culture in this country … we 
approach things in an extremely ad hoc, extremely unplanned and extremely ill-
conceived framework’ (Interview A18, 2008)8.  In contrast to most strategic culture 
analysis, I also contend that domestic factors are the key influence on a state’s security 
policies across time.  Thus, my analysis focuses almost exclusively on the first 60 years of 
Indian independence and contrasts the security policies of the BJP-led NDA with 
Congress dominated regimes.  More importantly, my study encompasses critical events 
in international relations (such as the end of the Cold War and 9/11) in order to 
underscore the persistent and entrenched nature of (Indian) security identity that defies 
more structuralist explanations.  Security identity can thus be regarded as a “constant” 
that encompasses a state’s historical interaction and behaviour, and which informs its 
present and future policy orientations.  Key international events influence this behaviour 
but will always be informed by prior experiences, producing an evolving composite 
whole rather than a wholesale re-evaluation of security practice. 
 
Security identity also differs from strategic culture concerning the latter’s insistence 
upon culture rather than identity.  This difference centres upon the problem of culture 
being difficult to operationalise.  Many approaches have abstracted a strategic culture 
from a state’s actions and then used the resulting strategic culture to explain further 
actions, resulting in a tautological confusion whereby it is nearly impossible to separate 
independent and dependent variables in a reliable way.  Part of this confusion lies with 
seeing strategic culture as having some kind of predictive power, which often appears 
deterministic (Johnston, 1995: 63).  Security identity is more useful in these regards as it 
only indicates possible choices within a constraining normative framework, rather than 
pre-determining which will be undertaken in certain scenarios.  These contentions have 
some commonalities with existing work (Basrur, 2001; Das, 2009).  This thesis also 
counters another criticism directed towards strategic culture analyses concerning their 
failure to gain access to those elites who make a state’s security policy (Rosen, 1995: 14).  
I gained access to many of those central to Indian security policymaking both before 
                                                
8 Interview with think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008. 
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and during the BJP-led NDA, allowing for a much more reflexive appreciation of Indian 
security.  
 
3.3) - THE SECURITY IDENTITY FRAMEWORK: 
 
Drawing together the findings of the previous two sections concerning identity 
construction and approaches to the analysis of security, this section encapsulates them 
together to present a framework for analysing security identity.  The framework joins 
together three factors –    
 
1) the cyclical dynamism of identity creation and evolution, as enabled by 
composite norms formed through ongoing interaction and learning through 
history; 
2) the patterns of differentiation delineated by seeing identity in terms of self/other 
- including splitting the three normative sources of security in order to focus 
on the contested space between them; and 
3) regarding security as something, which is ideational and temporally-based - 
encompassing both domestic and international influences, and which, 
includes threat perceptions between states.   
 
After the framework has been introduced, its salient features are also explained. 
 
Visualising the Framework: Inputs, Outputs and Feedback 
 
Following on from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that conceptualised the three normative sources 
of security as split and then interdependent entities, Figure 3.3 below conceptualises the 








Figure 3.3: Conceptualising the Security Identity Framework  
(with reference to Wittkopf & McCormick, 1999: xiii) 
 
The framework represents the ongoing and cyclical nature of identity formation as 
derived from social psychology and the formation of norms.  Thus, after the existing 
security identity inputs have passed through the confluence of the three normative 
security sources, the resulting outputs then feed back into the framework as evolved 
security identity inputs.  This cycle effectively allows the security identity to be in a 
persistent state of development, permitting existing norms to both continue and change 
in the face of new interactions and experiences.  Not only is such a process dynamic it 
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precedent and learning - key factors in the formation of norms.  Such a process 
recognizes how a policy (and thus norm) maker’s ‘perceptual thresholds … are 
influenced by what … he has experienced and learnt about’ (Jervis, 1969: 466).  In this 
way, through their greater repetition, the evolved security identity inputs have a critical 
filtering role concerning reactions to new events and experiences as they select or de-
select events that confirm their dominant basis.  As Jervis pertinently notes, ‘historical 
traumas can heavily influence future perceptions’ (1969: 470), as is evident for India 
concerning the events of 1947 for attitudes towards Pakistan or 1962 concerning China. 
 
Again, the framework also emphasises multiple aspects, sources and locations of 
security simultaneously, and recognises that a state’s security exists at the confluence of all 
these sources.  This understanding does not mean that every source of security is always 
effectively and ongoingly inter-connected within the security identity framework.  
Instead, it simply states that prior to any filtering and screening by the pre-existing 
inputs, any event or experience has the potential to affect the security identity’s underlying 
normative basis.  In union, these ideas produce a collective ‘identity topography’ (Hopf, 
2002: 262) of a state’s security practice.  The framework also acknowledges that, by 
virtue of self/other differentiation, security is inherently different from state to state.  
Finally, the framework explicitly reflects the importance of internal factors to our 
understanding of security and is (inter)relational in nature.    
 
Salient Attributes of the Security Identity Framework 
 
Three Normative Sources of Security 
 
The security identity framework collectively analyses three normative sources of security 
(the political, the physical and the perceptual), which act as the independent variables 
that impact upon the dependent variable of security identity.  These sources are further 
split into two parts to represent the state under examination and its relationship with 
other states and identities - hence domestic / international, internal / external, and self / 
other.  The interface of these dichotomies is where security takes place, indicating either 
harmony or dissonance between political systems, territorial integrity and national self-
conceptions.  Such categorisations also indicate how security is state-specific, proximate 
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and contested.  The disaggregation into multiple sources also enables the definition of 
several established guiding characteristics (the constant variables) inherent to a state’s 
security behaviour.  Through the splitting of the three sources, the analyst can 
simultaneously and clearly see how both foreign and domestic politics contribute to 
national security.  The framework additionally includes (through the international aspect 
of the political source) major international events which are so critical for system-based 
accounts.  This inclusion indicates how such events are relevant but not critical to the 
development of a state’s security identity and thus security practice. 
 
The emphasis on normative sources also enables greater precision for analysing 
normative continuity and change through a micro-structuring of a state’s security 
identity, leading to a clearer elucidation of an ‘actor’s operational code beliefs’ (Yee, 
1996: 76).  Using normative sources coupled with ongoing dynamic identity 
construction also allows several different strands of emphasis and analysis to be drawn 
together.  Thus, when the sources are seen as relational and interdependent entities, 
their interlocking confluence (or “focal point”) consequently enables their collective 
analysis.  At the same time, the three normative sources show how ‘security and 
insecurity are relational qualities, not a material distribution of capabilities, threats and 
vulnerabilities independent of such relations’ (McSweeney, 1999: 3).  The three 
normative sources thus structure the security identity framework and represent, as 
Snyder notes, ‘”the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of 
habitual behaviour … of a national strategic community”’ (quoted in Macmillan et al., 
1999: 4). 
 
In this context, it is norms that are the critical element for explaining continuity and 
change within the security identity framework, and for structuring the three normative 
sources of security.  It is the consistency, reliability and durability of these norms, which 
determines the long term established characteristics of a state’s security identity 
(Johnston, 1995: 48; Oros, 2008: 7).  Security identity research thus regards norms as 
representing habitual behaviour made up of beliefs and interests ‘that are culturally 
transmitted’ (Florini, 1996: 367).  This transmission indicates experiential precedents in 
state behaviour that temper ongoing security interests.  Such an observation also shows 
this research’s interest in how ‘structures of constructed meaning, embodied in norms or 
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identities, affect what states do’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 66).  These perspectives 
acknowledge the influence of strategic culture analysts concerned with semi-permanent 
national styles (Gray, 1986: 35), security “pre-dispositions” (Duffield, 1998) and seeing 
security development as analogous to language development (Basrur, 2001: 184).   
 
History as Recording Interaction and Experience  
 
When and how the norms structuring the normative sources of security have been 
threatened, indicates their relevance to a state’s security identity.  History is critical in 
this regard as it acts as a chronological tool (and as a temporal manager) that traces a 
state’s interaction.  Concerning security identity, history represents recorded dynamism, 
providing a depository of experience and precedents about prior policymaking and 
behaviour.    Furthermore, history situates security identity as a long-term, persistent, 
established and relatively consistent phenomenon.  Time is a necessary variable, serving 
to confirm that a state’s security is not a timeless essence but is instead historically 
contingent and contested.  As a linking device between current practice and entrenched 
precedent, security identity can thus ‘serve to legitimise dominant conventions about a 
state’s past, present and future’ (Johnston, 1995: 15).  Furthermore, as Johnston notes, 
‘the weight of historical experiences and historically-rooted strategic preferences tends 
to constrain responses to changes in the “objective” strategic environment’ (1995: 34). 
 
History’s importance for recording interaction and experience additionally relates to 
what Pye terms ‘”post-ism”’ (2001: 19) - that is the importance of looking to the past in 
order to see contemporary trajectories.  Tilly reinforces this notion by stating that ‘”all 
reliable knowledge of human affairs rests on events that are already history”’ (quoted in 
Hobden, 1998: 36).  Here security identity, through the constructivist lens, shows how 
formative interaction is at the root of relationships between states, rather than material 
capabilities.  The overarching aspect of history is of special importance in terms of 
linking different historical eras and overarching specific events.  Thus, my analysis 
focuses upon continuities despite perceived shocks to the international system such as 
the sudden oil price rises of the 1970s, the end of the Cold War or 9/11.  This approach 
is partly in response to the difficulties faced with analysing critical events (Das, 1997; 
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Varshney, 2002) but also to emphasise how security identities are contingent, responsive 




It is important to note that security identity has the ability to be inclusive of different 
facets of IR theory.  Security identity is not a theory or a model but a heuristic analytical 
tool that, through the coalescence of identity and security, encompasses the principles 
or security norms inherent to an identity-based conception of security.  Despite the 
descriptive terms used - values, principles, norms, identities - security identity is not 
ostensibly constructivist, but is merely an epistemological way of describing the 
grouping of these concepts.  This point again reflects strategic culture analyses such as 
Johnston (1996), who has described Chinese strategic culture as having elements of 
both realist-centred realpolitik and Confucian-Mencian influenced pragmatism.  Likewise, 
in the Indian context, Bajpai (2002) has described Indian security culture as being 
simultaneously a mixture of Nehruvian, neo-liberalist and hyper-realist.  In this way, 
realism can itself be regarded as a set of beliefs (in anarchy, in hegemony and power 
balance).  Security identity ought to be regarded as an analytical framework for 
investigating the dominant principles within a state’s security outlook.  It is not a 
positivist theory that is falsifiable or generalisable.  Instead, security identity is an 
indicatory framework that is readily transferable to other states as an analytical tool with 
which to examine their normative (and discursive) preferences. 
 
3.4) - APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO INDIA: 
 
Now that the security identity framework and its salient attributes have been discussed, 
what core profile does the framework provide in the Indian context?  This section 
outlines the basic essences underpinning India’s security identity in terms of the style of 
its political system and how that system is organised; the geographic nature of the state 
and its position relative to others; and the defining national texts and national symbols 
that inform its self-perception.  Explicating each normative source of security is this way 
is designed to provide an initial structure with which to locate the empirical analysis.  
This collective profiling of the core elements of Indian security provides the starting 
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basis for the analysis of the Indian security from 1947 to 1998 that will be carried out in 
the next Chapter.   
 
First Normative Source: Political Profile 
 
India’s political system is a federal republic founded upon popularly elected national and 
state governments.  The republic is currently split into 28 states and 7 union territories 
as listed in Table 3.1 below, 3 of which are offshore.  The number, borders and areas of 
these states and territories have fluctuated since 1947 as a result of political policy and 
electoral reform.  
 
  
STATES UNION TERRITORIES 
  
Andhra Pradesh; Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; 
Bihar; Chhattisgarh;  Goa; Gujarat; Haryana; 
Himachal Pradesh; Jammu and Kashmir; 
Jharkhand; Karnataka; Kerala; Madhya 
Pradesh; Maharashtra; Manipur; Meghalaya; 
Mizoram; Nagaland; Orissa; Punjab; 
Rajasthan; Sikkim; Tamil Nadu; Tripura; 




and Nagar Haveli; 




* - offshore 
Table 3.1: List of Current Federal States in India 
(CIA, 2010) 
 
Centered upon a secular constitution (defined as being inclusive and tolerant of all 
religions rather than being non-religious - see Smith, 1963), India’s democratic tradition 
is based upon a parliamentary-style consisting of an upper (Rayja Sabha) and lower house 
(Lok Sabha), currently with 245 and 545 members respectively.  As shown by Table 3.2 
below, the Indian National Congress (Congress) party has dominated the governance of 
India since 1947 until the late 1980s, which witnessed the rise of the BJP and smaller 
regional state-based parties.  With the exception of the brief BJP government led by 
Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1996, all Prime Ministers previous to 1998 had been one-time 
Congress ministers or legislators.  Furthermore, and again with the exception of the 
1996 BJP government, all non-Congress governments up until 1998 had been coalitions.   
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PRIME MINISTER PARTY TENURE IN OFFICE 
   
J L Nehru Indian National Congress August 15 1947 - May 27 1964 
G L Nanda* Indian National Congress May 27 1964 - June 9 1964 
L B Shastri Indian National Congress June 9 1964 - January 11 1966 
G L Nanda* Indian National Congress January 11 1966 - January 24 1966 
Indira Gandhi Indian National Congress January 24 1966 - March 24 1977 
Moraji Desai Janata Party (coalition) March 24 1977 - July 28 1979 
Charan Singh Janata Party (coalition) July 28 1979 - January 14 1980 
Indira Gandhi  Indian National Congress January 14 1980 - October 31 
1984 
Rajiv Gandhi Indian National Congress October 31 1984 - December 2 
1989 
V P Singh National Front (coalition) December 2 1989 - November 10 
1990 
Chandra Shekhar National Front (coalition) November 10 1990 - June 21 1991 
P V Narasimha Rao Indian National Congress June 21 1991 - May 16 1996 
A B Vajpayee BJP May 16 1996 - June 1 1996 
H D Deve Gowda United Front (coalition) June 1 1996 - April 21 1997 
I K Gujral United Front (coalition) April 21 1997 - March 18 1998 
   
* - interim Prime Minister 
Table 3.2: Indian Prime Ministers, Political Affiliation and Tenure in Office 
(1947-1998) 
 
Until the gradual liberalisation that occurred from the early 1990s onwards, economic 
policy in India was mainly conceived along nationalist and command-economy lines.  In 
turn, the military ‘plays almost no role at all’ (Cohen, 2002: 77) in the political decision-
making process, remaining detached from politics.  This detachment underscores a fear 
amongst India’s leaders that India’s military may be inspired by the several coups carried 
out in Pakistan since independence.  In addition, Indian society can be traditionally 
regarded as ‘based on ascriptive criteria (caste, family, and upbringing) … (which) 
assigns status and tilts opportunity’ (Jones, 2006: 7).  Such a basis encourages a 
hierarchical system based upon family ties and inherited positions of influence, which in 
Indian politics often translates to the existence of inter-generational political dynasties.   
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Second Normative Source: Physical Profile 
 
            
 
Figure 3.4: India’s Global and Regional Location 
(CIA, 2010) 
 
India is physically located in South Asia below the Himalayas and between the Arabian 
Sea and the Bay of Bengal.  Globally, India is positioned between the Middle East (West 
Asia), Russia, Central Asia, China, South East Asia and the Indian Ocean.  Both India’s 
global and regional location can be seen in Figure 3.4 above.  The world’s seventh 
largest country, India physically dominates the region with its total area collectively 
exceeding that of all its neighbours combined with the exception of China, which is 
located to India’s north-east.  This dominance is replicated in terms of population but 
India currently achieves near numerical parity with China.  Overall, India has land 
borders with six other states (five before 1971) totalling over 14,000 kilometres.  India’s 
coastline with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is around 7,000 kilometres in length and 
includes proximity to two other states.  Precise comparisons of these factors can be seen 
in Table 3.3 below. 
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COUNTRY TOTAL AREA 
(KM2 - MTAL 
 
POPULATION 
(JULY 2009 EST.) 
BORDER WITH INDIA 
(KM - M A R 
    
India 3,287,263 1,166,079,217  n/a  
    
China 9,596,961 1,338,612,968 3,380 
Pakistan  796,095 176,242,949 2,912 
    
Bangladesh 143,998 156,050,883 4,053 
Myanmar 676,578 48,137,741 1,463 
Nepal 147,181 28,563,377 1,690 
Sri Lanka 65,610 21,324,791 31* 
Bhutan 38,394 691,141 605 
Maldives 298 396,334 450* 
    
* - distance from Indian coast 
Table 3.3: South Asian Populations, Total Areas and Borders with India 
(CIA, 2010) 
 
Third Normative Source: Perceptual Profile 
 
Perceptually, India has traditionally regarded itself as the natural hegemon of South Asia 
that dominates her smaller neighbours (Cohen, 1997: 27).  This approach has been 
based upon her relative physical size, her potential economic and military power and a 
strong desire for autonomy in her foreign affairs - all resultant perhaps from her 
colonial experiences under the British Raj prior to achieving independence in 1947.  
Several defining national texts and national symbols have influenced this worldview, a 
selection of which be found in Table 3.4 below. 
 
  
NATIONAL TEXTS NATIONAL SYMBOLS 
  
Arthashastra - Kautilya 
Mahabharata 
Ramayana 
The Discovery of India - Jawaharlal Nehru 
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? - VD Savarkar 
Flag - Tricolour  
Anthem - Jana Gana Mana 
(“thou art the ruler of the 
minds of all people”) 
Song - Vande Mataram (“bow 
to thee, Mother”) 
  
 
Table 3.4: Defining Indian National Texts and National Symbols 
 
Ancient Indian statecraft influences this viewpoint, in particular Kautilya’s Arthashastra 
(“science of politics”) whereby ‘all statecraft revolved around the manipulation or 
balancing of a ring of antagonists’ (Cohen, 1997: 30).  Not only aimed at establishing 
suzerainty over other states, the Arthashastra ‘held that wars should be undertaken only 
as the last resort when statecraft failed to achieve this purpose, not because wars were 
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immoral but as they were expensive and troublesome and victory was not certain’ 
(Murty, 1964: 2).  In turn, important texts relating to Hinduism (such as the Mahabharata 
and the Ramayana), explain the relation of individuals to society and the world.  The 
Mahabharata, in particular, stresses that it is ‘illegitimate for Indians to provoke a war 
with people of another culture, or try to conquer territories outside India’ (Murty, 1964: 
8), additionally stating that any Indian empire must not extend beyond the Himalayas 
and the Indian Ocean. 
 
National self-perception has also been dominated by the dual forces of Jawaharlal 
Nehru (India’s first Prime Minister) and Mahatma Gandhi who broadly conceiving of 
India as a non-violent great power in waiting.  The ideology of Hindutva can also be 
regarded as an influence on India’s national self-perception, especially the writings of 
VD Savarkar (1923) concerning rediscovering the glory of previous Hindu rulers.  
Overall, such findings were necessarily historically selective, given the ‘limited periods of 
unification’ (Hilali, 2001: 742) present in Indian history.  India’s national symbols also 
influence the state’s perceptual outlook.  The colours of India’s national flag - the 
tricolour - reflect her religious make up, with orange representing Hinduism, green 
representing Islam and white representing any other religions.  The national anthem and 
national song respectively detail India’s geographical makeup and India’s struggle for the 
freedom and independence of “Mother India”.  Through their high incidence and 





Based upon the symbiosis of security and identity, the security identity framework 
allows for the ideational analysis of (Indian) security practice.  Through its inherent 
outputs, inputs and cyclical feedback, this analytical framework records norm continuity 
and change through the historical behaviour and interaction of a state.  These norms are 
themselves disaggregated into three major sources (the political, the physical and the 
perceptual) in order to facilitate the precise, yet simultaneous, analysis of where and how 
each norm has developed, entrenched and evolved.  The necessity of differentiation via 
the self/other nexus also confirmed how the study of security can be located at the 
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boundary between states (and identities), and must be seen as an inter-relational and 
inter-dependent entity.  The security identity framework thus allows for the analysis and 
comparison of differing norms during different time periods - one of my central 
research aims.   
 
Developing the security identity framework advances analytical approaches used in 
norm-based research.  Specifically, it emphasises an ability to record norm development 
as underpinned by social learning garnered through state-to-state interaction, as well as 
providing a collective overview of a state’s security practice (especially the presence and 
influence of domestic norms).  In these ways, security identity credibly contributes a 
new and distinctive approach to constructivist accounts of international relations.  
Furthermore, it also develops (and improves) strategic culture studies away from 
military-dominated and culturally deterministic analyses.  Through an ideational lens, 
security identity produces a coherent ‘orientating framework that highlights a set of 
effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies’ 
(Jepperson et al., 1996: 36).  The next chapter builds upon these foundations and uses 
the security identity framework to provide an overview of the development of India’s 





‘India’s Security Identity Develops, 1947-1998’ 
 
‘what does independence consist of?  It consists fundamentally and 
basically of foreign relations.  That is the test of independence’ 
(Nehru, 1961: 240) 
 
‘accidents of geography have had a powerful effect on 
determining national character and history’ 
(Nehru, 1994: 501) 
 
‘”India will not go with a begging bowl … New Delhi cannot 
be ignored … considering India’s strength and size”’ 
(Gujral quoted in Jain, 2007: 101) 
 
Can the security identity structure sufficiently provide a norm-based and identity-driven 
analysis of Indian security over time?  Can such an account successfully overarch and 
encompass changes across both political generations, and structural and systemic 
change?  Here I positively answer these questions by analysing the development of 
Indian security from post-colonial independence in 1947 to the emergence of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 
1998.  My approach employs the security identity framework to show how Indian 
security consists of a number of entrenched composite norms structuring her security 
practice during this period.  These norms reveal deep continuities in Indian security 
across notable structural and system changes, adding greater validity to the security 
identity approach.  Isolating these norms simultaneously emphasises multiple sources of 
security, and recognises that Indian security practice exists at the confluence of these 
sources.   
 
With the exception of the Janata Party from 1977-80, Congress resolutely dominated 
India’s government, and thus national security making policy, from 1947 to 1998.  
Within the immediate independence context, India’s security identity consisted of norms 
 66 
derived from Nehru’s core principles, which dominated Indian foreign policy until his 
death in 1964.  These principles were ahisma (non-violence), non-alignment, peace, 
disarmament, economic self-reliance (swadeshi), positive neutralism and complete 
independence (purna swaraj).  Collectively, these principles can be described as 
enlightened national self-interest.  Other core characteristics, many stemming from a 
Hindu heritage, were intended to maintain equilibrating balances within Indian society; 
namely tolerance, equality and general detachment.  Additionally, India was regarded as 
a great civilisation, earning her special recognition, duties and rights in the world. 
 
The chapter is split into three major sections reflecting the three normative sources of 
India’s security identity, as derived from an analysis of the discursive content of the 
three empirical loci (the political-rhetorical, the temporal historical and the reflexive-
individual - see Table 2.4).  The process of norm solidification is also shown through 
the socialising forces of event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance 
(Table 2.1).  Section one analyses the multiple norms making up the political source of 
India’s security identity and investigates the core guiding principles of India’s political 
system.  The second section then deals with the norms that form the physical source of 
India’s security identity, and details India’s historical relationships with her immediate 
neighbours.  In turn, the third section investigates those norms formed in the perceptual 
source of India’s security identity, and notes how India has learnt from her international 
interaction.  The chapter concludes by collectively summing up the composite norms 
integral to each normative source of India’s security identity up until 1998.   
 
4.1) - GOVERNANCE, INSTABILITY AND COMMUNALISM: 
 
As British rule weakened over India in the early twentieth century, the Hindu-
dominated Indian National Congress Party (Congress) promoted a mandate for a single 
inclusive nation tolerant of all creeds and religions.  In contrast, Mohammed Jinnah’s 
Muslim League held a strict communal stance that solely represented the Muslim 
population.  Unable to envision mutual tolerance and harmony within a single country, 
Jinnah called for a “two-nation” solution through Partition to establish a separate 
Islamic fatherland of India: Pakistan.  The Muslim League achieved its goal, while 
Congress gained power of the new India and impressed their ‘liberal, secularist, anti-
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communal and anti-violence (ethos)’ (Kundra, 1956: 59) upon the state.  In addition to 
Congress’ ‘moral scruples’ (Chiriyankandath, 2004: 204), these aspects complimented a 
Nehruvian Consensus based upon socialism, democracy and non-alignment (Sinha, 
2003: 201).  Previous to becoming leaders of a newly sovereign state and according to a 
leading think-tank head in India, ‘the Indian political leadership (had) never had to think 
about security’ (Interview A12, 2008)9.  India thus began its independence with little 
experience of international relations except that of the ex-colonial powers. 
 
Within India, there was a search for “unity in diversity” articulated through ‘a 
multinational vision of nationhood - in which region, language, social status are 
combined’ (Desai, 1996: 119), and which was nominally non-religious, anti-elitist and 
socially cohesive.  This secularism acknowledged a legacy of communal violence and 
separatism since independence, whereby ‘the history of Partition was assimilated into 
the career of the Indian state’ (Pandey, 1994: 204).  Congress’ dominance of Indian 
governments from 1947 to 1998, as well as Nehru’s long tenure as India’s first Prime 
Minister (and Foreign Minister), ‘created two generations of Indian politicians and 
bureaucrats committed to Nehruvianism’ (Cohen, 2002: 37).  Overall, Congress’ beliefs 
formed the ideological underpinnings for the norms that compose the first source of 
India’s security identity, in particular its democratic, tolerant and secular basis. 
 
Establishing Practice - Congress Secularism, Equality and Control 
 
British rule institutionalised India’s political system around a functional democratic 
process (Vora & Palshikar, 2004: 22-30).  These practices combined with a first-past-
the-post electoral regime and a parliamentary form of cabinet government.  Nehru’s 
dominance of the political process also underlined the importance of individual 
leadership in India - a pre-eminence replicated by strong Congress leaders (often from 
the Nehru dynasty) until the 1990s.  From this basis, the Indian Constitution 
promulgated in January 1950 declared India to be a sovereign democratic republic that 
was federal and non-monarchical, with an independent judiciary, a single electorate and 
guaranteed rights.  Given the state’s history however, Indian ‘democracy was 
                                                
9 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Army General, Delhi, May 5 2008.  Please 
refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
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constructed against the grain, both of a society founded upon the inequality of the caste 
order, and of an imperial and authoritarian state’ (Khilnani, 1997: 9).  (Socialist) 
democracy thus became the overriding norm of the political source of India’s security 
identity. 
 
Secularism was a response to potential instability and divisiveness within an India 
‘marked by deep attachments to cultural identities’ (Jayal, 2001: 2).  These attachments 
had been apparent during Partition and would be manifested during the next fifty years 
by communal tensions and separatism.  Secularism also encompassed the Arthashastra 
tradition, according to Pannikar, of ‘a purely secular theory of state of which the sole 
basis is power’ (1960: 116), as well as the separation of state and religion.  Accordingly, 
Article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution grants individual freedom of religion - 
reflecting sarva dharma shambhava (equal treatment of all religions).  This validation of a 
secular state confirmed not only Congress’ ideological roots but also India’s 
demographic diversity derived through repeated exposure to conquering empires.  The 
process of rooting state practice upon historical beliefs concerning secularism and 
plurality helped to establish their normative legitimacy within India’s security identity, 
and confirmed their strength across international structural changes (such as the end of 
World War II and the creation of modern India).     
 
India’s Constitution also instituted notions of equality through a commitment to protect 
‘religious difference rather than imposing a uniform “Indianness”’ (Khilnani, 1997: 167).  
Such principles were deemed necessary in a Hindu-dominated society and the 
Constitution rejected majoritarianism by protecting the rights of minorities.  
Henceforth, the Constitution included Article 15 (1) - no state discrimination on the 
grounds of religion - and protected the customs, laws and practices of India’s minority 
(religious) communities.  Additionally, government jobs and education were reserved for 
lower castes through positive discrimination under Articles 330 (1) and 332 (1).  The 
Constitution therefore established the institutional basis that normalised the presence of 
socialist democracy, unified equality and tolerance into India’s security identity.  
Through their persistence and continued high frequency in official political discourse, 
these norms became established guiding principles within the political source of India’s 
security identity.   
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The new Indian state also carried on (from its previous British rulers) principles of a 
centralised administration and the domination of neighbouring states (Sathamurthy, 
1990: 342).  Within the Indian state itself, these principles translated into the centre 
dominating the provinces.  Consequently, India’s Constitution contained national 
security functions to reassert central control via the emergency powers of President’s 
Rule whereby the Prime Minister could subordinate all national functions to direct rule 
(Articles 356 and 357).  These articles represented an institutionalised response to any 
threats against India’s secular and unified political basis, as well as any potential 
territorial dismemberment (as apparent in the physical source of India’s security identity, 
see below).  President’s Rule would be invoked on many occasions (particularly in 
Kashmir), and through its high frequency produced accepted structured protections 
against threats to those norms concerning India’s political and physical basis.   
 
Concerning economics, India’s leaders insisted upon a swadeshi approach consisting of 
principles of socialist self-sufficiency and self-reliance.  Dating from anti-colonial 
movements, swadeshi emphasised domestic production and limited international 
engagement - an approach intended to make India strong and to dissuade the influence 
of outsiders.  Swadeshi signalled the state as the key determinant of economic growth 
(including the institution of Five Year Plans), negating both foreign involvement and 
investment.  In a newly independent India, this approach was suited to developing the 
country’s infrastructure, becoming normalised and entrenched until the 1980s.  Then, 
faced with an early 1990s balance of payments crisis, as well as the decline of industrial 
and economic support from the Soviet Union, India gradually set about adapting and 
liberalising her economy.  Such a policy reflected a perceived need to catch up with 
other Asian states whose trade levels were rapidly expanding in the 1990s.  Average 
annual Indian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 1963 to 1997 can be found 









































Figure 4.1: Average Annual Indian GDP Growth (1963-1997) 
(World Bank, 2010) 
 
The Threat of Communalism and Militancy 
 
Communalism describes ‘the political functioning of individuals and groups for the 
selfish interests of particular religious communities or castes’ (Smith, 1963: 140).  Its 
religious association is also a powerful force across borders - as shown by conflicts 
between India and Pakistan, which often function along a secular / communal rather 
than a Hindu / Muslim dialectic (Nanda, 1976: 1-23).  At independence, the contrasting 
political agendas of an inclusive India or a two-nation solution produced communal 
tension and rioting as each side desired political influence.  This rioting led to over a 
million deaths, as an estimated 10 million people changed lands (Wolpert, 1997: 216).  
Regarded by Nehru as an Indian fascism that was undemocratic, segregative and non-
inclusive, the communalism of Partition ‘inflicted a deep wound in the heart of the 
people’ (1991: 25).  This continued association between the birth of modern India and 
mass violence helped establish anti-communalism as a central norm within the political 
source of India’s security identity. 
 
Militancy by ethnic groups against the central government also became commonplace 
after 1947.  In response, Congress insisted that India’s ‘national integrity and 
sovereignty were inalienable and indivisible’ (Damodaran & Unnithan-Kumar, 1990: 
17).   Furthermore, the threat perceived from militancy (and indeed communalism) 
highlighted ‘the importance of internal political stability in dissuading outsiders from 
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threatening India’ (Bajpai, 1998: 159).  These beliefs resulted in the Indian state’s 
prescriptive attitude towards potential separatists - be they in the northeast (the Mizo, 
Naga and Gharo freedom movements in the 1960s), Assam or across India (the 
Naxalites).  Such groups bolstered the threat to India’s political (and territorial) integrity, 
and through their high frequency, engrained anti-militancy into its security identity.  
Other threats came from Punjabi Sikhs who wanted to establish an independent 
Khalistan (land of the pure) during the 1980s and 1990s, and from Tamils in southern 
India who demanded self-rule from the 1950s to the 1980s.  Indian politicians would 
often placate agitations by granting minorities their own linguistically-based states 
(Jones, 2006: 11; Sabhlok, 2002). 
 
Repeated (and often coercive) attempts by the Indian state to politically integrate 
Kashmir into the Indian Union contributed to an insurgency in the state from 1989.  
This policy highlighted underlying assumptions that Kashmiri Muslims were communal 
and wanted to be part of Pakistan (Jha, 1991: 34).  As the Kashmir situation worsened, 
Indian politicians placed a greater emphasis on Pakistani involvement in the insurgency.  
Much of this emphasis stemmed from historical memory; particularly how both the 
post-Partition 1947 invasion and the 1965 border incursions had been initiated through 
Pakistani-backed militants.  Here we can clearly see the role of history and repetition in 
establishing and normalising long-standing conceptions concerning militancy within the 
security identity.  Moreover, Pakistan took advantage of the situation in Kashmir, 
encouraged by a successful jehadi strategy in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and a 
desire to avenge its 1971 defeat by India (Jane’s Information Group, 2001).   
 
The Kashmir insurgency fashioned protracted threats to the democratic secularism, 
plurality and tolerance emblematic of the political source of India’s security identity.  It 
also exacerbated ethnic tensions and precluded the prospect of communal violence and 
insurgency from other states in India.  The insurgency spilt over into other parts of 
India with evidence of Pakistani, Afghan and Kashmiri militancy in Bangladesh and the 
northeast provinces (Ataov, 2001; Devotta, 2003; Ganguly, 2006; Saikia, 2002).  Such 
unrest often overstretched the Indian army, and further internal societal linkages could 
be seen via ‘the enlarging nexus of the jehadi forces with the Indian underworld’ (Rudra, 
2003: v) - forces which encouraged both communal and militant tendencies in India.  As 
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omnipresent and repeated themes within Indian politics, each new outbreak of violence 
compounded their significance and resonance within the political source of India’s 
security identity, confirming their normative presence.  In response to these conditions, 
Prime Minister Rao appointed India’s first-ever Minister of State for Internal Security in 
the early 1990s. 
 
Several examples from India’s political history show the dangers of ethno-nationalism 
and its association with foreign policy and national security.  Through their repetition 
and frequency, these examples personify the established threat of militancy against India 
and thus its presence in India’s security identity.  For instance, Indira Gandhi was 
assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards on October 31 1984 after troops stormed the 
Golden Temple in Amritsar to flush out Sikh militants pressing for self-rule.  In turn, 
Indian attempts to balance Tamil and Sinhala in Sri Lanka led to Rajiv Gandhi’s 
assassination by a suicide bomber on May 21 1991.  Both cases were accompanied by an 
aftermath of communal (religious community-based) violence, and underscore how the 
domestic politics of India’s neighbours is part of India’s securiy identity.  In 1992, these 
tensions became exemplified by the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque at Ahodhya 
by Hindu nationalists.  Collectively, these examples served to cement Indian state 
concerns over communalism and militancy into the political source of India’s security 
identity.  Reflective of these concerns, spending on police and paramilitaries regularly 
increased from independence until the 1990s (Bajpai, 1998). 
 
The 1975-77 Emergency and Emergent Communal Politics 
 
India witnessed the full evocation of President’s Rule from 1975-77 when Indira 
Gandhi suspended the legislature and constitution.  This move was in response to the 
predominance of vote banks (loyal blocs of voters from a single ethnic community) in 
the electoral system and perceptions of an overly influential federal system.  The 
Emergency came to represent ‘a twenty-two month eclipse’ (Khilnani, 1997: 9) of 
Indian democracy by state authoritarianism and was symptomatic of corruption, 
paranoia and disharmony within Congress and government (Bates, 2007: 231-5).  Even 
though Indira Gandhi was deposed in the 1977 Lok Sabha elections by a Janata Party 
coalition, the Emergency represented a distinct erosion of India’s democratic legitimacy 
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and threatened the democratic norm underpinning the political source of the security 
identity.   
 
Congress’s political monopoly was only briefly broken however, and Indira Gandhi 
returned to power in 1980 amid violence due to the new government’s coalitional and 
factional makeup.  During the 1980s, political fluctuations and instability became an 
increasing common and normalised aspect of Indian democracy.  Moreover, Indira 
Gandhi inculcated mass politics and populism, invoking religious identity into national 
elections and breaking established electoral taboos.  Such actions appeared to weaken 
the tolerance, plurality and anti-communal norms present within the security identity.  
Furthermore, as Congress’ political rule became more threatened, it became more 
authoritarian.  This greater authoritarianism was backed up by the greater incidence of 
President’s Rule - up from 10 times between 1947 and 1966 to 70 times between 1967 
and 1986.   These events led to criticism of Congress and the (normative) secular basis 
of the state, and aided the regional diversification of Indian politics. 
 
Consequently, the elections of 1989, 1991 and 1996 saw an increase in communal 
politics.  This increase had much to do with the emergence of lower caste political 
parties, aided by the Mandal Commission in the 1990s.  Such phenomena also coupled 
with the rise of coalition governance, such as the Janata Dal who won the 1989 election.  
Although the norm of democracy remained engrained in India’s political landscape (and 
therefore as part of its security identity), the Indian state’s vulnerability to the politics of 
caste and religion was unveiled, questioning both its secular self-determination and 
legitimacy.  Within this atmosphere, the emergent nationalist Hindutva philosophy of the 
BJP represented a backlash against Nehru and Congress who were seen to have 
discriminated against Hindus by being overtly inclusive.  Increasingly, ‘the rise of Hindu 
fundamentalism stood on the platform of majoritarian democracy’ (Mohanty, 2004: 
110). 
 
By the 1990s, communal politics appeared to be threatening the secular character of the 
Indian state, indicating the difficulties of subsuming religious identity into India’s 
national identity.  As India’s political system changed, electoral and communal violence 
also became increasing normalised, signalling for many the communalization of the 
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Indian polity (Vanaik, 1997: 296-360).  Against this backdrop, the rise of Hindutva, the 
BJP and Hindu communalism became ‘one of the counter-trends to the democratic 
process in India’ (Mohanty, 2004: 106).  Therefore, while a democratic system had 
become a normalised part of Indian political life, the system was developing away from 
the norms of secularism and anti-communalism (and being Congress-dominated) to 
being more divisive and pluralistic.  This challenge to Congress’ secularism translated 
into electoral success for the BJP as they ‘gain(ed) access to parliament through a 
deliberate appeal to communal emotions’ (Austin, 1994: 21).   
 
As communalism changed India’s political landscape, the self-reliance of swadeshi also 
showed signs of development towards gradual economic liberalisation.  Overall 
however, Indian policymakers remained suspicious of ‘foreign investment, multinational 
corporations and (a) globalised economic order’ (Bajpai, 1998: 160), regarding them as 
threatening Indian independence.  As the 1990s reached their conclusion, India 
remained juxtaposed between two positions - seeing ‘the anarchy of the global financial 
system’ (Hasan & Nakazato, 2001: 472), particularly in relation to the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis, yet recognising that ‘modernise we must but we must be aware that 
modernisation is not necessarily jettisoning our value system’ (Vice Admiral Nayyar, 
1995: 57).  Moves towards economic liberalisation also acknowledged both depleted 
Indo-Russian links post-Cold War and the need for new foreign policy dimensions.  
Despite this adaptation, the norm of swadeshi remained present within India’s security 
identity through its underlying principles of self-reliance and autonomy. 
 
4.2) - KASHMIR, CHINA AND REGIONAL HEGEMONY: 
 
The newly independent India subsumed a multiplicity of social and religious identities 
into a centralised state apparatus.  Geographically, many of India’s physical 
characteristics came from the heritage of British rule with her northern borders with 
China, Nepal and Bhutan demarcated by the Curzon and McMahon lines.  In turn, the 
act of Partition that created India and Pakistan, relied upon the Mountbatten Plan’s 
‘“basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims”’ 
(quoted in Wirsing, 1995: 13).  Furthermore, the British bought with them the concept 
of the state with its specific spatial dimension (Hilali, 2001).  These legacies were 
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ongoing influences on Indian security concerning the composite norms relating to both 
her border relations and her internal homogeneity, norms that came to collectively 
represent her “cartographic anxiety” (Krishna, 1996).  Given their relative consistency, a 
state’s geographic features can be viewed as ongoing established characteristics that will 
transcend most major international structural changes, except direct invasion or 
annexation. 
 
A Curzonian mindset was also prominent concerning India’s physical position in South 
Asia, as India ‘inherited the Raj tradition … (of having) an influential, if not dominant, 
role over the wide arc from Aden to Singapore’ (Panda, 2003: 49; Kavic, 1967), 
including Iran, Afghanistan, Thailand and Tibet.  This logic led to an ongoing campaign 
of territorial consolidation, recognising the importance of geography and territoriality as 
major attributes of sovereignty.  Thus, 1954 saw the integration of former French 
settlements, while 1961 witnessed the reclaiming of Portuguese Goa.  In 1975, Sikkim 
was absorbed into India.  Earlier, the remaining Coco Island under Indian control was 
returned to Myanmar (in 1951).  Proximity to other states also played into this logic 
especially given India’s enduring territorial conflicts with Pakistan and China.  For a 
leading think-tank director in Delhi, the physical source of India’s security identity 
represents ‘the imperatives of our [India’s] circumstances’ (Interview A18, 2008)10. 
 
Origins - Kashmir as an Engrained Seat of Conflict 
 
Partition was accompanied by territorial problems as some of India’s 562 princely states 
sought independence rather than accession to either the new India or Pakistan.  While 
most of these issues were quickly solved - such as Hyderabad and Junagadh - the status 
of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) became contested.  With a Muslim majority and 
occupying 85,000 square kilometres of land bordering India and Pakistan, Kashmir 
served as a strategic window into Afghanistan and Central Asia.  Furthermore, 
Kashmir’s maharaja - Hari Singh - wanted the state to be an independent “Switzerland 
of the East”, and postponed his decision on accession.  Singh’s hand was however 
forced in October 1947 when Muslim peasants rebelled against their Dogra Rajput 
(Hindu) landowners and Pakistani Muslims invaded across the newly established border 
                                                
10 Interview with a think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008. 
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to help them.  In return for their military intervention, Singh signed an Instrument of 
Accession with India.  After a limited conflict, a United Nations (UN) brokered cease-
fire was reached, with Pakistan gaining a third of Kashmir and India receiving the rest of 
the territory.   
 
The contested status of Kashmir led to a psychological state of mutual demonization 
between India and Pakistan.  Centring on Westphalian and Weberian precepts of 
sovereignty and self-determination, the issue quickly became ideological and non-
negotiable.  It also became zero-sum with both sides fearing the demonstration effects 
of Kashmir seceding to the other as it would question the cohesion and viability of their 
new-found sovereignty.  Kashmir therefore came to symbolise threats to the legitimacy 
of the new India, with only its successful re-absorption enough to successfully affirm 
India’s physical makeup.  In the 1950s, as India became a founding member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)11 and Pakistan joined the US-backed South East Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), these differences increased.  Keeping Kashmir became a 
moral and strategic belief for India to signal both her NAM credentials and to dissuade 
external subversion of her physical borders.  These factors established the territorial 
threat from Pakistan concerning Kashmir as a norm within the physical source of 
India’s security identity. 
 
Repeated efforts were made to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully.  These multilateral 
and bilateral attempts included the 1951 Dixon Plan, the Graham efforts (1953-8) and 
negotiations in October 1954.  In 1949, 1953, 1956 and 1959 (and 1968 and 1969) India 
also offered Pakistan a no-war declaration.  However, in August 1965 under the 
leadership of Ayub Khan, Pakistan initiated a guerrilla war to liberate Kashmir.  After a 
short conflict (including Indian advances into Pakistan), a UN ceasefire was reached and 
the status of Kashmir was manifested in the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 
whereby India and Pakistan withdrew to pre-conflict positions.  The 1965 war 
compounded India’s normative fear of fragmentation present from the first Kashmir 
conflict and, through its repeated frequency, critically habitualised the physical threat 
from Pakistan.   
                                                




Clashes with Pakistan in 1971, this time in response to East Pakistani calls for the 
establishment of an independent “Bangla Desh”, again highlighted continued Pakistani 
enmity which was seen to threaten South Asia’s and India’s stability.  After New Delhi-
trained Mukti Bahini (“liberation forces”) attacked East Pakistan in September 1971, a 
subsequent offensive by Indian forces liberated East Pakistan leading to Pakistan’s 
surrender and the establishment of Bangladesh.  On July 3 1972 India and Pakistan 
signed the Simla Agreement that created a de facto border between the two sides in 
Kashmir via the Line of Control (LoC).  Again, India relinquished any territorial gains 
and also returned 94,000 prisoners.  This agreement engrained the sustained threat to 
India’s border with Pakistan, effectively normalising it further within India’s security 
identity but also reiterated the continued territorial division of Kashmir between the two 
sides.   
 
Kashmir would remain contested by India and Pakistan throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, remaining as ‘a test of Indian state sovereignty, its capacity to protect its citizens, 
keep order and justify its territorial ownership’ (Khilnani, 1997: 31).  Repeated efforts at 
negotiation and some agreements (most notably between Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv 
Gandhi and IK Gujral and Pakistani Presidents Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) 
continued throughout this period, often following conflicts and crises.  These 
negotiations included attempts to ease trade, travel and communication restrictions, as 
well as the gradual normalisation of diplomatic and cultural interactions (see Bajpai, 
1998: 169).  Negotiation often rested upon the implementation of different Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs).  A summary of these continuing trends is shown in Table 






1947-9 First Kashmir War 
1960 Indus Water Treaty (signed after 5 years of negotiation) 
1965 Second Kashmir War 
1966 Tashkent Agreement 
1971 East Pakistan War 
1972 Simla Agreement 
1978 Salal Dam Agreement 
1984- Siachen Glacier dispute begins 
1984-92 Sikh Khalistan movement (supported by Pakistan) 
1987 Brasstacks Crisis (over Indian troop mobilisations) 
1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against 
Nuclear Installations and Facilities (implemented 1992) 
1989 beginning of Kashmir insurgency (supported by Pakistan) 
1991 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, 
Manoeuvres and Troop Movements / Agreement on 
Prevention of Air Space Violations and to Permit 
Overflights and Landing by Military Aircraft 
1993 Mumbai bomb blasts (India alleges Pakistani involvement) 
1994-7 Composite Dialogue emerges and Joint Working 
Groups (JWGs) instituted (on Kashmir; peace and security; 
Siachen; Wullar Barrage; Sir Creek; terrorism and drug trafficking; 
economic cooperation; and promotion of friendly ties) 
  
 
Table 4.1: Major Indo-Pakistani Conflicts, Agreements and Negotiations 
(1947-1998) 
 
Few tangible results took place from 1947 to 1998 between Indian and Pakistan, with 
few meetings actually taking place in either country (most took place at the sidelines of 
international conferences, especially at the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation - SAARC).  When negotiations were successful, they floundered because of 
further conflict or disagreement.  This oscillation between conflict, negotiation and 
(occasional) agreement became the norm by 1998, indicating profound dissonance 
between the two sides.  Further still, the de facto partition of Kashmir was by 1998 ‘more 
or less accepted by all parties in India’ (Vanaik, 2002: 337), and thus normalised.  
Overall, the frequency of these interactions served to integrate the Kashmir issue within 
Indo-Pakistani relations, solidifying a key dimension of India’s security identity whose 
symbolic appeal went beyond realpolitik (Kartchner, 2006: 15). 
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Entrenching the Threat - Chinese Invasion 
 
India-China relations were warm in the late 1940s and early 1950s as they both emerged 
as modern states.  India was the first non-socialist country to have diplomatic ties with 
communist China under Mao Zedong and consistently voted in its favour at the UN.  In 
addition, ‘Nehru believed that an India-China détente could stabilise Asia and keep the 
superpowers at bay’ (Cohen, 2002: 56), beliefs based upon centuries of friendship.  
These beliefs were exemplified by the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement embodying five 
principles - respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and 
peaceful co-existence.  Accompanying Panchsheel, India conceded suzerainty over 
Tibet, and recognised it as an autonomous region of China (China had annexed Tibet in 
1950).  This concession, along with some fruitful 1950s border negotiation, marked the 
high point of India-China relations, celebrated by the slogan Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai (“India 
and China are brothers”). 
 
However as the Cold War developed, China under Chairman Mao began to see India as 
threatening its perceived leadership of the Third World.  Relations between the two 
countries became more fraught, especially given Chinese aid to the Mizo and Naga 
insurrections in India’s northeast (Norbu, 1997; Thomas, 1993: 44) and the flight of the 
Dalai Lama to India in 1959.  This tension and an inter-perception of ‘caution and 
circumspection’ (Shirk, 2004: 126) became personified by ongoing border disputes 
between the two sides, beginning in 1959 with Chinese incursions into Ladakh and the 
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).  Eventually, these tensions led to war in October 
1962, resulting in a heavy Indian defeat as she lost thousands of troops and large 
stretches of territory.  Chinese incursions into India amounted to 90,000 square 
kilometres of Arunachal Pradesh by 1998, engraining the continued territorial threat 
from China as a norm within India’s security identity.   
 
Soon after the 1962 conflict, Pakistan and China exchanged land to bolster their 
positions in the region, much of which resulted in China gaining land from Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir.  These events (and particularly the unresolved territorial 
implications) served to personify further ongoing threats to India’s territorial integrity 
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within its security identity.  They additionally created a norm of suspicion concerning 
Chinese (and Pakistani-Chinese) intentions towards India’s physical existence.  Widely 
regarded within Indian strategic circles as a betrayal by China, an ex-Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) official noted how after 1962 ‘foreign policy became national security’ 
(Interview B35, 2008)12.  India-China relations continued to be marked by border 
disputes, and led to several skirmishes - such as at Nathula on the Sikkim-Tibet border 
in September 1967 and at Somdurong Chu in 1987.   
 
Despite the events of 1962, a succession of Indian politicians endeavoured for better 
relations with China.  These included initial statements of friendship in May 1970, the 
resumption of diplomatic relations in July 1976, and a joint communiqué in May 1980 
on avoiding border clashes that included the implementation of hot lines, face to face 
commander meetings and prior notification of military exercises.  These developments 
continued throughout the 1980s under China’s Deng Xiaoping.  Coupled with his 
summit with Premier Zhao Ziyang in New York in October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi’s state 
visit to China in 1988 helped to end the stasis between the two sides.  This visit included 
establishing a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border issue plus a Joint Economic 
Group (JEG) on economic and commercial issues.  Consequently, and as a sign of 
improving relations, India did not condemn China’s actions at Tiananmen Square in 
1989.  Reciprocal visits continued into the 1990s, such as those by Chinese Premier Li 
Peng in 1991 and Indian President Ventatraman in 1992. 
 
During a September 1993 visit by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, a landmark 
agreement was signed on maintaining Peace and Tranquillity on the Line of Actual 
Control (LoAC).  This agreement significantly improved relations and included force 
reductions, air exercise restrictions and the setting up of the India-China Expert Group 
of Diplomatic and Military Officers to support the JWGs.  After high-ranking Politburo 
members visited India in 1993 and 1995, in 1996 Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese 
head of state to visit India since the 1962 war.  His visit increased the 1993 measures, 
including minimal border forces, the removal of major weapons, as well as having police 
and paramilitary (rather than military) border patrols.  In line with heightened 
                                                
12 Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, November 10 2008. 
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diplomatic links, India-China trade increased from $200 million in 1991 to $1.02 billion 
in 1995 (Bajpai, 1998).  While relations had improved, unresolved border issues and 
ongoing suspicion (as personified by continued close China-Pakistan relations), these 
norms continued to be present in the physical source of India’s security identity. 
 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 
 
With her smaller neighbours, India continued a tradition of special relationships 
inherited from the British.  These relationships often centred upon unequal treaty-based 
security arrangements, with neighbouring states effectively becoming protectorates in 
Indian security rationales.  Emblematic of this stance, under Article 5 of the 1950 Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship with Nepal, it was compulsory for Nepal to tell India of any 
planned arms purchases.  A 1949 Treaty with Bhutan held to similar principles.  Other 
prominent regional treaties were the 1972 twenty-five Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation with Bangladesh, and the July 1987 Accord with Sri Lanka that 
‘reflected New Delhi’s desire for [regional] pre-eminence’ (Hagerty, 1991: 356).  
Through the repetition and acceptance of such principles, a norm of regional hegemony 
became gradually engrained into the physical source of India’s security identity. 
 
Often referred to as the Indira Doctrine, the norm of regional hegemony also rested 
upon India denying external powers any influence in South Asia.  Concurrently, Indian 
military power was used as a deterrent and as an interventionist force in the region.  
Thus, India engaged in several bilateral peacemaking operations - in Nepal (1950), in Sri 
Lanka (1971 and 1987-90) and in the Maldives (1988).  While not always wholly 
successful - as with the total failure of the 1987-90 operations in Sri Lanka (see Kadian, 
1990) - India embraced interventionist policies towards South Asia, even if it would 
abhor such policies if applied to itself.  Indian policy was also never entirely settled - 
relations with Bangladesh for example were at times fraught over illegal immigration 
and the cross-border infiltration of Islamic and separatist militants.  South Asian states 
have also tried to balance Indian interests with those of external powers - as personified 
by China’s influence on Nepal’s 1989-90 trade dispute with India. 
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In the face of heightened energy diplomacy and economic relations, Indian policy 
towards the region changed in the 1990s, mainly through the actions of Prime Minister 
Gujral, who effectively gave up reciprocity in bilateral affairs.  Regarded as necessary to 
counter the influence of states such as Pakistan, China and the United States (US), the 
Gujral Doctrine based regional relations upon good will and benevolence (Gujral, 1998, 
2003).  The doctrine ‘helped improve considerably India’s [regional] relations’ (Ayoob, 
2000: 30) in the 1990s, and resulted in a number of important agreements.  These 
agreements included the 1996 Ganges River (Farakka) Water-Sharing Agreement with 
Bangladesh, the 1996 Mahakali Treaty for power production in Nepal and trade 
agreements with Sri Lanka.  Concerning Myanmar, Nehruvian idealism was dropped as 
engagement over gas supplies trumped the state’s continued undemocratic basis (Lall, 
2006).  Overall, by 1998 India had developed a ‘concessionary stance towards its 
neighbours’ (Bajpai, 1998: 197) and the norm of regional hegemony moved from being 
based upon reciprocity to benevolence.   
 
The physical source of India’s security identity also contained engrained norms of tacit 
Indian dominance of the IOR.  Apart from protecting the Curzonian arc, this norm 
rested upon historical elements whereby British, Dutch and French colonialists had all 
invaded Indian from the sea.  India insisted that ‘great powers should leave the Indian 
Ocean’ (Mohan, 2003: 234) and in the 1960s and 1970s endeavoured to declare the IOR 
a Zone of Peace.  After this approach failed, India joined the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1995, a trade association 
composed of 18 member states.  By the 1990s, the security importance of the IOR was 
underscored by India becoming the biggest consumer of natural gas from the Gulf, 
Central Asia and South East Asia (Mohan, 2003: 210).  Rising strategic competition with 
Pakistan and China increased this importance, underpinned by India having the IOR’s 
most developed navy in 1998 (Hiranandani, 2002). 
 
4.3) - ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING AUTONOMY: 
 
India’s autonomy in international affairs was to be achieved through positive neutralism 
and purna swaraj (complete independence) from great power politics.  This approach 
encompassed specific policies of non-alignment, self-reliance, ahisma (non-violence) and 
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nuclear disarmament.   Furthermore, Indian conduct was based upon the idealistic 
internationalism of a Nehruvian world order based upon peace, harmony, cooperation 
and development, whereby all countries were treated equally regardless of status or 
position.  The legacies of colonialism (and Partition) played into this logic by instilling 
an inherent distrust of any outside forces.  This Nehruvian approach to security 
represented, for India’s leading strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam, a ‘”strategy of 
balance of power for a militarily weak but large and self-confident nation in a bipolar 
world”’ (quoted in Mansingh, 2005: 46).   
 
Set against this pragmatism, there was a deep-seated belief that India was destined to 
achieve great power status, as India’s leaders believed that ‘”fate has marked us for big 
things”’ (Nehru quoted in Gordon, 1995: 1).  This aspiration was rooted in the 
perceived standing of earlier Indian empires, her long interaction with the outside world 
through various conquering powers and also India’s physical location as the meeting 
point of Asia.  These beliefs combined with India’s struggle for independence, which 
India’s leaders interpreted ‘as part of the resurgence of Asia’ (Nanda, 1976: 2) with India 
at the helm.  In addition, a nuclear capacity was regarded as part of this aim in terms of 
developing independent capabilities, technological prowess and national self-worth 
(Nayar & Paul, 2004: 3).  These notions collectively established the basis for the 
composite norms structuring the perceptual source of India’s security identity. 
 
Post-Independence Autonomy yet Vulnerability 
 
India’s leadership of the NAM endeavoured to counteract the ‘rigidly biglobal and 
pejoratively hegemonial’ (Sharma, 2001: 20) Cold War world.  Non-alignment also 
generated moral influence for India and reinforced arguments that ‘to join any of the 
two superpower blocs … mortgage(ed) India’s eventual emergence as a future major 
player’ (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 157).  In the first decades of independence, this belief 
existed ‘regardless of the realities of what India is’ (Dixit, 2004a: 113), as India’s leaders 
saw great power based upon moral idealism rather than territorial, economic or military 
indicators.  Employment of this language helped to portray India as ‘a self-confident 
actor’ (Khilnani, 1997: 176), entrenching such beliefs into a norm of great power status 
as part of the wider security identity.  Overall, the NAM created an independent voice 
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for India in international politics, and became the second largest multilateral 
organization after the UN. 
 
Non-alignment was neither isolationist nor neutral as India criticized various states over 
their policies in Korea, Congo, Suez and Vietnam.  Reflecting India’s own experiences, 
such criticism targeted expansionist powers rather than specific ideologies.  The norm 
of economic self-reliance (swadeshi) from the political source of India’s security identity 
also backed up non-alignment aims of stability and self-sufficiency.  Furthermore, 
eschewing arms races allowed military spending to be concentrated on economic 
development.  These policies were central to establishing and protecting India’s interests 
on the international stage, and showed for Nehru how ‘the ideology of peace was bound 
together with India’s security interests and power considerations’ (1994: 533).  An ex-
MEA official also noted how India’s leaders wanted to overcome the ‘parity syndrome’ 
(Interview B4, 2008)13 commonly held by external powers (such as the US and China) of 
supposed India-Pakistan equality. 
 
The vulnerability of these beliefs and the low priority given to defence contributed to 
India’s 1962 defeat by China.  This defeat forced India to accept ‘that the pursuit of a 
major power role in the absence of hard power or military capabilities was a chimera’ 
(Nayar & Paul, 2004: 19).  The 1962 experience “socialised” India into the international 
order, as India learnt the limits of her conception of great power status.  It also 
questioned the efficacy of non-alignment, diminished India’s international standing and 
led to pronounced and increased military spending.  Much of this military aid came 
from the two superpowers (for figures see Kundra, 1956: 154-5; Nanda, 1976: 15-6).  
India’s humiliation was compounded when she was compelled to institute limited 
economic liberalisation in order to develop her heavy industry and infrastructure, thus 
marking the need for ‘greater external dependencies’ (Khilnani, 1997: 40).  While India’s 
defence expenditure increased in the 1960s, the percentage of GDP spent would not 
significantly increase after this period, as shown in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
                                                
13 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat 


















































Figure 4.2: Average Annual Defence Expenditure as a % of GDP 
 (Bajpai, 1998: 181; SIPRI, 2010) 
 
Despite the 1962 setback, the norm of pursuing great power status remained in the 
mindsets of India’s security community and India’s 1965 victory versus Pakistan 
strengthened the state’s self-sufficiency.  India’s growing awareness of great power 
politics was again shown before the 1971 war with Pakistan when she signed a twenty-
year Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union (then led by 
Leonid Brezhnev).  This treaty protected India from UN censure by the US, balanced 
against the Islamabad-Beijing-Washington triplex entente and acted as a socialising 
experience in great power realpolitik.  The 1971 conflict consequently showed India 
capable of successfully fighting a conflict and redefining her strategic environment.  In 
this period, we can therefore see how the norms contained within the perceptual source 
of India’s security identity (although domestically-derived) were adapting to the 
international environment.  Subsequently, post-1971, ‘India emerged as the pre-eminent 
power on the subcontinent’ (Ganguly, 1999: 163).  1971 furthermore confirmed the 
ongoing morality present within India’s security identity and remains as a rare case of 
successful state-to-state humanitarian intervention.   
 
India’s lessons in realpolitik emboldened her acquisition of nuclear weapons, achieved 
through the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of May 18 1974.  Although resulting in 
sanctions, the PNE was carried out to counter China’s regional nuclear monopoly and 
to lessen any reliance upon, and involvement in the region of, the great powers.  
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Although only publicly emergent in 1974, nuclear research had begun in India in 1944 
and India’s Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948.  The Indian Prime Minister 
held responsibility for the Department of Atomic Energy, with no institutional checks 
or balances and little military influence (Perkovich, 1999: 9).  In turn, from the 
beginning, many India’s scientists and leaders knew that nuclear technology ‘would 
bring nuclear weapons’ (Jones, 2006: 16).  This view coupled with tensions between a 
moral antagonism towards nuclear weapons (including demands for disarmament) and a 
desire to be a great power.  Throughout, India’s leaders maintained the same policy, that 
‘unless everyone closes the nuclear door, it is not in India’s interests to do so’ (Basrur, 
2001: 195). 
 
Emblematic of this norm, India was the first state to call for a ban on nuclear testing, 
for a universal non-proliferation treaty (in 1965), for a treaty of non-use of nuclear 
weapons (in 1978) and for a phased programme to totally eliminate nuclear weapons 
(the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan in 1988).  India was a co-sponsor of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1965 (but refused to ratify it due to objections over 
Article 6 and an inability to gain a nuclear guarantee from other powers) - a situation 
repeated with the later Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  International rebuffs 
towards Indian attempts at restricting proliferation (as well as Chinese and Pakistani 
nuclear development) spurred Indian leaders towards nuclear (weapons) development. 
 
By the 1990s, India’s nuclear weapons programme appeared to face an existential crisis.  
Still contending with international sanctions, it also seemed that many international 
proliferation controls were India-specific (such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group set up 
in response to India’s PNE) and intended to threaten her great power emergence.  
Thus, Indian analysts talked of a US-European Union (EU)-Japan (and even US-China) 
concert against India (Bajpai, 1998: 174-5).  When the CTBT’s entry into force provisos 
(Article 14) opened up a final testing window from September 1996 to September 1999, 
such nuclear inequity appeared to be explicit (particularly after China and France tested 
nuclear devices in 1995).  By 1998, India’s nuclear stance appeared as ambiguous 
recessed deterrence (Bajpai, 1998: 184), and she remained one of the ‘main NPT 
holdout states’ (Thomas & Gupta, 2000: 5) along with Pakistan and Israel.  Overall, 
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concurrently pursuing nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons development had 
become entrenched as a norm of nuclear ambiguity within India’s security identity. 
 
Looking West, Central and East 
 
Characteristic of India’s policy towards West Asia was a preference for closer (and more 
explicit) relations with Arab countries rather than with Israel.  This preference was 
based upon expediency, namely to secure energy supplies from Iran and Iraq, but also 
to weaken Pakistani influence over the region, especially concerning Kashmir.  It also 
fed into maintaining closer relations with those NAM members based in West Asia 
(such as Egypt) and from the 1970s, reflected growing India-Soviet ties.  Domestically, a 
preference for dealing with Arab countries was also deemed necessary to maintain the 
political support of India’s Muslims for Congress.  By the 1990s, the importance of 
remittances from Indian workers (especially in the Gulf States) added to this rationale.  
Overall, through continued and more frequent interaction with Arab countries, this pro-
Muslim inclination in India’s West Asia policy became an established norm within the 
perceptual source of India’s security identity. 
 
Consequently ‘non-relations with Israel became the hallmark of India’s [West Asia] 
policy’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 192).  Typical of this stance, India voted against Israel’s 
inclusion into the United Nations (UN) in May 1949, supported the Arabs in the 1967 
War and gave the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) full diplomatic recognition in 
1980.  These policies were additionally influenced by seeing Israel as effectively a 
colonizer of Palestinian land.  In turn, Indian passports were invalid for travel to Israel 
and Israel only had a consul-general in Bombay.  However, some clandestine Indo-
Israeli links were in evidence - such as Israel giving military assistance to India in 1962 
(Banerjee, 2006: 249).  From 1984 onwards, Rajiv Gandhi began to forge closer ties and 
met Israeli officials in Washington, restored a full consul in Bombay, relaxed visa 
restrictions and allowed Israel to compete in the 1987 Davis Cup in India.  Wider aims 
influenced these actions, as they also become ‘an integral part of [Indian] policy vis-à-vis 
Washington’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 197). 
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As Soviet support (and 85% of India’s arms supply - Interview B1, 200814) evaporated 
following the end of the Cold War, on January 29 1992 India became the last major 
non-Arab and non-Islamic power to establish relations with Israel.  Earlier in 1991, 
India had supported the repudiation of the UN resolution equating Zionism with 
racism.  1991 also saw the first military links between the two countries and in 1993 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres visited India.  India remained cautious however, 
and, as noted by a former MEA official, asked Yasser Arafat for his agreement before 
initiating these contacts (Interview B2, 2008)15.  In turn, Indo-Israeli engagement from 
the 1990s onwards ‘signalled India’s aspirations for great power status’ (Kumaraswamy, 
2003: 193).  Still reflective of its domestic constituency, Congress however kept such 
ties outside of the MEA.  Overall, by 1998 these ties now reflected a norm of having a 
more balanced relationship with all West Asian states, as well as a continued engrained 
belief in religious moderation.   
 
Indian attention also focused upon Central Asia with the decline of the Soviet Union.  
Building upon ancient historical and cultural links, in 1991 and 1992 diplomatic relations 
were started with all the new Central Asian states.  India also signed agreements on 
trade, agriculture, science and technology issues (such as with Kazakhstan in February 
1992 and Kyrgyzstan in March 1992).  Greater mercantilism played into these links as 
did economic integration and energy security.  The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 
the 1990s heightened this need and led to consistent Indian support of the Northern 
Alliance.  This stretching of Indian influence also fed into continued Indo-Iranian ties 
that had been close since independence.  Apart from long established historical and 
cultural ties stemming from shared borders pre-1947, India has the world’s second 
largest Shia population and was among the first to recognize the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in 1978.  Protecting oil supplies travelling from the Strait of Hormuz across the 
IOR to India also underlined these links.   
 
Indian leaders also attempted to initiate Asian multilateralism.  These efforts dated from 
Nehru’s Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, and included the Baguio 
                                                
14 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the 
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
15 Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, November 17 2008. 
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Conference of May 1950, (on economic and cultural cooperation and collective security) 
the Columbo Plan of July 1951 (on economic and technological cooperation) and calls 
in 1967 for an Asian Council.  Building on the consensus with the state’s security 
community concerning its pre-eminent regional status by the 1970s, India stepped up 
multilateral links within the region in order to provide stability, trade links and increased 
global standing.  This policy included membership of various multilateral bodies such as 
SAARC in 1985 and BIMSTEC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand for 
Economic Cooperation) in 1997.  Through these actions, India steadily transcended her 
‘long standing confinement (and) … began to carve out a wider role as an Asian great 
power’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 120). 
 
From 1992, India also created further military, economic and diplomatic ties with 
Southeast Asia through the “Look East” Policy that built upon her religious, artistic, 
linguistic and political legacies.  Thus with the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), India became a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner 
in 1995, and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996.  These 
relationships helped to both strengthen India’s territorial integrity and her regional 
standing.  Looking East also signalled a growing diversification in India’s international 
focus, especially as the economic importance of ASEAN had increased as unrest in 
international oil markets became apparent through the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s.  
By 1998, attempts at stretching India’s influence beyond South Asia had become a 
developed (but not yet normalized) part of its security identity.    
 
Negotiating US Power 
 
Although the US had encouraged Indian independence, post-1947 India had no 
domestic profile in the US and was marginalised in the post-World War II global 
hierarchy.  Furthermore, the US regarded non-alignment as a regression of the 
international system that circumvented its influence, and was a threat to US-Soviet 
bipolarity.  Following Indian state visits to Moscow and Beijing in the 1950s, US leaders 
were convinced ‘that India’s claims about being a non-aligned country were a tactical 
posture, whereas in substance India was becoming part of the Soviet bloc’ (Kapur, 1996: 
290).  Indian advocacy of China’s membership of UN only crystallised this opinion.  
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These perceptions were also compounded by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and India’s 
planned economy and socialistic orientations.  In turn, the US’s arming of Pakistan 
throughout the Cold War in the hope of creating Indo-Pakistani parity facilitated a 
norm of mutual distrust between the two sides.   
 
While containing positive interactions (such as the US giving India financial help, food 
aid, nuclear fuel for reactors and space program assistance in the 1950s), Indo-US 
relations until the 1990s were marked by ‘pattern of mutual attraction and 
disillusionment’ (Cohen, 2002: 1-2).  The pattern of Indo-US attempts at 
accommodation mixed with mistrust would slightly thaw in the 1980s but remained a 
key norm within the perceptual source of India’s security identity.  Thus, the US tried to 
prevent India’s use of force in Goa in 1961 but supported India in the 1962 war against 
China and gave India $80 million in military assistance post-1962 (Cohen, 2000: 3; 
Mishra, 2005: 82).  In turn, in July 1965 US food assistance was suspended by US 
President Johnson when India was undergoing a harsh famine, while the USS Enterprise 
was sent into the Bay of Bengal by US President Nixon during the 1971 East Pakistan 
conflict.  Reflective of these fluctuations, analysts collectively described the two sides as 
estranged democracies and comrades at odds enduring a cold peace (see respectively 
Kux, 1992; Rotter, 2000 and Brands, 1990).   
 
India’s refusal to sign the NPT, as well as US technology sanctions after the 1974 PNE 
and deepening US-Pakistan ties, increased this estrangement as India and the US 
remained distanced powers (Cohen, 2000: 11).  After the mutual visits of Jimmy Carter 
and Moraji Desai in 1978 during the Janata government, the repeated visits of Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to Ronald Reagan’s US in the 1980s served to improve 
relations.  Against a backdrop of hopefully ending sanctions mixed with a perceived 
over-reliance on arms from the USSR, these meetings resulted in the 1984 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the transfer of defense related technology, 
as well as increased trade.  Sanctions on dual-use and sensitive technologies however 
remained, as did divergence concerning the USSR’s policy in Afghanistan.  As such, 
Pentagon officials noted that ‘”while India is playing chess, the United States is playing 
checkers - we are not even on the same board”’ (quoted in Saksena & Grillot, 1999: 
157).   
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In many senses, and according to a former Indian Foreign Secretary, the Cold War had 
been ‘a conditioning reality’ (Interview B4, 2008)16 on Indo-US relations and one which 
also harnessed mutual distrust.  As the Cold War ended, US strategic disinterest in the 
subcontinent grew, particularly given the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
Conversely, relations between the two sides began to improve.  Thus, following initial 
interactions between their defence secretaries in the late 1980s, senior military 
commander visits began in 1992 through a ‘joint consultative mechanism on defence 
policy and security issues’ (Dixit, 2004a: 40).  Referred to as the “Kickleighter 
proposals”, these efforts included reciprocal Army Chief of Staff visits and participation 
in Indo-US strategic symposiums.  1992 also witnessed the first Indo-US army joint 
training exercise (Teak Iroquois) and the first joint naval exercise (Malabar I).  Such 
exercises would be repeated over the next six years.  These links were backed up by the 
1994 Agreement on Sharing Sensitive Information and the January 1995 Agreed 
Minutes on Defense Relations, which formalized nascent cooperation between the two 
sides.   
 
Concurrently, the (middle class) profile of Indians in the US was rapidly increasing as a 
result of US efforts in the 1960s to make university study, immigration and citizenship 
easier to fulfil.  The early 1990s also saw the creation of an India caucus in the US 
Congress.  In 1993 India was named a Big Emerging Market (BEM), and trade between 
the two states increased from $5.3 billion in 1990 to $8.5 billion in 1995 (Cohen, 2000: 
18).  Indian suspicion remained however over the NPT and CTBT that threatened 
India’s nuclear autonomy and also US Defence statements concerning ‘”discourag(ing) 
India’s hegemonic aspirations over other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean”’ 
(quoted in Dixit, 2004a: 43).  Thus, while India saw greater US links as a potential way 
to achieve great power status, distrust of the US (and general anti-western sentiment) 
continued as a key norm in her security identity, despite the end of the Cold War.  In 
turn, through the cultivation of multiple international partners India steadfastly 
remained “non-aligned” concerning relations with any of the great powers.   
 
                                                
16 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat 




Using the security identity framework, this chapter has identified the dominant 
normative sources running through the formation and evolution of India’s security 
practice from 1947 to 1998, revealing the origin, basis and continuance of India’s central 
security concerns.  From the legacy of Partition and the orientating principles of Nehru, 
these sources guided the intricacies of Indian foreign policy, collectively structuring 
India’s security identity.  In turn, the norms revealed in each source are reflective of the 
discursive consensus present within India’s security community concerning how India’s 
foreign policy ought to be conceived and delivered.  Based upon self-sufficiency and 
complete independence, India’s security identity was dominated by the understanding 
‘that power-seeking provokes power-seeking, force begets force’ (Bajpai, 1998: 195) 
with India never pre-emptively invading other states.  India’s policymakers also learnt 
from India’s international interaction and adapted their behaviour accordingly, especially 
with regard to realpolitik and swadeshi, while some of the major norms had an ongoing 
influence on their attitudes towards ongoing and future events (particularly ahisma and 
non-alignment in the context of the post-colonial and Cold War periods).  Furthermore, 
Indian diplomacy represented ‘a combination of force, negotiations and indirection’ 
(Bajpai, 1998: 169).  The major composite norms of each of the three sources of India’s 
security identity can be found in Table 4.2 below. 
 
   
NORMATIVE SOURCES OF INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY 
POLITICAL PHYSICAL PERCEPTUAL 
   
 
: (socialist) democracy 
: equality / tolerance 
: secularism / plurality  







: Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, 
suspicion / LoC “accepted” 
: China: continued territorial 
threats / ongoing suspicion 
: regional hegemon - 
reciprocity then 
benevolence 
: tacit IOR dominance 
 
: ahisma / idealism 
: autonomy / non-
alignment 
: great power aspiration 
: nuclear ambiguity 
: West Asia: explicitly pro-
Muslim then balanced 
: US: distrust/ anti-western 
   
 
Table 4.2: Major Composite Norms in India’s Security Identity until 1998 
 
Through the isolation of specific norms, the validity of a norm-based and security 
identity-driven account of (Indian) security has been confirmed.  In particular, we have 
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been able to see how these norms developed through India’s historical interaction with 
other states, revealing how repeated events engrain certain normative security practices.  
Whilst nominally independent, the analysis has also shown how the three sources are 
interdependent, particularly between the domestic and international domains.  Splitting 
Indian security into ostensibly separate but connected sources helped us to understand 
these complexities and the collective strength of India’s security identity over time.  In 
turn, through experience, interaction and history, this specific Indian security identity 
maintained and sustained norms which continued to structure the state’s foreign and 
domestic policy - effectively producing a “security consensus”.   
 
Whilst some of these norms evolved, their essence remained - for example with Indian 
democracy moving from a broadly secular-dominated Congress basis to a more 
thoroughly mixed secular / communal footing by the 1990s.  In turn, despite some 
fundamental political changes within India (the Janata regime of 1977-80 and emergent 
caste politics in the 1990s), as well as outside it (the ending of the Cold War and 
burgeoning globalisation), India’s security identity consistently revolved around the 
same core sources and major composite norms.  This consistency shows the strength 
and continued impact of the norms isolated within India’s security identity, despite 
wider structural and systemic changes.  A constructivist approach has thus been shown 
to be more efficacious than a realist one.  These norms also came from domestically 
derived sources, not external ones, and reflected the dominant ideologies concerning the 
state and foreign policy present within India during this period.  Such remarks highlight 
not only continuity and change in India’s security practice but are essential for our 
analysis of Indian security during the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA government.  The 
next chapter sets the foundations for this comparison, by outlining the development of 
the norms underpinning BJP ideology from their origins in the nineteenth century until 





‘The BJP and Indian Foreign Policy: 
Origins, Ideology and Agendas’ 
 
 ‘the security of the nation is an integrated whole: 
an amalgam of the internal, the economic, the social, the 
political, the military and the diplomatic’ 
(BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 416) 
 
‘diplomacy and defence are two sides of the same coin’ 
(BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 352) 
 
‘”it is out of the past that the future is moulded …   
it is the past that becomes the future …“’ 
(Swami Vivekananda quoted in BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 247) 
 
What principles structure the domestic and foreign policies of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 
(BJP’s) Hindutva (constructed Hindu nationalist) ideology?  Like India’s security identity, 
are there longstanding and established norms underpinning these policies and how did 
they form?  Here I analyze the core norms central to Hindu nationalism and the BJP 
until 1998, in terms of how the party views the world and conceive of India’s place 
within it.  Produced through a uniquely Hindu nationalist driven agenda, often in 
contrast to the secular and socialist basis of Congress, I trace the development, 
solidification and evolution of these key policy norms, revealing their established and 
entrenched nature.  As with India’s security identity up until 1998, it is the themes of 
repetition, high frequency and harmony / dissonance that have dictated whether or not 
beliefs became norms within Hindutva policy.  Using the three sources of security 
inherent to the security identity structure, these composite norms inform BJP ideology 
domestically (the political), regionally (the physical) and globally (the perceptual).   
 
The chapter is split into three major sections.  The first section investigates the BJP’s 
political heritage through an analysis of the origins of its Hindutva ideology and the 
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party’s role as the political arm of the wider Sangh Parivar.  Section two then analyses the 
ideological basis of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) (the BJP’s predecessor) from its 
foundations in 1951 to its disbanding in the late 1970s.  The third section then 
concentrates on the political rise of the BJP, charting its emergence onto the national 
stage in the 1980s until its 1998 general election victory.  This structure allows us to 
analyse the emergence of norms central to Hindu nationalism across multiple political 
generations (and as with India’s security identity, across major international structural 
changes), while charting Hindutva’s electoral rise.  The chapter concludes by setting out 
the norms making up the BJP’s domestic and foreign policy agenda, and initially 
compares them with those norms structuring India’s security identity until 1998.  
 
5.1) - “HINDU, HINDI, HINDUSTAN”: 
 
Hindu nationalism originated in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the European 
domination of India and from the neo-Hinduism of high caste Brahmins wanting to 
revive the Hindu past.  In particular, Western Christian missionaries were seen as a 
foreign “Other” threatening both Bharat - the sacred land of the Himalayas - and 
Sanskrit (and its vernacular Hindi) - the mother of all (European) languages.  
Consequently, the Arya Samaj was formed in 1875 in Punjab to increase Hindu self-
esteem and assert Hinduism’s spiritual superiority (Gupta, 1991; Jones, 1976; Rai, 1914).  
Distinct Hindu (rather than Aryan) organisations emerged in 1907 as upper caste trade 
and commerce leaders formed Hindu Sabhas (Hindu Associations) to counteract British 
moves against Hindu land ownership through the 1901 Punjab Land Alienation Act.   
Additional plans to grant India’s Muslim minority a separate electorate (eventually 
decreed under the 1909 Morley-Minto constitutional reforms), awakened a ‘feeling of 
vulnerability and … the need for a … pan-Hindu consciousness (Jaffrelot, 2007: 39). 
 
In 1915, the All India Hindu Sabha (or Hindu Mahasabha) was founded and spread across 
northern India.  The emergence of the Muslim Khilafat movement in the 1920s, along 
with nascent inter-communal rioting and economic frustrations, galvanized the 
perceptions of Hindu India under threat.  In particular, Hindu solidarity according to 
Lal Chand (a member of the Arya Samaj) was ‘to be communal and not merely 
geographical’ (1938: 103).  In the 1930s, the Hindu Mahasabha became an independent 
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political party, with its ideology codified through the leadership of VD Savarkar and his 
book - Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923).  Representing more than religion, Hindutva 
indicated Hinduness simultaneously based upon a common people (Hindus), language 
(Hindi) and geography (Hindustan).  This triptych is the basis for the norms structuring 
the BJP’s domestic and foreign policies.  Hindutva was also a reaction to inaccurate 
Western orientalist conceptions of Hinduism as a single world religion (King, 1999: 
146).  In turn, Hindu nationalism was both xenophobic and paternalistic, crystallizing a 
modern, masculine Hindu culture to protect Bharat Mata (mother India). 
 
Key Hindutva Components 
 
Proponents of Hindutva regarded Hindus as the largest and the oldest community in 
India, while Muslims and Christians were divisive outsiders.  Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs 
were not considered as non-Hindus because they followed sects closely related to 
Hinduism.  Hindutva therefore rejected the universalist approach of Congress’ 
secularism, which they argued was discriminatory.  As Lal Chand remarked, the ‘Hindus 
have no outside friends or sympathizers to look after them or press their claims’ (1938: 
6) and thus had to protect their own interests.  Being threatened also coupled with a 
sense of superiority, whereby Hindu civilisation had “perfected society” through their 
scientific and military advances (Jaffrelot, 2007: 56).  As the mother of all languages, 
Hindu nationalists demanded that Hindi be the national language as only an enslaved 
race took on another (foreign) language. 
 
In turn, Hindustan had been defiled by foreign invasions, which had degraded the 
ancient glory and superiority of Hindu civilization.  India’s Muslim minority was a 
remnant of these invasions and a threat to Hindus by giving allegiance to Mecca rather 
than Hindustan.  Christians were equally disloyal given their faithfulness to the Church 
of England or Rome.  Both Islam and Christianity were therefore anti-national and alien 
religions and this extra-cultural and extra-territorial loyalty prohibited their assimilation 
into Hindu culture.  Additionally, the oppression of Hindus had been continued by the 
westernized Indian (Congress) elites’ (secular) appeasement of Muslims.  Instead, 
Hindutva ‘attempted to provide an outlet for the religious and cultural consciousness of 
the people, one that was completely ignored and devalued by secularity and nationalism’ 
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(Momen, 2005: 256).  These sentiments were the foundations of anti-Muslim and anti-
Christian norms within Hindutva. 
 
Outsider disloyalty existentially threatened the unity and hegemony of Hindus and the 
existence of Hindustan itself.  Hindutva protagonists thus talked of “a Mohammedan 
corridor” from Constantinople to Delhi (Jaffrelot, 2007: 71-4) and of Muslim 
dominions being created in India through Indian Muslim connivance.  British censuses 
that showed a Hindu majority in steady decline - threatening Hindus with a future 
minority status - augmented these views (Shraddhananda, 1926).  Hindu nationalism 
therefore successfully identified a range of enemies (Muslims, Christians, colonialists, 
Congress) to justify its cause, confirming Savarkar’s belief that ‘nothing makes Self 
conscious of itself so much as conflict with non-Self’ (1923: 46; Kakar, 2000).  This 
dichotomy also reveals how Hindutva self-conceptions contrasted with the norms of 
India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998, specifically an insistence upon a solely 
Hindu outlook and a fear of all non-Hindu outsiders. 
 
Savarkar also coined the territorial dimension of Hindutva - the Hindu Rashtra - the land 
of the Hindus beyond the Indus, between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.  From 
Kashmir to Ceylon, from Sindh to Bengal, the Hindu Rashtra was entrenched as an 
independent state of, and for, Hindus.  This state also recalled historical notions of 
Akhand Bharat (undivided India) when India’s territorial strength had extended into 
Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and the Indian Ocean.  In an address in 1937, Savarkar 
even spoke of a “greater Hindustan” encompassing Africa, America and Mauritius 
(Bénéï, 1998: 120), which had to be reclaimed to confirm the territorial unity of the 
Hindus.  To fulfill this cultural uniformity, Savarkar’s wanted to “Unite Hindus and 
Militarise Hinduism” (1923) to ensure their (national) security.  This conceptualization 
contrasted with norms within India’s security identity until 1998 that largely accepted 
India’s post-independence territory (besides Kashmir).  It also went against other 
established security identity norms of secular tolerance and ahisma (non-violence). 
 
 98 
Hindutva’s Umbilical Cord 
 
Hindu nationalism’s organizational structure was established by KB Hedgewar via the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS - National Volunteer Corps) in Nagpur in 1925, and 
aimed ‘to propagate the Hindutva ideology but also to infuse new physical strength into 
the majority community’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 16).  Hedgewar created a national movement 
based upon local branches (shakhas) of volunteers (swayamsevaks) led by preachers 
(pracharaks).  An all-male cultural organization, the RSS is based upon paramilitary skills, 
ideological training and supreme life-long loyalty to the Hindu nation.  Members pledge 
allegiance to a saffron flag rather than the Indian tricolour.  By 1947, the RSS had over 
600,000 swayamsevaks across India, and were India’s biggest Hindu nationalist 
movement.  These numbers continued to grow and by 1998, the RSS had 2.5 million 
swayamsevaks with shakhas in at least thirty-seven countries outside India (Seshadri, 1988: 
313).  RSS members are mainly urban lower middle class businessmen and shopkeepers. 
 
MS Golwalkar succeeded Hedgewar as head of the RSS (sarsanghchalak) in 1940 and it 
was his book We or Our Nationhood Defined (1939) that provided the RSS with its 
ideological charter.  In keeping with the Hindu Mahasabha and Savarkar’s Hindutva, 
Golwalkar stressed how India’s national identity equated with Hindu culture in terms of 
country, race, religion, culture and language.  This understanding included an emphasis 
on Brahmin dominance and on racial factors whereby lower caste Hindus diluted the 
purity of upper caste Hindus, referred to by Pandey as ‘upper caste racism’ (1993: 252).  
As a negative impact on the racial purity of Hindus as the “national race”, Muslims were 
again primary targets and personified Hindutva’s fear of outsiders.  Furthermore, Hindus 
had to re-find their spiritual and physical superiority through their own mobilization, 
independent of ‘self-serving and corrupt’ (Josh, 2000: 295) politicians.  
 
Golwalkar drew inspiration from the racialist core of fascism and ‘encouraged Hindus 
to emulate Nazi Germany’s treatment of Jews in their relations with Indian Muslims’ 
(Bacchetta, 2000).  Furthermore, Islam was a “foreign body” in Hindu society (along 
with Christians and communists - the latter because they have no religion), and their 
previous conquests of India represented the ‘”rape of the Motherland”’ (Hansen, 1996a: 
148).  Indian Muslims were blamed for Partition and the violence that accompanied it, 
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especially the aggression of Jinnah’s Direct Action Day in 1946.  In general, ‘the very 
existence of Pakistan, and the period of British rule over India, (we)re de facto evidence 
of a betrayal of India by Muslims to other Muslims, and then to the Western powers’ 
(Cohen, 1997: 31).  Muslims were therefore disloyal and as an internal threat to India’s 
national security, reinforced such normative beliefs within Hindutva. 
 
Post-independence, Golwalkar would continue to target India’s Muslims as an “enemy 
within”, blaming them for bombings, terrorism and insurgency (1966: 232-265).  
Christians were also seen as anti-national through their policy of conversions and were 
accused of trying to create a secessionist “Padrestan” in India through the smuggling of 
arms by American missionaries (ibid: 232-265).  The RSS’s military training was 
designed to combat these threats (and indeed RSS swayamsevaks protected Hindus during 
Partition), and aimed to generate the leaders for a renascent Hindu Rashtra in order to 
nullify them.  Achieving great power status to make India strong thus became 
established in Hindutva thought as a way to eradicate foreign influence, displaying initial 
similarities with core normative beliefs from India’s security identity until 1998. 
 
The Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) and the Sangh Parivar 
 
After Mahatma Gandhi was killed by an ex-RSS swayamsevak (Nathuram Godse) in 
January 1948 and the RSS was banned, its leaders realized the need for political 
mobilisation.  Negotiations between Shyama Prasad Mookerjee (then president of the 
Hindu Mahasabha) and Golwarkar led to the creation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS - 
Indian People’s Alliance) in 1951 on the eve of India’s first general elections.  Senior 
RSS swayamsevaks were sent to help the BJS’s foundation, including Atal Behari Vajpayee 
and LK Advani who would lead the party and its subsequent incarnation, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP - Indian People’s Party).  Despite the RSS’s insistence on being solely a 
cultural organization, RSS-BJS links remained strong with an RSS leader, Dr Mahavir, 
becoming the first BJS General Secretary.  The BJS thus represented a ‘front 
organization’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 18) of the RSS. 
 
The BJS was part of the RSS’s wider Sangh Parivar (Family of Associations), which aimed 
to penetrate all levels of Indian society.  The RSS oversees the structure of each 
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organization, controlling their decision-making and appointment making.  This control 
is often achieved by having RSS pracharaks as affiliate leaders within these organizations.  
Consequently, in any local government or state government structure controlled by the 
Sangh Parivar, there is always an RSS pracharak.  The RSS therefore remains as the 
‘ideological and strategic leadership of the Sangh Parivar’ (McDonald, 2003: 1567).  The 
BJS and later BJP are no exceptions to this influence.  Major Sangh Parivar organisations 
are listed in Table 5.1 below. 
 
   
DATE NAME FUNCTION 
   
1936 Rashtriya Sevika Samiti  
(National Women’s Volunteer Committee) 
exclusively female RSS 
branch 
1948 Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad  
(ABVP - Indian Students Association) 
students union / anti-
communist 
1951 Bharatiya Jana Sangh  
(BJS - Indian People’s Alliance) 
political wing (1st generation) 
1952 Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram  
(VKA - Centre for Tribal Welfare) 
anti-Christian tribal 
movement / anti-conversion 
1955 Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh  
(BMS - Indian Workers’ Association) 
workers union / anti-
communist 
1964 Vishnu Hindu Parishad  
(VHP - World Council of Hindus) 
centralizes all Hindu 
religious sects 
1977 Vidya Bharati  
(Indian Knowledge) 
coordinates school networks 
based on Hindutva 
1980 Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP - Indian People’s Party) 
political wing (2nd 
generation) 
1984 Bajrang Dal  
(BD - Army of Monkeys/ Hanuman) 
all-male militant wing of the 
VHP 
1984 Durga Vahini 
(Army of Durga) 
all-female militant wing of 
the VHP 
   
 
Table 5.1: Foundation Dates and Functions of Major 
Sangh Parivar Organisations 
 
Aimed at mobilizing as many sectors of society as possible, there were over 200 Sangh 
Parivar organizations by 2000 (Bacchetta, 2000).  In particular, the Akhil Bharatiya 
Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP - Indian Students Association) and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh 
(BMS - Indian Workers’ Association) were the biggest unions of their kind by the 1990s, 
as the Sangh Parivar became ‘almost omnipresent’ (Du, 2001: 151) throughout India.  In 
order to secure India’s Hindu majority, the RSS ‘wanted “the entire gamut of social life” 
to be designed “on the rock bed of Hindu nationalism”’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 
39).  Like the RSS, many of the Sangh Parivar groups also opened branches abroad to 
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incorporate the Hindu diaspora for the nationalist cause and as an important source of 
revenue (Anand & Kakaria, 1993). 
 
5.2) - THE FIRST GENERATION: 
 
As the political wing of the Sangh Parivar, the BJS’s agenda remained based upon the 
ideology of Hindutva, particularly the writings of Deendayal Upadhayay, who paid 
homage to Savarkar.  Mookerjee’s death in 1953 removed some liberal influences and 
deprived the movement of a legitimate national leader, leading to a BJS mainly based 
upon discipline and control.  Throughout its existence, the BJS alternated between being 
a populist (largely centrist) patriotic party protecting the rights of the poor and small 
businessmen, and being a more militant organization aggressively promoting national 
unity.  This alternation was often due to maintaining the BJS’s political survival while 
promoting ‘the sectarian and community interests of Hindus’ (Arora, 2005: 284).  Under 
the BJS, Hindutva’s core domestic and foreign policy beliefs began to solidify as 
established guiding principles and norms.  
 
Full Spectrum Indianisation 
 
Drawing upon Hindutva ideals of a Hindu Rashtra where outsiders were regarded as an 
existential threat, early BJS ideology rested upon ideas of Indianisation.  The BJS thus 
demanded that non-Hindus and all religious, social, caste and regional minorities 
“Indianise” and culturally adapt to the “Hindian” nation (Fox, 1987).  The ‘evil 
consequences’ (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 244) of Partition had much to do with this 
outlook, which threatened the BJS’s core manifesto mantra of “One Country, One 
Culture, One Nation, One Ideal”.  Indianisation was therefore a policy aimed at the 
‘purification of India through Hinduization’ (Cohen, 2002: 47).  For the BJS, Congress’ 
secular policies that typified the political source of India’s security identity until 1998 ran 
contrary to these aims, polluted the Hindu Rashtra and ignored its fundamental Hindu-
orientated nature. 
 
Indianisation was inspired by Upadhyaya’s theory of Integral Humanism (1958), which 
aimed to achieve national harmony and regeneration.  Outsiders threatened this 
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harmony and the BJS demanded that all outsiders give their ‘undivided allegiance to 
Bharat … and her great and ancient culture’ (BJS 1951 Manifesto, 2005: 284).  The 
perceived continued failure of Congress to build a successful, modern India was put 
down to ignoring these essential values and effectively encouraging communal 
behaviour (BJS 1972 Manifesto, 2005).  The BJS also aimed to combat Nehruvian 
notions of a “composite culture” based upon equality and plurality by removing existing 
special religious provisions (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 179). 
 
Indianisation maintained an emphasis on Sanskrit and Hindi, with other languages being 
seen as divisive and dangerous (particularly the Hindi-derived but Pakistan-based Urdu, 
as well as English).  The BJS campaigned for Indian education to be conducted entirely 
in Hindi, Hindu festivals to be celebrated as national holidays and Ayurvedic medicine to 
be the basis of India’s National Health System.  Indian history also had to be rewritten 
so ‘”that it may be the record of the Indian people and not merely of foreign invaders 
and conquerors”’ (BJS Resolution quoted in Jaffrelot, 2007: 167).  A continued anti-
conversion stance formed part of the Indianisation approach, as did major campaigns 
aimed at protecting cows (which are sacred for Hindus). 
 
Hindutva’s distrust of the state was reflected in the BJS’s economic policy.  The BJS was 
against nationalization (except defence industries) and interventionism, and was 
distrustful of any socialist or communist agenda, such as Nehru’s policy of co-operative 
joint farming.  Furthermore, the BJS was pro-private business but against complete free 
enterprise - policies that were mainly middle class orientated.  Swadeshi was a mainstay of 
their (protectionist) economic agenda, conceived as a consciousness of self-reliance 
aimed at strengthening the Hindu Rashtra.  Thus, in the 1950s, the BJS discouraged 
foreign goods but advocated limited foreign aid along with the (partial) Indianisation of 
foreign industries (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 256).  By the late 1960s, the BJS 
supported a gradual opening up to foreign trade (but not with communist countries) 
and having a mixed economy (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005).  During this period, BJS 
notions of swadeshi therefore appeared similar to those within India’s security identity 
until 1998 but were influenced by a clear anti-socialist discourse. 
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Protecting the Hindu Rashtra 
 
In line with core concepts such as the Hindu Rashstra and Akhand Bharat, any land 
occupied by outsiders was a ‘”national humiliation”’ (Mookerjee quoted in Jaffrelot, 
1996: 196).  As such, the BJS supported the liberation of Indian territory from the 
Portuguese and French.  In turn, Pakistani occupied Kashmir (PoK) (taken during the 
1947-8 Kashmir War) was ‘historically, geographically and culturally’ (BJS 64.04, 2005: 
107) part of India.  To this end, the BJS advocated repealing and then abrogating Article 
370, which gave Kashmir special constitutional privileges.  While the BJS initially wished 
for a peaceful solution, repeated Pakistan aggression led to demands that Kashmir be 
reclaimed by any means necessary - demands contrary to Congress policy during the 
same period.  Consequently, the BJS laid ‘maximum emphasis on warning and preparing 
the country against the Pak danger’ (Vajpayee, 2005: ix).   
 
Furthermore, Indian Muslims were a potential “fifth column” and ‘”all separatist 
tendencies and attitudes betraying a pro-Pak bias must be curbed and the outlook of 
Indian Muslims must be nationalized’” (BJS Committee quoted in Graham, 2005: 254).  
Only through a reunification of the two countries could India’s problems with Pakistan 
(concerning Kashmir, high defence spending, and economic instability) be solved.  
Being a Muslim state underpinned these problems, as did Pakistan’s policy of 
discriminating against Hindu minorities, especially in East Pakistan.  For the BJS, these 
Hindus were effectively ‘“denationalized”’ (BJS 1958 Manifesto, 2005: 227) and 
threatened with ‘genocide’ (BJS 64.01, 2005).  The BJS were however keen to have a 
reciprocal relationship with Pakistan, as displayed by their support of the 1961 Indo-
Pakistan Canal Waters Agreement.  This dichotomy between confrontation and 
engagement suggested underlying norms of pragmatic behaviour towards Pakistan. 
 
As the United States (US) commenced supporting Pakistan in the early 1950s, the BJS 
warned of the Cold War encirclement of India and the danger of a ‘hot war’ (BJS 54.08, 
2005: 202).  Pakistani collaboration with China over Kashmir, as well as military aid, 
increased this perception.  When Pakistan invaded Kashmir in 1965, the BJS felt 
vindicated and praised Congress’ repulsion of the attack (BJS 65.26, 2005).  However, 
they criticized Congress over the subsequent Tashkent Agreement, which failed to keep 
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India’s territorial gains.  Similarly, the BJS were happy at the liberation of East Pakistan 
in 1971 but criticized Congress weakness for returning Pakistani prisoners and failing to 
take back PoK (BJS 72.13, 2005).  Continued Pakistani arms build-ups (with US and 
Chinese help) entrenched BJS perceptions of a weak and appeasing Congress 
government.  Again, (and contrasting to India’s security identity at this time), these 
sentiments pointed to the formation of belligerent BJS policy norms towards Pakistan. 
 
Besides Pakistan, ‘the arch enemy of Hindu nationalism has always been China’ 
(Jaffrelot, 2007: 299).  This status came from a suspicion of communist fifth columnists, 
China’s rival civilisational status and its ‘aggressive designs’ (Situation, 2005: 5) against 
India.  China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the inclusion of Indian territory on 
Chinese maps (BJS 53.15, 2005: 209) sustained these reservations.  From the late 1950s, 
the BJS demanded military action to counter Congress’ “weak-kneed” policies against 
China’s ‘continued cartographic and military aggression’ (BJS 60.20, 2005: 157).  When 
China invaded India in 1962, the BJS again felt vindicated as they had warned of 
Chinese aggression but had been ignored (BJS 63.22, 2005: 127).  BJS policy towards 
China continued to reflect an ongoing threat, with promises to help free Tibet, refuse 
China’s United Nations (UN) entry, ally with Formosa [Taiwan] and oppose Chinese 
support of Indian insurgents (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 162).  
 
Emblematic of these viewpoints, the BJS demanded ‘a more realistic, dynamic and firm 
(foreign policy)’ (BJS 1962 Manifesto, 2005: 221) than that of Congress governments 
during this period.  They advocated compulsory military training, a large territorial army 
and increased military spending.  Furthermore, the BJS wanted a foreign policy ‘guided 
solely by considerations of national interests rather than by moralizing impulses’ (BJS 
53.16, 2005: 210).  These policies contrasted with those norms within the Congress-
dominated security identity until 1998, which the BJS considered to be overly pacific in 
their security outlook.  In comparison, BJS policy appeared to be much more forceful in 
terms of protecting the Hindu Rashtra.  Aimed primarily at Pakistan (and to a lesser 
extent towards China), such policies were engraining norms to regain Kashmir, reabsorb 
Pakistan and protect India from all outsiders. 
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Hindutva Beyond Borders 
 
Strength (cultural, territorial and military) characterized the BJS’s perceived role for 
India in the world.  Envisaged as a way to overcome India’s historical subordination to 
outside powers, this strength would enable India ‘to be accepted alongside the “great” 
nations of the world’ (McDonald, 2003: 1565).  Making India militarily strong by 
developing nuclear weapons was part of this policy and from the 1950s the BJS 
demanded that nuclear tests be undertaken (Sarkar, 1998).  They were the only party to 
advocate such a position, which pre-dated clear nuclear threats from any of her 
neighbours (such as China’s 1964 nuclear tests) and thus confirmed the domestic rather 
than external origin of such a stance.  In turn, the Hindu Rashtra’s violation by China in 
1962 and Pakistan in 1965, led to manifesto promises to manufacture nuclear weapons 
(BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 177).  Such weapons were necessary both for military 
strength and as a deterrent (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 174).  Nuclear weapons would 
give India greater international autonomy (BJS 68.14, 2005), although the BJS were also 
pro-disarmament (BJS 73.01, 2005: 38).  The BJS additionally promised to get India a 
permanent seat the United Nations (UN) Security Council (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 
267).   
 
Concerning India’s non-aligned policy, the BJS called for “genuine non-alignment” 
based upon ‘strict neutrality’ (BJS 57.23, 2005: 187).  Henceforth, the BJS lamented 
Congress policies that leant ‘towards a particular [Soviet] bloc’ (BJS 1962 Manifesto, 
2005: 221).  In general, the BJS criticized Congress for letting India be used by the US, 
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (UK) as a ‘cockpit of intrigues’ (BJS 58.09, 
2005: 170), reflecting the BJS’s normative suspicion of outside powers.  Instead, the BJS 
wanted a purely South Asian political and economic order.  By the late 1960s however, 
the BJS recognised the need for allies against India’s aggressors, regardless of power 
blocs (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 177).  The BJS also wanted non-alignment that was 
useful militarily or a move towards bilateralism ((BJS 60.03, 2005; BJS 73.01, 2005: 39).  
Much of BJS policy highlighted a distaste at Indo-USSR linkages particularly when the 
Soviets had armed Pakistan, and published maps showing Indian territory as Chinese 




In turn, the BJS was critical of the US, especially its arming of Pakistan - seen to be 
contrary to US and Indian democracy and which badly affected India’s foreign policy 
independence.  These criticisms reflected a common distrust of the US shared with 
India’s pre-1998 security identity but did however belie an underlying pro-Western and 
pro-democracy orientation within BJS policy (Arora, 2005: 287).  This latter perspective 
contrasted with norms in India’s security identity that were much more pro-communist 
(especially during the early 1970s).  Reflective of these attitudes, US-Pakistan links were 
blamed on Congress, as Congress governments had declined US help (BJS 53.16, 2005) 
and the BJS argued that the China threat should necessitate closer US links (BJS 63.24, 
2005).  An admiration for US pragmatism and realpolitik was also in evidence (BJS 71.02, 
2005: 60).  However, the BJS still congratulated Egypt (after the Suez Crisis) and 
Vietnam (after its victory) versus the US.   
 
In West Asia, the BJS demanded ‘full diplomatic relations with Israel’ (BJS 1967 
Manifesto, 2005: 178).  This policy reflected a belief that Indo-Israel links could help 
stabilize West Asia and also recognised Israel as the region’s only democratic state (BJS 
63.24, 2005: 131).  Such a policy called for a more evenhanded, neutral and mediating 
Indian position, unlike India’s pro-Arab stance blamed on Congress’ appeasement of 
India’s Muslim voters (Arora, 2005: 294).  In turn, as Israel had fought against Islamic 
countries, she was therefore a ‘natural friend’ (Bhambhri, 2001: 33).  This policy belief 
clearly contrasted with the norm of pro-Muslim engagement present within India’s 
security identity at this time.  Elsewhere, the BJS had an established policy to revive 
‘ancient cultural relations’ (BJS 1954 Manifesto, 2005: 280) with South-East Asia.  
Protecting the interests of Overseas Indians, especially in Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 
and Africa was also a steadfast policy.  The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also began to 
figure in the BJS’s security considerations, as they promised to ‘develop the Indian Navy 
to become the biggest in the Indian Ocean’ (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 174) - views that 
matched norms in India’s security identity until 1998.   
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The BJS’s Electoral Record 
 
The BJS never succeeded in winning control of any Indian state or more than a small 
number of seats in the Lok Sabha.  By the 1970s however, they had become established 
across India and had a rising membership and percentage of the national vote, as shown 
in Table 5.2 below.  Although strong in northern states, the BJS did not challenge 
Congress for a political majority. 
 
   
 SEATS WON NATIONAL VOTE (%) 
ELECTION BJS CONGRESS BJS CONGRESS 
     
1951 3 364 3.06 44.99 
1957 4 371 5.97 47.78 
1962 14 361 6.44 44.72 
1967 35 283 9.31 40.78 
1971 22 352 7.35 43.68 
   
 
Table 5.2: BJS and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1951-1971) 
(Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
 
The BJS’s lack of electoral success often resulted from their militant communal strategy 
and continued links with the RSS, which ran ‘against India’s constitutional rules of 
secularism’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 20) and prevented larger political alliances.  The dominance 
of Congress, especially in terms of patronage and largesse, as well as the relative 
obscurity of the BJS’s leadership aided their poor electoral performance (Graham, 
2005).  In turn, continued difficulties reconciling RSS elements with BJS principles 
fractured relations between the two groups, with the RSS often exerting control over 
the BJS.  The BJS however remained ‘closely identified with the severe Hindu 
nationalism of the RSS’ (Graham, 2005: 237).  Core developing BJS policy norms of 
Indianisation, re-establishing the Hindu Rashtra, ongoing suspicion of all outsiders and 
capital, and a desire for a strong, nationalist and nuclearised foreign policy, accurately 
reflected this identification.  Although some dilution of BJS doctrine was attempted in 
the late 1960s (particularly concerning Hindi), it failed to improve their political 
position. 
 
The BJS did however gain experience of government as part of the Janata Party rainbow 
coalition, which won the post-Emergency election of 1977, as BJS politicians won 
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nearly 100 seats (Arora, 2005: 294).  As the most senior BJS leader, Vajpayee was 
appointed Minister of External Affairs, while Advani became Minister of Information 
and Broadcasting.  Janata Party (foreign) policy differed though from many stock BJS 
lines (especially concerning Pakistan) and advocated diplomatic normalization with 
Vietnam and China (see Janata Party 1980 Manifesto, 2005).  Some BJS influence was 
evident however, such as closer links with Israel and Iran (Kishore, 1969: 125-40).  
Additionally, Hindutva’s cultural agenda was implemented in some states and 
sporadically in India’s national education system.  However, frequent Hindu-Muslim 
riots caused some Janata Party members to demand that Vajpayee and Advani withdraw 
from the RSS.  Their refusal led to the coalition’s breakdown in 1979 and subsequent 
electoral defeat in 1980.  
 
5.3) - THE RISE OF THE BJP: 
 
On April 6 1980 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was established under the dual 
leadership of Vajpayee and Advani.  The party aimed to dilute Hindutva to make it more 
politically acceptable - an approach ‘resented by the rest of the Sangh Parivar’ (Jaffrelot, 
2007: 20).  The RSS initially rejected the new party.  However, BJP policy still largely 
followed that of the BJS, and the BJP remained as the political wing of the Sangh Parivar.  
Reflective of its largely upper caste leadership and origins, BJP policy thus concentrated 
on its traditional political basis of a ‘militarized vision of a unified, politicized Hinduism’ 
(Bacchetta, 2000).  This basis continued to be structured by the policy beliefs (and 
nascent norms) that had developed under the BJS.  Overall, BJP policy came to be 
summarized by its foreign policy thinkers as ‘nationalism, national integrity (and) 
national interest’ (Interview A20, 2008)17. 
 
Communalism, Mandal and Ayodhya 
 
Indian politics became more communal in the 1980s as Congress’ explicitly drew on 
both Hindu and Muslim vote banks - a strategy that often played into the BJP’s hands.  
As such, in 1987 the Shah Bano affair, Rajiv Gandhi courted the Muslim vote by 
                                                
17 Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.  Please refer to the 
Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
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passing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill, which adopted sharia 
law into secular law and fuelled BJP arguments of a pseudo-secular Indian state that 
appeased Muslims.  The BJP also gained succour from the influx of Bangladeshi 
immigrants into Assam (said to be diluting the Hindu-dominance of India’s population) 
and the visit of Pope John Paul II.  Additionally, in Punjab, Congress bought religion 
into politics when Indira Gandhi funded the extremist Sikh leader Sant Bhindranwale to 
combat rising Sikh nationalism.  This funding led in 1984 to the storming of Amritsar’s 
Golden Temple and Indira Gandhi’s subsequent assassination.  For the BJP, these 
‘misdeeds were like manna from heaven’ (Corbridge, 1999: 232), and provided a 
platform for their core policies.  Against this background, the BJP won 85 seats in the 
1989 Lok Sabha elections and membership of the National Front (NF) coalition. 
 
The BJP’s success came at a time of reform in India’s electoral system, in particular the 
1990 Mandal Commission’s recommendations to reserve 27% of government jobs for 
the lower castes.  The BJP used Mandal to mobilise upper caste Hindus against the 
increasing political power of lower castes (Bhargava, 1996).  In 1990, BJP president 
Advani then went on a Rath Yatra (chariot procession) across India, intended to 
culminate in Ayodhya where the RSS and the Vishnu Hindu Parishad (VHP - World 
Council of Hindus) were trying to replace a Muslim mosque (Babri Masjid) with a Hindu 
temple (Ram Janmabhooni).  Advani was arrested before his arrival, leading to communal 
rioting by Hindutva activists and the withdrawal of BJP support for the NF coalition, 
which collapsed.  With a joint focus on the nascent insurgency in Kashmir, BJP support 
grew in the subsequent 1991 national elections to 120 seats, giving it a national base and 
making it India’s principal opposition party. 
 
The VHP held further ethno-religious mobilizations in Ayodhya throughout 1991 and 
then on December 6 1992, a BJP-VHP rally at the site led to the destruction of the 
mosque and sparked Hindu-Muslim riots across India, leaving 1,200 people dead.  
Although BJP-held state assemblies were dissolved, and the RSS and VHP temporarily 
banned, Ayodhya established the legitimacy of Hindutva among the Hindu middle class 
(Hansen, 1999).  It also appeared as a validating justification and entrenchment of the 
BJP’s pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim policy norms.  Portrayed as an event that protected all 
Hindus, Ayodhya mobilized Hindu support across caste lines and enabled the 
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mainstream political integration of the BJP.  For Advani, “‘the Ayodhya movement 
reaffirm(ed) the nation’s cultural identity … (and was) the dynamo for a resurgent, 
resolute and modern India”’ (quoted in Jaffrelot, 2007: 291).   
 
After Ayodhya, the BJP became more moderate as it pressed for further electoral 
success, looked for regional partners and was restricted legally (Lochtefeld, 1996; Van 
Dike, 1997).  Consequently, the BJP and the RSS remained at cross-purposes in their 
pursuit of the Hindutva agenda (Jaffrelot, 2005) - confirming the ongoing tension 
between the two groups.  Growing disillusionment with the leftist political order helped 
the BJP’s pursuit of power, as manifested by government corruption, rising economic 
and social dislocation, and internal instability.  In contrast, BJP leaders boasted a ‘record 
of clean public life’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 392) that contrasted with Congress’ 
‘dynastic rule’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 392).  Simultaneously rejecting Islam, 
Christianity and socialism, the BJP voiced ‘deeply-held grievances, frustration and 
aggression against the state and the Congress party’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 99). 
 
In the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP gained 161 seats - becoming the single-largest 
political party in the Indian parliament, outranking Congress for the first time.  They 
were asked to form a government, with Vajpayee as Prime Minister.  Unable to form a 
coalition and due to internal wrangling, the government collapsed after 13 days in 
power.  Then in the Lok Sabha elections of 1998 the BJP won 182 seats.  As leader of 
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with a total of 250 seats, the BJP formed the 
government through a simple majority and Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister on 
March 19 1998.  The BJP’s electoral rise is shown in Table 5.3 below. 
 
   
 SEATS WON VOTE (%) 
ELECTION BJP CONGRESS BJP CONGRESS 
     
1984 2 404 7.74 49.10 
1989 85 197 11.36 39.53 
1991 120 232 20.11 36.26 
1996 161 140 20.29 28.80 
1998 182 141 25.59 25.82 
     
 
Table 5.3: BJP and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1984-1998) 
(Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
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Cultural Nationalism, Positive Secularism and Self-Reliance 
 
The BJP developed and solidified many of the norms present within BJS policy.  As 
such, the BJP remained dedicated to Indianisation and the forging of ‘one nation, one 
people and one culture’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 248).  Developing this norm, 
Indianisation and Hindutva became referred to as “cultural nationalism” - a unifying 
principle of ‘timeless cultural heritage’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 146).  All India’s 
minorities were to be assimilated into the state, as Advani referred to ‘”Mohammadi 
Hindus”, “Christian Hindus”, and “Sikh Hindus” … to emphasize the ancient and 
persistent Hindu character of the Indian nation-state’ (Smith, 1996: 122).  To counter 
any threats to Indianisation the BJP remained dedicated to banning religious conversion 
and cow slaughter.  These policies continued and cemented existing norms from the 
BJS era.   
 
Developing its pro-Hindu (and anti-Muslim, anti-Christian bias) the BJP campaigned for 
“positive secularism” rather than the “vote secularism” of Congress (BJP 1984 
Manifesto, 2005: 397).  Positive secularism represented ‘justice for all, appeasement of 
none’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 359), and contrasted to Congress’ secularism, which 
was seen as pseudo-secular and discriminatory against the majority Hindu population.  
BJP leaders therefore made regular commitments to implement a Uniform Common 
Civil Code for all Indians.  In turn, they wanted to abolish the constitutional autonomy 
of India’s only Muslim-majority state, Kashmir, through the repeal of Article 370 of the 
Indian Constitution.  These policies would eradicate ‘any legal and political recognition 
of cultural and religious difference’ (Khilnani, 1997: 188) and represented the 
development of clear entrenched policy norms, which contrasted with the secular and 
equality norms typical of India’s security identity up to 1998. 
 
These traits fed into ‘the aura of cultural injury and martyrdom (that) is a trademark 
style of the BJP’ (Khilnani, 1997: 189).  Manifesto promises to construct the Ram 
Janmabhoomi temple at Ayodhya as ‘a symbolic righting of historic wrongs’ (BJP 1991 
Manifesto, 2005: 320) testified to these normative sentiments.  The BJP also called 
increasing numbers of illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh ‘an invasion’ (BJP 
1996 Manifesto, 2005: 279) that diluted India’s Hindu majority.  This national 
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chauvinism continued to include a militaristic inclination towards Pakistan whereby the 
Kashmir insurgency heightened fears of an internal Muslim fifth column.  The loyalty of 
Indian communists was also questioned (BJP National Executive 01.05.92, 2005: 265), 
as were Christian missionaries (often seen as being in league with Congress) (BJP 
National Executive 03.03.89, 2005: 89-90), all of whom weakened India’s national 
integrity.  This behaviour compounded BJP fears of outsiders and personified their 
perception of local and global threats to India. 
 
The BJP wanted to reform the Indian education system to reflect its cultural nationalism 
norm.  According to Murli Manohar Joshi (the BJP’s education spokesman), India’s 
western-orientated English medium education system had ‘destroyed the indigenous 
system’ (1994: 27).  A new free education system would build ‘a system worthy of the 
genius of our heritage’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 382-3), inspire an emergent Hindu 
Rashtra and include Vedic mathematics, yoga and Sanskrit.  Although the BJP’s linguistic 
policies were weakened by a need for wider political support, with Urdu being 
encouraged (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 182), Hindi did remain as the dominant national 
language.  In addition, foreign universities were to be stopped from setting up in India 
(BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 182).  The BJP also focused on the importance of cinema 
for encouraging ‘national integration’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 388), although 
globalizing media was regarded as posing a threat to Indian values and morality (BJP 
1998 Manifesto, 2005: 229-233).  Again, all of these policies ran contrary to India’s pre-
1998 security identity. 
 
BJS policy norms concerning swadeshi developed to become ‘”liberalisation with self-
reliance or … self-reliance with liberalization”’ (BJP Executive Meeting quoted in 
Jaffrelot, 2007: 343).  Swadeshi was now retuned to mean ‘economic sovereignty’ (BJP 
1996 Manifesto, 2005: 265) or simply ‘India first’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 159).  
Thus, wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries were to be discouraged and Indian 
businessmen given priority over foreigners.  Concurrently, rapid internal liberalization, 
decentralisation and de-bureaucratisation were promised and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) allowed only in exporting industries.  The BJP’s swadeshi norm contrasted with the 
norm present within India’s security identity until 1998 but only in that it limited the 
rate of liberalization.  This difference inspired confidence in India’s businessmen - a 
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major BJP constituency, and helped plans to attract investment from overseas Indians.  
Overall, according to BJP ideologues, the party stood for ‘free market, free enterprise, 
corporate society’ (Interview A20, 2008)18. 
 
The BJP still advocated government control in some areas due to India’s large 
population and its relative underdevelopment but remained wary of total free trade.  
Thus, their economic policy came to be described as ‘full liberalization and calibrated 
globalisation’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 160).  Often this wariness reflected tensions 
with the RSS and BMS who remained suspicious of outside investment and its cultural 
impact.  These tensions were manifested through the Enron controversy of August 
1994, anti-Kentucky Fried Chicken agitations and the 1996 election slogan of 
“computer chips, not potato chips”.  Overall, the BJP recognized that increased 
economic strength was a way to compete with Asia, China and the US.  Furthermore, 
improved links with the US was ‘the best guarantor of the continuity of the neo-liberal 
orientation’ (Vanaik, 2002: 323).  BJP norms were thus pro-capitalist and pro-western 
concerning world economic engagement, displaying a nuanced difference with norms of 
limited liberalization and a socialist economic orientation. 
 
Land and Neighbours 
 
Restoring and protecting the Hindu Rashtra remained central to BJP policy towards 
India’s neighbours, whereby national integrity was dependent upon territorial integrity.  
Strong borders were also part of great power status and the BJP had especially tough 
policies concerning separatists (Jaitley et al., 2005: 78).  Overall, these beliefs enshrined a 
policy norm of anti-militancy and compounded norms concerning protecting the Hindu 
Rashtra and restoring Akhand Bharat - norms that were more explicit than those in 
India’s pre-1998 security identity, such as “accepting” the Line of Control (LoC) in 
Kashmir.  These norms included legislating against terrorism and secessionist 
movements, mainly associated with Pakistan (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 275).  
Development was also seen as key to stability, particularly in the northeast (BJP 1998 
Manifesto, 2005: 199).  Overall, the BJP regarded India as under threat ‘from one or 
                                                
18 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.   
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another combination of Islamic, Western, Chinese and small regional powers’ (Cohen, 
1997: 29). 
 
Nowhere else was the exclusionist notion of the Hindu Rashtra more under threat than 
in Kashmir.  Thus, BJP promises to achieve Kashmir’s full territorial and political re-
integration, including taking back the parts of it claimed by Pakistan and China, were 
now key policy norms. Overturning India’s defensive and reactive outlook through a 
strong, assertive and militaristic nationalism would rectify these problems.  The BJP also 
recognized that Kashmir had been the root of three wars and that there were clear 
security, economic and social benefits to resolving the issue (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 
390).  Looking for a resolution revealed an ongoing norm of pragmatism within BJP 
policy as they recognised the need for friendly relations with the Muslim countries that 
surrounded India (Malik & Singh, 1994: 124).  The repetition of such sentiments in BJP 
policy documents underscored this norm’s entrenchment.  Such pragmatism was not 
apparent in India’s security identity until 1998.  A fear of suspected Pakistani nuclear 
weapons however tempered such viewpoints.  Enduring US and China transfers of 
weapons and nuclear technology (respectively) were also blamed for creating a regional 
arms race (Mishra, 1996: 79-123).   
 
BJP policy towards China focused upon the continued occupation of Indian territory 
and continued military support to Pakistan as affronts to Indian nationalism and 
sovereignty (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272).  At the same time, BJP leaders ‘were not 
entirely adverse to rhetoric about Sino-Indian cooperation on behalf of the third world’ 
(Garver, 2002: 13).  This move away from the previous anti-China policy of the BJS 
now encompassed the underlying norm of pragmatism apparent in policy towards 
Pakistan (and again contrasting with India’s pre-1998 security identity).  Policy norms 
towards China had thus developed between the BJS and BJP periods.  Overall, the BJP 
aimed for the ‘normalisation of relations with China … (based upon the) proper 
recognition of India’s national interests and (the) honourable solution of the border 
dispute’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 390).  Furthermore, BJP resolutions called for 
negotiations at the political rather than the official level (BJP National Executive 
13.04.83, 2005: 125) in order to maximize Indo-China ‘friendship and cooperation’ (BJP 
1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272).  Increased trade levels were integral to such policies. 
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Towards South Asia, the BJP recognized that India’s ‘national interest is best served by 
creating an environment of peace and harmony’ (Arora, 2005: 282).  In addition, an 
emphasis remained upon ‘re-establish(ing) India’s Asian identity’ (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 
2005: 416).  Regional peace and non-interference furthermore underpinned BJP policy, 
and they demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka (BJP 1984 
Manifesto, 2005: 417).  Concerning Myanmar, the BJP saw ‘scope for greater co-
operation in the fields of defence, security, economy and culture’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 
2005: 194).  In turn, with Bangladesh, criticism of ‘unabated illegal infiltration’ (BJP 
1998 Manifesto, 2005: 195) continued.  Overall, the BJP wanted ‘the proper ordering of 
relations with our neighbours’ (BJP National Executive 09.11.89, 2005: 96), based 
around a norm of India as the region’s natural hegemon.  In the IOR, the BJP rejected 
‘the domination of superpower interests’ (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 417), advocating a 
blue water Indian Navy to ‘increase the radius of (India’s) power projection’ (BJP 1998 
Manifesto, 2005: 197).  These policies established norms of India as the region’s natural 
hegemon and of controlling and protecting the IOR - norms similar to those of the pre-
1998 security policy but with added bite.   
 
Restoring India’s Place in the World 
 
Contrary to Congress’ perceived effeminate idealism and morality, the BJP argued that 
India had to be much more responsive and assertive in its foreign policy aims - 
indicating an appreciation of realpolitik.  In turn, national interest had to be assertively 
protected, with a strong and secure India being a prerequisite for ‘transform(ing) India 
into a prosperous and powerful nation’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 201).  These 
principles established norms of being assertive, and displaying realism in BJP foreign 
policy - whereby according to Kautilya ‘”power is the only means to ensure friendly 
relations with other nations”’ (quoted in Arora, 2005: 281).  These beliefs contrasted 
with the ahisma and idealism norms within India’s security identity until 1998.  The BJP 
also continued to equate becoming a global power with a norm of acquiring nuclear 
weapons, and had manifesto promises to ‘give our Defence Forces Nuclear Teeth’ (BJP 
1991 Manifesto, 2005: 352).  While contrary to the nuclear ambiguity norm typical of 
India’s security identity up to 1998, the BJP also remained pro-nuclear disarmament.  
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This duality suggested a different style and emphasis from Congress rather than a 
completely different normative basis. 
 
Nuclear weapons were central to ending Congress’ ‘policy of drift and escapism’ (BJP 
National Executive 19.07.85, 2005: 117) and ensuring India’s total autonomy in her 
foreign policy.  Furthermore, having nuclear weapons would build a proud and 
resurgent India, and validate the norm of making India a global power.  National 
security spending also increasingly became a focal point of BJP discourse and the party 
continued to advocate defence expenditure increases as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Mishra, 1996: 121-3).  Additionally, the BJP supported ballistic missile 
production (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 277) and institutionalizing foreign policy via a 
National Security Council (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 351).  Further promises included 
coordinating the Indian government ministries towards foreign policy, harmonizing the 
Indian military and undertaking a Strategic Defence Review (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 
193-7).  All of these policies fed into the rationale underpinning the core BJP policy 
norm of proactively making India into a global power. 
 
The BJP also wanted to give India a loud, important and respected voice in international 
relations.  BJP policy makers saw no common ideology with the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), complaining that it did not help India versus Pakistan or China and 
that the NAM’s interests were put above India’s (Interview A20, 2008)19.  Such a vision 
criticized Congress’ governments that had ignored ‘our rightful place and role in world 
affairs … (leading to) a loss of national self-confidence and pride’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 
2005: 192).  The BJP also recognized that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War, India needed a new international voice (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 
2005: 350).  The BJP wanted new horizons beyond Congress’ pre-occupation with 
Pakistan and began comparing India with the rest of the world, rather than Congress’ 
sole comparisons of India with South Asia (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 273).  The BJP 
thus continued demands for permanent UNSC membership, and bilateral ties based 
upon ‘strict reciprocity’ (BJP National Executive 07.11.92, 2005: 73) - both of which 
became established norms within its foreign policy outlook.   
 
                                                
19 Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.   
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Elsewhere, the BJP continued the BJS norm of insisting on closer Indo-Israeli ties (and 
balanced West Asia relations) although the former partly diminished after relations were 
normalized during the 1990s.  Indeed, by 1998, Israel was clubbed together with other 
countries including Iran, Central Asia, Africa and Japan, as critical bilateral partners (BJP 
1998 Manifesto, 2005: 194).  In turn, historical distrust against the USSR (based upon 
anti-communist sentiments) seemed to evaporate after the end of the Cold War, as the 
BJP recognised a ‘compatibility of interests’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272).  The BJP 
also continued to advocate protecting Indians (particularly Hindus) abroad in Guyana, 
West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius and South Africa, promoting dual citizenship (BJP 1991 
Manifesto, 2005: 352), and ‘economic, social, cultural, emotional and spiritual links’ (BJP 
1998 Manifesto, 2005: 209).  In these ways, the BJP wanted to ‘mobilize Non-Resident 
Indians to effectively lobby India’s case with the governments and business 
establishments of their host country’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 209). 
 
Globally, the BJP rejected the US’s self-adopted role as a “world policeman” (BJP 
National Executive 23.04.81, 2005: 135).  They also opposed US pressure on nuclear 
weapons, which was seen to be against Indian sovereignty, pro-Pakistan and emblematic 
of weak Congress governments (BJP National Executive 23.12.95, 2005).  Conversely, 
by the late 1990s the BJP saw better relations with the US as key to making India a 
global power but ‘based on mutual respect and a congruence of interests’ (BJP 1996 
Manifesto, 2005: 272), especially economic.  The BJP therefore expected the US ‘to be 
more sensitive to India’s security and economic interests’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 
193), particularly over their links to Pakistan.  In fact, the BJP wanted closer Indo-US 
defensive ties provided they helped to annul the Pakistan threat (Mishra, 1996: 110).  
The party also saw the US as a potential reliable partner and that closer US ties would 
help India’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ambitions.  By 1998, BJP policy 
towards the US had developed into a norm of distrust mixed with a pro-capitalist 
leaning that recognized the advantages of closer Indo-US ties.  It also reflected the US-
based education of many BJP politicians, in contrast to India’s elites in the 1930s to 





From their emergence in the nineteenth century to their election victory of 1998, there 
was a normative consistency to political Hindu nationalism based upon an ongoing 
process of policy development and solidification.  Repeated narratives and consistent 
principles critically entrenched key norms into the BJP’s domestic and foreign policy 
perspectives.  As per the three indicators of norm measurement (Table 2.1), the high 
frequency of similar events harmonized these norms across different generations of 
political Hindu nationalism and (like India’s security identity until 1998) predominantly 
transcended international structural changes.  The BJP did recognize however the need 
for Indian to find a new voice in international affairs, especially after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Furthermore, the norms were developed and refined as the BJP rose to 
power in the 1980s and 1990s, often in response to fresh political interactions and 
experiences (including its ongoing relationship with the RSS).  Of particular note were 
the BJP’s nuclear ambitions, which pre-dated the 1962 war with China, China’s 1964 
nuclear tests and Pakistan’s 1965 invasion, thus stressing the primacy of the ideational 
(rather than material) account critical to the security identity approach.  Just as was 
evident concerning norms in India’s security identity prior to 1998, we also saw how 
BJP conceptions of the world helped to shape their ongoing assessment and attitudes 
towards other states (most pertinently Pakistan and China).  A summary of major BJP 
policy norms until 1998 can be found in Table 5.4 below.  
 
   
MAJOR COMPOSITE NORMS IN BJP POLICY UNTIL 1998 
POLITICAL PHYSICAL PERCEPTUAL 
   
 
: cultural nationalism 
(Indianisation / 
Hindutva) 
: positive secularism 
: India first swadeshi / 
calibrated globalization 
: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian  
: anti-militancy (as external) 
 
 
: protect the Hindu Rashtra  
: Akhand Bharat – explicit 
policy to regain Kashmir 
: but pragmatic engagement 
with Pakistan and China 
: natural regional hegemon 
: control / protect the IOR 
 
: assertive 
: realpolitik / realism 
: global power / UNSC 
: pro-nuclear weapons 
: West Asia: explicitly 
pro-Israel & balanced 
: US: distrust / pro-
capitalist 
   
 
Table 5.4: Major Composite Norms in BJP Policy until 1998 
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Referring back to Chapter 4, which identified the dominant norms structuring India’s 
security identity until 1998, a cursory comparison with BJP policy norms becomes 
possible.  Such a comparison highlights where possible harmony and dissonance 
between the two sets of norms would occur when the BJP-led NDA came to office in 
1998.  Importantly, the norms underpinning the BJP’s policy consensus appear to 
(largely) differ from those structuring India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998, 
despite developing in the same context and in response to the same events taking place 
at the same frequency.  This divergence confirms not only that differing ideologies are 
structured around differing norms but that there are multiple, composite and competing 
norms concerning how Indian security ought to be practiced.  These composite norms 
are set out in Table 5.5 below. 
 
   
MAJOR COMPOSITE NORMS UNTIL 1998 NORMATIVE 
SOURCE INDIAN SECURITY IDENTITY BJP POLICY 
   
 
POLITICAL: 
: (socialist) democracy 
: equality / tolerance 
: secularism / plurality 
: swadeshi then limited 
liberalization 
: anti-communal 
: anti-militancy (as internal) 
: cultural nationalism 
(Indianisation / Hindutva) 
: positive secularism 
: India first swadeshi / 
calibrated globalization 
: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian  
: anti-militancy (as external) 
 
PHYSICAL: 
: Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, 
suspicion / LoC “accepted” 
: China: continued territorial 
threats / ongoing suspicion 
: regional hegemon - 
reciprocity then benevolence 
: tacit IOR dominance 
: protect the Hindu Rashtra  
: Akhand Bharat – explicit 
policy to regain Kashmir 
: but pragmatic engagement 
with Pakistan and China 
: natural regional hegemon 
: control / protect the IOR 
 
PERCEPTUAL: 
: ahisma / idealism 
: autonomy / non-alignment  
: great power aspiration 
: nuclear ambiguity 
: West Asia: explicitly pro-
Muslim then balanced 
: US: distrust / anti-western 
: assertive  
: realpolitik / realism 
: global power / UNSC 
: pro-nuclear weapons 
: West Asia: explicitly pro-
Israel and balanced 
: US: distrust / pro-capitalist 
   
 
Table 5.5: Comparing India’s Security Identity with BJP Policy until 1998 
 
Through this comparison, examples of dissonance can be seen in the political source 
concerning the basis of the Indian state (secularism versus cultural nationalism), in the 
physical source concerning the status of Kashmir (“acceptance” of the Line of Control 
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(LoC) versus an explicit policy to regain all the state), and in the perceptual source 
concerning their style of international engagement (ahisma versus assertive).  It is the 
clear differences in their core beliefs and principles that produce this dissonance.  
Conversely, we can see near harmony between some of these norms, such as the shared 
balance between swadeshi and liberalisation, as well as commonalities concerning being 
South Asia’s hegemon and achieving great power status.  Here, the difference between 
the norms underpinning India’s security identity until 1998 and BJP policy appears to be 
of style, nuance or indeed semantics.  Overall, this evidence of norm dissonance and 
harmony confirms this research’s central premise that differ ideologies produce 
different (domestic and foreign) policy norms.  It is also the basis for comparing NDA 
policy from 1998 to 2004 with previous governments.  The following three chapters 
carry out this comparison to isolate divergence and convergence between BJP policy 






the BJP’s Impact on India’s Domestic Politics’  
 
‘the cultural impulses of India are the first building block’ 
(Singh [Jaswant], 1999a: 4) 
 
‘making the party … bring about parivartan (change) in every sphere 
of national life - economic, social, political and cultural’ 
(BJP National Council 03.05.98, 2005: 107) 
 
‘Ayodhya bought us to power’ 
(Advani, 2008: 31) 
  
Having established the presence of two sets of composite norms concerning Indian 
foreign policy and security, how did these differing norms converge and diverge during 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government?  
Here, I investigate this interaction in the first source of the security identity - the 
political - in order to analyze the impact, or otherwise, of the core normative practice of 
India’s security identity upon BJP policy when in government.  Such an approach 
substantiates our focus upon analyzing the internal (domestic) sources of security and 
emphasizes how there are multiple, composite and competing norms present within a 
state’s security practice.  This approach also shows the ways in which India’s security 
identity limited the BJP-led NDA government’s influence on the domestic political basis 
of the Indian state, revealing evidence of norm continuity and change in India’s security 
practice.  A summary of the two (competing) sets of key composite norms that 





INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY BJP POLICY 
  
 
: (socialist) democracy 
: equality / tolerance 
: secularism / plurality 
: swadeshi then limited 
liberalization 
: anti-communal 
: anti-militancy (as internal) 
 
 
: cultural nationalism 
(Indianisation / Hindutva) 
: positive secularism 
: India-first swadeshi / calibrated 
globalization 
: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian  




Table 6.1: Political Norms in India’s Security Identity & BJP Policy until 1998 
 
The chapter is split into three major sections.  The first section deals with how the BJP 
behaved in government, especially concerning the coalition constraints it faced in the 
NDA, their promotion of Sangh Parivar activists into state institutions and the nuclear 
nationalism of the 1998 Pokhran tests.  Section two then analyses how the BJP’s 
programmatic communalism became personified through its policies towards India’s 
Muslims and Christians, the conceptual linkages engendered between Pakistan and 
terrorism, and attempts to re-write Indian history.  The final section then assesses the 
BJP’s positioning within India’s emergent modernity, especially in terms of 
globalization, and a growing middle class and mass media.  I end the chapter with some 
conclusions, especially concerning how the BJP-led NDA constituted a shift in Indian 
politics that appeared to not only threaten India’s secular foundations but also to change 
the basis of the political dimension of India’s security identity. 
 
6.1) - POLITICAL REALITIES AND POKHRAN II: 
 
Although by far the largest party in the NDA coalition that won the 1998 Lok Sabha 
general election, the coalition’s diverse nature constrained the BJP’s activities while in 
government.  Consequently, many of the BJP’s core election promises were set aside to 
be reflective of coalitional consensus and, as an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
official notes, the ‘discipline of the democratic system’ (Interview B12, 2008)20.  In the 
NDA’s National Agenda (drafted by all its coalition partners), BJP plans to enact a 
                                                
20 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and ambassador, 
Delhi, October 22 2008.  Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out 
for this thesis. 
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Uniform Civil Code (negating special provisions and personal laws for Muslims and 
other minorities), to build the Ram Janmabhooni temple in Ayodhya, and to remove 
Article 370 from the Constitution (providing the state of Jammu and Kashmir with a 
special status), were all shelved.  Coalition partners did however agree with the BJP’s 
pledge to ‘exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 
197).  The composition of the winning NDA coalition in the 1998 Lok Sabha general 
elections is shown in Table 6.2 below. 
 
   
COALITION PARTY NATIONAL 
VOTE (%) 
SEATS 
   
BJP 25.59 182 
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (AIADMK) 
1.83 18 
Samata Party (SAP) 1.76 12 
Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 1.00 9 
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) 0.81 8 
All India Trinamool Congress 
(WBTMC) 
2.42 7 
Shiv Sena (SS) 1.77 6 
Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) 0.42 4 
Lok Shakti (LS) 0.69 3 
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (MDMK) 
0.44 3 
Haryana Vikas Party (HVP) 0.24 1 
Janata Party (JP) 0.12 1 
NTR Telugu Desam Party (Lakshmi 
Parvathi) (NTRTDP (LP)) 
0.10 0 
Mizo National Front (MNF) 0.02 0 
   
TOTAL: 37.21 254 
   
 
Table 6.2: NDA Parties, National Vote and Seats in the 
1998 Lok Sabha General Election 
 (Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
 
In turn, the BJP recognized that trying to implement all their manifesto promises would 
threaten the stability and continuance of the coalition, and instead elected for a 
‘pragmatic rather than dogmatic posture’ (Kantha, 1997: 3096).  That no coalition had 
ever served a full term in Indian politics underscored such a prerogative.  For Hansen 
and Jaffrelot (2001), such actions represented the “compulsions of politics”, whereby 
once a political party enters government in India it gravitates to the political centre 
ground.  Such observations are important indicators for our analysis of India’s security 
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identity, especially in terms of indicating the potential acquiescence of political parties to 
dominant, established and embedded normative practice.  The overriding anti-Congress 
and anti-Left nature of the NDA, conversely suggested prospective discontinuity and 
polarization from such previous normative practice, as India’s security identity had 
formed and developed under Congress-dominated regimes. 
 
Constrained yet Dominant 
 
Despite its diluted agenda, the BJP dominated the NDA coalition and secured the key 
domestic cabinet roles.  Atal Behari Vajpayee was Prime Minister, Lal Krishna Advani 
Home Minister, Yashwant Sinha and then Jaswant Singh Finance Minister, Murli 
Manohar Joshi Education Minister, and Jaswant Singh then Yaswant Sinha External 
Affairs Minister.  Such dominance enabled the BJP’s steering of government policy and 
its promotion of Hindutva.  Confirming their still close ties, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS) vetted both the full list of cabinet ministers before their appointment, as 
well as the National Agenda (Vanaik, 2002: 324).  Advani confirmed such a working 
relationship, describing the RSS and the BJP as a ‘duo working in tandem’ (2005: 6).  
The makeup of the coalition was also representative of an Indian political system 
mobilized ‘along ever narrower lines of political identity’ (Tharoor, 1998: 131), with 
many of the smaller coalition parties more concerned with regional than national or 
international politics.  These smaller parties were diverse in their (often) exclusive 
domestic concerns, variously focused upon religious, cultural, linguistic and caste 
interests.  Thus, while the NDA constrained the BJP’s radicalism, the BJP was the only 
party in the coalition with an international agenda.   
 
The BJP’s susceptibility to coalition politics remained apparent however, most 
particularly in April 1999 when the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(AIADMK) withdrew its support, resulting in the fall of the NDA government.  In the 
subsequent Lok Sabha general election in October 1999, the NDA was re-elected and 
achieved a larger majority than in 1998, as shown in Table 6.3 below.  The NDA’s 
renewed mandate was bolstered by an additional 29 seats from the Telugu Desam Party 
(TDP), who were affiliated with the BJP but were not part of the NDA.  While 
Congress’ share of the national vote rose from 25.82% to 28.30% in 1999, their number 
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of seats fell from 141 to 114 (Electoral Commission India, 2010), further increasing the 
NDA’s governing position through an enhanced majority. 
 
   
COALITION PARTY NATIONAL 
VOTE (%) 
SEATS 
   
BJP 23.75 182 
Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) 3.10 21 
Shiv Sena (SS) 1.56 15 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 1.73 12 
Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 1.20 10 
All India Trinamool Congress 
(WBTMC) 
2.57 8 
Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) 0.65 5 
All India Lok Dal (AILD) 0.55 5 
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (MDMK) 
0.44 4 
Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference (J&KNC) 
0.12 4 
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) 0.69 2 
Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) 0.37 2 
Asum Gana Parishad (AGP) 0.32 0 
Lok Shakti (LS) 0.01 0 
   
TOTAL: 37.06 270 
   
 
Table 6.3: NDA Parties, National Vote and Seats in the 
1999 Lok Sabha General Election 
(Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
 
The BJP’s dominance of the NDA was reinforced by the structure of Indian governance 
and Indian bureaucracy.  Critical to these structures is the personalised nature of Indian 
politics based upon unquestioning loyalty and the willingness to subordinate ministry 
interests to those of an individual political leader (Coen, 1971; Charlton, 1997: 206-212; 
Hardgrave, 1986; Interview A18, 200821).  Such a system can foster both corruption and 
nepotism, especially in conjunction with the promotion of one’s own party workers and 
loyalists (Das, S.K., 2001; Jai, 2001).  Accordingly, the BJP systematically promoted its 
own supporters to positions of influence during the NDA period.  Furthermore, and 
despite election promises to fight bhrashtachar (corruption) and ensure shuchita (probity in 
public life) the NDA was no less prone to scandal than its predecessors.  In separate 
                                                
21 Interview with a think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008. 
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incidents, the BJP’s president, Bangaru Laxman, and the president of the Samata Party 
(a key partner in the pre-1999 NDA coalition), were filmed accepting bribes. 
 
The BJP’s promotion of its RSS supporters, along with members of other Sangh Parivar 
groups, strengthened the party’s political position, while allowing these groups to 
influence the Indian state as ‘extra-state powers (that) enforce accountability at a lower 
level’ (Froerer, 2005: 39).  Such positioning allowed the BJP to challenge established 
norms in India’s security identity (such as equality and secularism), by introducing 
Hindutva-orientated policy norms (such as Indianisation and positive secularism).  For 
example, evidence increased of Supreme Court judgments developing an inherently pro-
BJP or pro-Hindu bias (Pinto, 1999).  The BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-Christian policies 
also became increasingly institutionalized into India’s political fabric, again confronting 
established norms of anti-communalism, tolerance and plurality within India’s security 
identity.  These incidences suggested a trend of “saffronisation” (developing a Hindutva-
orientated prejudice) within Indian politics.  Therefore, even though the more militant 
aspirations of the BJP’s political manifesto never materialized, the BJP did introduce 
normative prospective change through the political promotion of their RSS supporters. 
 
The Proving Ground of Nuclear Nationalism 
 
When the NDA government took power in April 1998, the BJP wanted to quickly 
prove their Hindu nationalist credentials in a way they had never had the chance to do 
so in 1996, when they collapsed after 13 days in government.  They also wanted to 
break the status quo of previous regimes and to demonstrate as a former Indian Army 
officer noted, ‘that they had more guts than Congress’ (Interview A12, 2008)22.  In turn, 
Vajpayee stated, the BJP wanted to ‘”show them [the electorate] that we mean 
business”’ (quoted in Chawla, 1998).  Pursuing their one core policy sanctioned by the 
NDA’s National Agenda and fulfilling an election promise dating from the 1950s, these 
aims were personified through the nuclear tests carried out on May 11 and 13 1998 at 
Pokhran in Rajasthan, 150 kilometres from the Pakistan border.  Often referred to as 
their ‘“nuclear nationalism”’ (Chaturvedi, 2005: 273), the nuclear tests characterized the 
                                                
22 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Army General, Delhi, May 5 2008.  
 127 
BJP’s assertive policy approach intended to ‘build a new India that will stride and not 
shuffle into the next century’ (BJP National Council 03.05.98, 2005: 107). 
 
Domestically, the 1998 tests carried out a BJP (and Hindutva) normative commitment, 
secured the status of the new NDA government and mobilised popular sentiments for 
the BJP’s militant nationalism (Tremblay & Schofield, 2005; Seethi, 2005).  Reflecting 
such perspectives, the tests were officially dubbed Shakti after the Hindu goddess of 
strength and energy.  Despite the precedents of the 1974 PNE, the onward trajectory of 
India’s nuclear programme and also the tests being known as Pokhran II, 1998 
represented a fundamental development in India’s security identity.  By making India’s 
nuclear capacity overt, norms of nuclear ambiguity that had evolved since independence 
were overturned.  Pokhran II underlined intrinsic differences in the normative security 
practice between the BJP policy (and actions) and India’s security identity until 1998.   
 
The 1998 tests also fitted with the BJP’s pre-1998 rhetoric that the “political Hinduism” 
dominant under Congress regimes was historically defensive and reactive (Kapur, 2006: 
39).  Such Hinduism, the BJP had argued, was unwilling to assert itself against outside 
forces such as Muslims, Christians and other western influences, and had produced a 
weak and subservient India.  Therefore, the nuclear tests represented, according to The 
Pioneer, an ‘explosion of “self-esteem”’ (quoted in Sarkar, 1998: 1725) that was 
assertively projected inside India and externally to the rest of the region and the world.  
The 1998 tests further represented a public enunciation of the core beliefs and norms 
underpinning BJP ideology and policy.  Only Prime Minister Vajpayee, National 
Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, and Professor Rajendra Singh (an RSS officer) knew of 
the timing of the tests (and notably not the Defence Minister, Georges Fernandes).  
This grouping confirmed the historical, ideological and organizational links between the 
BJP and RSS central to the tests’ rationale.  The tests also placated RSS hard-liners, as 
‘”the party hawks wanted to extract their pound of flesh … too many other concessions 
were being made”’ (Ahmad quoted in Serrill & McGirk, 1998). 
 
The BJP’s normative policy beliefs concerning Pakistan and China as threats to the 
Hindu Rashtra were additionally optimized by the tests (as further explored in Chapter 7).  
Pokhran II also asserted the norms present within both BJP policy and the pre-1998 
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security identity of India’s aspired-to great power role in the world versus other nuclear 
powers and opposition to international multilateral controls (as will be shown in 
Chapter 8).  These normative linkages confirmed the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of the multiple composite norms structuring India’s security practice 
across the three normative sources (political, physical, perceptual), from both the 
perspective of India’s security identity and BJP policy.  Furthermore, we can see how the 
BJP’s Hindu nationalist foreign policy fed into both the domestic and international 
dimensions of the security identity’s political source by portraying Hindus under threat 
from (internal and external) outsiders.  Some observers additionally (and critically) saw 
Pokhran II as the ‘swadeshi bomb’ (Sarkar, 1998: 1725) and as a symbol of India’s 
renewed autonomy. 
 
Moreover, the tests were a political statement to show the BJP as the only party who 
were serious about national security not only in the international but also in the 
domestic context (Interview B3, 2008)23.  Here, the Muslim-Pakistan nexus was added 
to such underlying principles and reinforced the ideological underpinnings of what was 
referred to as the “Hindu bomb”.  In turn, the tests were regarded as an act that unified 
the whole country, mainstreaming (and normalizing) these sentiments outside of any 
political affiliations.  As Vajpayee accurately remarked afterwards ‘”an overwhelming 
majority of Indians … have spontaneously supported India’s step of conducting nuclear 
tests … there is an absolute national consensus on this issue”’ (quoted in Chawla, 1998; 
Dettman, 2001).  To maximize public support, the tests were coupled to the public 
holiday of Buddha Purnima.  In short, the tests buttressed the BJP’s political support 
from their coalition partners, the Indian public and the RSS while establishing a pro-
nuclear weapons norm in India’s security identity and practice.   
 
6.2) - FINDING ENEMIES: 
 
Through its emphasis on cultural nationalism, India was ‘an object of reverence’ 
(Tarkunde, 1998: 1696) for the BJP.  In turn, their policy norm of Indianisation aimed 
to ‘”obliterate the differences between all the cultures co-existing in the country”’ 
(Indian Supreme Court quoted in Nauriya, 1996: 11).  Against this backdrop, pre-1998 
                                                
23 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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Indian security identity policy norms of secularism and plurality were deemed to devalue 
‘the religious and cultural consciousness of the people’ (Momen, 2005: 256), were anti-
Hindu and went against the very nature of India itself.  Furthermore, the promotion of 
core Hindutva policy norms such as cultural nationalism and positive secularism 
demanded the identification and targeting of suitable outsiders with which to portray 
the Hindu Rashtra as under attack.  These outsiders were primarily the traditional BJP / 
Sangh Parivar scapegoat of India’s Muslim population but also India’s small Christian 
minority.   
 
The BJP attempted to put into practice policies intended to overcome the politics of 
appeasement and pseudo-secularism they believed to have been practiced by Congress.  
Possessing the power of governance gave the BJP an opportunity to shift away from 
notions of an inclusive, secular nation to one that was communal, Hindu-based and 
Hindu-orientated as per the demands of Hindutva.  At their strongest, BJP activists such 
as Prafull Goradia proclaimed ‘”we haven’t come out of the slavery complex … we need 
a heavy dose of nationalism to develop national and communal self-confidence so that 
we get over this”’ (quoted in Elliott, 1998).  India’s composite culture was thus to be 
refocused from plurality to hegemony in order to claim back what Advani regarded as 
its ‘”Hindu content”’ (quoted in Noorani, 2008: 85).  Rewriting the role of Hindus 
within Indian history helped amalgamate such policies and was explicitly undertaken by 
the BJP during the NDA period.  Implementing these BJP policy norms directly 
challenged the composite norms that had structured India’s security identity, and 
threatened to overturn the normative basis of its political source. 
 
Programmatic Communalism and Exclusionary Politics 
 
By the 1990s the politics of Congress (especially around elections) were deemed by 
Indian commentators of all hues to be increasingly communal in nature.  The binary 
opposition of communalism/secularism had therefore blurred, whilst attempts ‘to 
portray the BJP as being synonymous with communalism … ignore(d) an almost 
universal resort to (the) communal card for political gains by most actors in Indian 
politics’ (Kantha, 1997: 3090).  However, while Congress’ increasingly ambiguous 
definition of secularism ‘often tolerated, encouraged and supported communalism … (it 
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was) opportunistic … the BJP’s communalism is programmatic - dedicated to the 
creation of Hindu Rashtra’ (Ram, 1999: 1567).  The BJP was thus seen to use 
communalism out of (a normative) conviction rather than electoral opportunism.  The 
BJP’s continued links with the RSS underlined the party’s ideological commitment to 
communalism, in particular its anti-Muslim tendencies, which had become normalized 
in their domestic policy since India’s independence. 
 
Despite establishing a Ministry for Tribal Affairs and purportedly being more pro-
reservation for India’s lower castes (BJP National Council 27.08.00, 2005: 75), BJP 
norms of Indianisation were insinuated into India’s political process.  This introduction 
was aided by India’s courts sanctioning the acceptance of Hindutva as ‘”a way of life or 
state of mind … it is not to be equated with or understood as religious 
fundamentalism”’ (quoted in Crossmand & Ratna, 1996: 2613).  While unable to 
introduce their Uniform Civil Code, the BJP-led NDA did set up a Constitutional 
Review Commission, as it investigated how the established norms of secularism and 
equality within the Indian Constitution could be surmounted.  In turn, the BJP 
continuously cast aspersions on the loyalty of Indian Muslims to the Indian nation, 
deeming them to be linked to Pakistan and by extension (through insurgency in 
Kashmir and elsewhere) linked to terrorism. 
 
By continuing to use this group as an ideational scapegoat, the BJP were able to 
personalise apparent threats to their vision of a united Hindu nation (Akhand Bharat), 
which in turn helped to solidify their exclusionary politics.  In this regard, the BJP also 
became purposefully anti-terrorist as a covert way to be anti-Muslim.  Following on 
from the normative content of BJP policy pre-1998, Bangladeshi Muslims continued to 
be seen as creating communal problems in bordering Indian states through illegal 
immigration, as well as drug and people smuggling (BJP National Executive 04.04.01, 
2005: 54-5).  Such attitudes were then aggressively linked to the fear of Pakistan and 
Muslims as shown in the Pokhran II tests and consequently connected with BJP policy 
towards Pakistan by feeding BJP supporters with anti-Muslim sentiment.  These fears 




Since assuming power in Gujarat in 1995, the BJP had ‘stacked its inner ranks’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002: 41) with members of the Sangh Parivar (predominantly from the 
RSS and VHP) in order to promote its cultural nationalist agenda.  According to a 1998 
joint report by the Committee to Protect Democratic Rights and the Andhra Pradesh 
Civil Liberties Committee, it was ‘”a well planned strategy … aim(ed) at communalising 
society at the grass root level”’ (quoted in Human Right Watch, 2002: 44).  Such 
radicalizing trends were compounded in 2001 with the appointment of Narendra Modi 
as chief minister in the state, the first RSS pracharak (leader) to gain such a position.  By 
2002, Gujarat’s institutions had become effectively saffronised, and exemplified 
Hindutva norms of Indianisation, positive secularism and (tacit) anti-Muslim sentiments.  
These trends signaled ‘a dramatic reversal of that gradual process of integration and 
consolidation which has been going on for the past three centuries (in India)’ 
(Frykenberg, 1997: 22).  Further still, Gujarat in 2002 would earn ‘the dubious 
reputation of being a laboratory for the Hindutva agenda’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 
41). 
 
On February 27 2002, a Muslim mob attacked a train at Godhra, killing 58 Hindu 
pilgrims (including Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) - World Council of Hindus) activists) 
who were returning from an attempt to restart the building of the Ram Janmabhooni 
temple at Ahodhya.  In the attack’s immediate aftermath, Modi claimed that the 
violence was an ‘“organized terrorist attack”’ (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2002: 
13) aimed at destabilizing the state.  Building upon the proximity of Pakistan, the RSS 
additionally argued that the Godhra attack had been instigated by Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) and that local Muslims were to blame and were inherently 
pro-Pakistani (Chenoy et al., 2002).  In turn, Gujarat’s Minister of State for Home, 
Gordhan Zadaphia (who was also a senior VHP activist), stated ‘”we will teach a lesson 
to those who have done this.  No one will be spared and we will make sure that the 
forces behind this act will never dare to repeat it”’ (quoted in Chenoy et al., 2002).  On 
the following day, February 28, Hindu-Muslim communal violence erupted across the 
state, leaving thousands dead in a matter of days.  
 
The infiltration of Sangh Parivar activists into the Gujarati state apparatus aided the 
resultant organized, systematic and pre-planned violence, whereby rioters were given 
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lists of Muslim houses, flats and shops (Shah, 2002: 1391).  This state complicity and 
orchestration was supported by local police as the saffronisation of state institutions 
meant that there was often no physical or legal protection for Gujarat’s Muslim 
population (Human Right Watch, 2002).  The face of ‘hard Hindutva’ (Kapur, 2006: 205) 
was also manifested as the VHP’s militant wing - the Bajrang Dal - led the rioting.  These 
events seemed to exemplify the extreme communal agenda of the BJP (and the Sangh 
Parivar) that becomes possible when an Indian state is under their control (Mehta, 2006: 
158).  In December 2002, the Modi government re-won the state assembly elections, 
revealing the powerful succour of majoritarian communal politics and their acceptance 
into mainstream Indian government.  Although not replacing existing norms of tolerance 
and equality within India’s security identity, Gujarat in 2002 showed how these norms 
were being widely challenged by competing BJP policy norms, producing new and 
developing (proto-normative) practices in Indian domestic politics.  It also confirmed 
the presence of different norms within the BJP itself (hard Hindutva and a softer 
Hindutva), and how these norms were balanced / employed by the party’s politicians. 
 
New Targets and Anti-Terrorism 
 
The arrival of the BJP into power also witnessed the targeting of India’s Christian 
minority who make up 2-3% of the Indian population.  Much of this violence stemmed 
from BJP and Hindutva hostility to Christian conversions of the Indian population away 
from Hinduism and the presence of Christian missionaries in tribal areas.  Indeed after 
1998, the RSS explicitly prohibited Hindus from conversion to Christianity (Du, 2001: 
151) and the BJP prevented foreign missionaries from entering the country.  All of these 
actions represented distinct continuities from the BJP’s anti-Christian policy norms 
established up until 1998, and were in direct competition with norms of tolerance and 
secularism in India’s security identity.  Apart from being regarded as a religious threat 
through lower-caste conversions, discrimination against Christians was also becoming 
increasingly based upon their association with anti-war and anti-nuclear protests 
(Shourie, 2006).  Anti-Christian actions also drew attention away from the BJP’s anti-
Muslim activities, particularly as ‘Ayodhya is no longer yielding the fruit it once did’ 
(Pinto, 2000: 3636). 
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Increased violence against Christians rose when the BJP-led NDA entered power 
(Sarkar, 1999: 1698), and often involved the setting on fire of prayer halls, churches, 
shops and houses.  Most infamously, on January 27 1999, an Australian missionary 
called Graham Staines and his two sons were burnt to death by Hindu extremists.  In 
the wake of further attacks on Christians in Gujarat and Orissa in 1999, the BJP 
government, as Mishra argues, ‘question(ed) the religious freedoms guaranteed by the 
Indian constitution . . . (and) created a culture of impunity in which even low-level 
police officials felt emboldened to harass them [the Christians]’ (2004a: 30).  By 2001, 
Human Rights Watch noted that ‘“attacks against Christians . . . (had) increased 
significantly since the BJP came to power”’ (quoted in Beer & Mitchell, 2006: 1003).  In 
turn, RSS youth organisations attacked Christians and burnt Valentine’s Day banners 
(Elliott, 2001).  Christians had publicly become the BJP’s ‘new enemies’ (Sarkar, 1999: 
1691), targeted to consolidate the rise of Hindutva and its core policy agenda of cultural 
nationalism. 
 
The increased number of attacks against minorities during the BJP-led NDA period also 
signified a rise in human rights abuses.  Furthermore, according to Varshney (2002), the 
diametric opposition between Hindu nationalism and secular nationalism had resulted in 
increasing state repression, particularly with a central apparatus led by the BJP.  Sangh 
Parivar elements were increasingly and regularly blamed in inquiry commission reports 
for instigating communal violence (Ram, 1999: 1568).  The failure of the Indian 
government to find anyone guilty of such violence also appeared to signify the 
normalized presence of pro-Hindutva personnel within India’s political apparatus 
(Interview A14, 2008)24.  In 1999, Amnesty International reported that state complicity 
in human rights abuses ‘”continued to be widespread … conditions in many prisons 
(were) cruel, inhumane, or degrading … “disappearances” continued and hundreds of 
extrajudicial executions were reported”’ (quoted in Beer and Mitchell, 2006: 997).   
 
In turn, the BJP shared an anti-militancy policy norm with the pre-1998 security identity 
but regarded such threats to India as being primarily funded by external, rather than 
internal, forces.  This basis stemmed from viewing outsiders (Muslims, Christians, 
westerners) as anti-national forces threatening the Hindu Rashtra.  Within the 
                                                
24 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
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international dimension of the domestic source within the security identity, this rationale 
largely focused upon terrorism emanating from Pakistan (and to a lesser extent from 
Bangladesh and Nepal).  From this basis, and building upon existing anti-terrorist 
provisions in the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1987, 
the NDA passed further anti-terrorist legislation.  The Prevention of Terrorism 
Ordinance (POTO) was passed in 2001, and then replaced by the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002 - both of which were widely perceived as draconian and 
fundamentally against human rights.  POTA allowed security forces to hold individuals 
for up to 180 days without charge, expanded the reach of the death penalty, denied any 
presumption of innocence and allowed confession through torture (Sáez, 2003: 191).   
 
Terrorism remained a major problem for the Indian state during the NDA government, 
in particular from left-wing extremists and separatists in the north-east (BJP National 
Executive 04.04.01, 2005).  To counter these problems (in addition to POTA), the 
NDA set up a Terrorism Coordination Centre in 1998 and piloted the Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN.  These legal measures 
fulfilled established BJP manifesto promises.  Apart from some evidence of negotiation 
attempts with northeast insurgents, success was apparent, with the NDA making a 
peace agreement with the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) in 2003.  In turn, 
Pakistan continued to be regarded as ‘an established headquarters of terrorism’ (BJP 
National Executive 26.09.02, 2005: 39), and was explicitly linked to several major 
terrorist attacks against India in this period.  Apart from peaks in 2000 and 2001, Indian 
fatalities from terrorism were lower during the NDA than in the preceding four years, as 
shown in Figure 6.1 below.  Disaggregated, the figures show a significant reduction in 
civilian and security personnel deaths and, before 2004, an overall increase in terrorist 
fatalities.  Deaths from left-wing extremist violence remained constant during the same 
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Figure 6.1: Indian Fatalities from Terrorism (1994-2004) 
(SATP, 2010b) 
 
Recasting the Past 
 
Along with their campaigns against India’s Muslim and Christian minorities, the BJP 
attempted to rewrite Indian history to compound their discrimination against these 
groups, and to reinforce the BJP’s Hindutva-derived policy norms.  Primarily carried out 
through the rewriting of textbooks, major school staff changes and the reorganization 
of educational institutions, the BJP attempted ‘to recast the past by giving it a strongly 
Hindu religious orientation’ (Panikkar, 2001).  This manipulation of history by the BJP 
was intimately tied to their norms of Indianisation and positive secularism that rested 
upon constructing a ‘past on religious-communal lines … to promote and propagate 
history undistinguished from myth and equate individual and collective faith with 
historical acts’ (Corbridge, 1999: 233).  These policies further coupled with their anti-
Muslim and anti-Christian norms, as rewriting Indian history was designed to promote a 
pro-Hindu worldview that fully subscribed to the ideals of a resurgent and glorious 
Hindu Rashtra.   
 
Central to education in India is the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) 
established in 1972.  In 1978, attempts had been made under the Janata Party coalition 
to purge it of all ‘”undesirable” elements and fill it with those acceptable to the RSS and 
like-minded people’ (Aligarh Historians Group, 1979: 58).  These actions were taken to 
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promote nationally the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan interpretation of Indian history that is 
strongly communal and biased towards Hindutva.  In 1998, with its Murli Manohar Joshi 
as Minister of Human Resource Development (which includes Education), the new 
BJP-led NDA ‘reconstitute(d) the ICHR … (and) directed it to promote “national 
history”’ (Corbridge, 1999: 233).  The BJP also gained control of the National Council 
for Educational Research and Training (NCERT), which produces the majority of 
India’s national school texts.  Both institutions ‘rapidly los(t) their academic freedom, as 
renowned historians (we)re replaced by bureaucrats and academics willing to toe the 
political line’ (Panikkar, 2001). 
 
The rewriting of Indian history by the BJP aimed to reorder the secular disposition of 
the Indian state and ‘to redefine the character of the nation as Hindu, and to lend 
legitimacy to the politics of cultural nationalism’ (Panikkar, 2001).  This reordering 
amounted to an attempt to replace existing secular normative accounts of history and 
included pushing back the period of the Rig Veda to 5000 BC against the general 
consensus of 1500 BC in order to establish India (and Hinduness) as the world’s oldest 
civilization (Panikkar, 2001).  Furthermore, RSS-inspired schoolbooks stated that ‘India 
is the mother country of ancient China and that the ancestors of the Chinese people 
were Indian kshatriyas (Hindu warriors)’ (Elliott, 2001).  Science and social concerns 
were also demoted in favour of religious education, while astrology was introduced into 
schools along with the study of Sanskrit (Elliott, 2001).  Such ideas reflected the 
worldview of the VHP, while representing ‘an agenda for the “Hinduization” of 
education’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 40) and the downgrading of non-Hindu 
contributions to the world.  The increased usage of the Hinduised Vidya Bharat system 
in over 17,000 schools aided this process (Hasan, 2007: 243).   
 
Place names were also “linguistically cleansed” whereby non-Hindu designations were 
increasingly replaced by Hindu ones (Smith, 1996: 124).  Delhi became Indraprasth, 
Lucknow renamed Lakshmanpuri and the Indian Ocean called Ganga Sagar.  The 
singing in schools of Vande Mataram, a patriotic song offensive to Muslims, was also 
made compulsory (Myers, 2001) and effectively re-asserted one of India’s key national 
symbols.  Other policies included the issuing in 2000 via NCERT of a (later scrapped) 
national curriculum framework based upon Hindutva.  Overall, all new school history 
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books had to be cleared by religious leaders before publication.  As a consequence, the 
result for Indians (and millions of students) was ‘not a full history of their country but a 
sanitised and stilted version (of it)’ (Elliott, 2001).  Some critics went even further, 
stating that these were efforts to saffronise Indian education and to ‘“Talibanize” Indian 
history’ (Hasan, 2007: 243).  These attempts again defied existing norms of plurality, 
equality and tolerance within India’s pre-1998 security identity. 
 
6.3) - EMERGENT MODERNITY AND THE BJP: 
 
The BJP emergence as a mass party in the 1980s was aided by its pro-capitalist 
nationalism that promoted a norm of India-first swadeshi.  In particular, the BJP’s pro-
capitalist roots were often promoted by adherents such as Jaswant Singh (among others) 
who had joined the BJP from the Swatantra Party.  Placed against an increasingly 
liberalizing Indian economy this norm included calibrated globalization, which differed 
from India’s security identity norm until 1998 of swadeshi couple with limited 
liberalisation.  By being pro-capitalist and neo-liberal, this policy agenda had stabilized 
into an established normative belief for the BJP.  Intrinsically, economic liberal reform 
was always a central tenet of BJP policy rather than being purely reactive due to outside 
circumstances.  This difference was the stock BJP criticism of Congress’ liberalisation in 
the early 1990s (Interview A21, 2008)25 and partly stemmed from the BJP’s anti-socialist 
perspectives.  It also indicated a nuanced divergence between BJP policy norms and 
those of the pre-1998 security identity, despite their shared adherence to the swadeshi 
norm.   
 
Being the party which had the greatest support from India’s middle class augmented 
these foundations for the BJP, with the middle classes as major stakeholders in India’s 
modern capitalism.  The BJP were able to take advantage of this positioning by talking 
‘about moral or ethical decline by pointing to modern society’s lack of morality, loss of 
ethical values, increased corruption … where the only answer to the current “decay” is a 
reinforcement of religious norms’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 89).  India’s new middle class 
effectively became the major vote-bank of the BJP (Interview A17, 200826).  Additional 
                                                
25 Interview with a senior analyst of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, May 9 2008. 
26 Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008.  
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representations of India being subject to outside economic threats (western capitalism 
and globalization) would reinforce this rhetoric and thus the BJP’s support base.  In 
turn, the electronic media revolution that gripped India from the late 1980s provided 
the public space within which to further distribute and circulate these perspectives.  
Compounding this effect was the position of the middle classes as the major consumers 
of mass media and increasing ‘infotainment’ (Interview A17, 2008)27. 
 
Redefining Swadeshi and Embracing Globalization 
 
The initial emphasis that the BJP placed upon swadeshi - based upon a need to protect 
India’s independence and sovereignty from outside influence - appeared to be initially 
reshaped once the BJP came to power.  As a result, the BJP largely advocated the 
emergent neo-liberal position held by previous Congress-led governments from the 
early 1990s onwards (Seethi & Vijayan, 2005: 63).  To an extent, this faithfulness 
reflected the centralist tendencies of Indian politics, as well as the imperatives and 
incentives of the international economic system (Nayar, 2001).  The need for a stable 
environment in order to support India’s continued economic growth was also a factor, 
as was ‘the badly needed gas and oil (which) was central to India’s new foreign policy’ 
(Lall, 2006: 427).  Both these factors necessitated outward looking economic linkages, 
and suggested a harmonious convergence between BJP policy norms and those of 
India’s security identity.  As shown by Figure 6.2 below, despite some higher annual 
readings, average annual GDP percentage growth in this period was only marginally 
above the 6.12% figure for 1993 to 1997 (as per Figure 4.1). 
                                                































Figure 6.2: Annual Indian GDP Growth (1998-2004) 
(World Bank, 2010) 
 
However this approach was an adaptation rather than a repudiation of swadeshi, and 
reflected core BJP policy norms of an India-first policy and a gradual movement 
towards the globalization of India’s economy.  This redefinition of swadeshi meant that 
as long as it benefited India’s national interest, economic self-reliance could be from 
both within and without of India.  For example, increased foreign direct investment (FDI) 
benefited both India and any foreign investor, while additionally allowing India to gain 
foreign expertise to be purely self-reliant in the future.  As such, in March 2001 the BJP 
lifted any qualitative restrictions on the import of nearly all foreign goods (Lakha, 2007: 
111).  This redefinition successfully harnessed BJP rhetoric of re-masculating India by 
pragmatically placing the national interest of economic expansion within the already 
established security identity norm of great power aspiration (from the perceptual 
source).  Overall, this coupling indicated how, for BJP policy makers, swadeshi was ‘taken 
more seriously’ (Interview A20, 2008)28.  Signaling this change, Advani declared that 
‘“the BJP believes in swadeshi, which in essence means that India has to develop on its 
own … it certainly does not mean xenophobia or a belief that everything foreign is 
bad”’ (quoted in Alden & Vieira, 2005: 1088).   
 
Much research concerning the rise of Hindu nationalism in the 1990s has firmly situated 
it in the context of globalization (Jaffrelot, 1996; Kurien, 1994; Rajagopal, 2001; Vanaik, 
1997), arguments that compliment the presence of the BJP’s growing middle class voter 
base in this period.  Part of this association comes from the observation that religion 
                                                
28 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008. 
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and nationalism are ‘particularly relevant organizing principles at a time when modern 
society is making increasing demands on individuals’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 79).  The 
combination of these factors gave the BJP’s Hindutva a contemporary relevance within 
Indian politics at the turn of the millennium, and was an attractive ideological response 
to changing economic conditions.  Furthermore, the emergence of a (western) 
liberalised and globalised economy in India (increasingly driven by consumerism and 
privatization) questioned what national identity ought to be.  The rise of Hindutva 
through the political emergence of the BJP was ‘a bold strategic response to this 
question’ (McDonald, 2003: 1563), and challenged existing (but weakening) socialist 
norms within India’s security identity.  
 
Therefore for the BJP, ‘economic prosperity, a strong state, and an authentic and 
unequivocal cultural and national identity … (were) the necessary ingredients for 
realizing the promise of recognition in global modernity’ (McDonald, 2003: 1565).  
Furthermore, previous (Congress) protectionist strategies were argued to have neither 
helped to combat poverty nor made the economy stronger, especially when compared 
with Chinese growth in the 1990s (Srinavasan & Tendulkar, 2000).  Having a global 
economic growth capacity was thus equated with being a global power (another core 
security identity and BJP policy norm), which the BJP used to justify its calibrated 
globalization policy (Anderson, 2001: 772-773).  As part of perceptually building this 
aim, during the NDA the BJP declared their Vision 2020 to make India a developed 
country by 2020.  This public pronouncement was ‘a big mental leap, given the 
traditional self-perception (of India) as a weak and developing country’ (Muni & Mohan, 
2004: 317).  Such links between economic performance and becoming a great (or even 
global) power had not, up until this point, been made explicit in Indian state practice (or 
its security identity). 
 
The Middle Class and Mass Media 
 
In electoral terms, while nationally representing a minority of the population, the 
majority of BJP supporters come from the educated, upper caste and upper class groups 
(Brass, 1998: 503).  Made up of a variety of entrepreneurs, businessmen, traders and 
small indigenous manufacturers, the middle class gain the most from a modern India, 
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and are at the frontline of rapid cultural change in the face of outside forces and neo-
liberalism (Hansen, 1996b: 181).  For the Hindu middle class, ‘the BJP’s support of 
economic liberalization policies also addresse(d) the rising economic ambition of this 
class while the ideology of Hindutva takes care of their identity problems’ (Pandey, 2007: 
541).  By being aligned with the developments within the mainstream of Indian society, 
the BJP become part of that mainstream - legitimising Hindutva and consolidating its 
middle class support base.  By being at the fulcrum of India’s new capitalism and 
consumerism, the middle classes effectively set and reinforced the BJP’s agenda, from 
ardent chauvinistic nationalism to economic reform (Rajagopal, 1996). 
 
Just as the rewriting of history can reinforce national identities, the use of media imagery 
became a vital aspect of the BJP and Hindutva’s presence within India’s globalising 
economy.  In particular, the relationship between the media and domestic policy 
produced a nationalist discourse ‘according to which the BJP view India as having been 
under siege in the face of the enemy within, the Muslims who live in India, and the 
enemy without, Muslims who live in Pakistan and Bangladesh’ (McGuire, 2007: 22-3).  
The funding of violence at Ayodhya in 1992 by diasporic Hindus in Canada and 
America (Robbins, 1998: 11) shows the strength of such imagery and the reach of the 
associated normative practice that accompanies it.  Overall, Hindu nationalism benefited 
from how India’s ‘”constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent, and 
recognize themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expression”’ 
(Hansen quoted in Momen, 2005: 250).  Modern media in India again coupled with the 
country’s growing middle class, further cementing the BJP’s support base and 
normalizing their political presence. 
 
Images play a critical role in reinforcing identities, stereotypes and threats.  For the BJP, 
the symbols of Babri Masjid and Muslim infiltrators all became ‘coded images associated 
with our innermost fears or desires, which are being incorporated and exploited in the 
political process’ (Momen, 2005: 256).  Hindutva’s mass appeal to specific identity 
markers (such as religion, national difference and masculinity) overlapped with modern 
consumerism by redefining ‘”popular symbols and … including these symbols in daily 
narratives”’ (Breckenridge quoted in Momen, 2005: 251).  Pre-NDA examples included 
the screening of an adaptation of the Ramayana on Indian television in the late 1980s to 
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weekly audiences of eighty million, as well as the broadcasting of large-scale events such 
Advani’s Rath Yatra in the early 1990s that culminated in Ahodya (Bénéï, 1998: 122; 
Corbridge, 1999).  Other examples include attempts by Shiv Sena to sponsor a Michael 
Jackson concert in 1996 in Bombay (Katzenstein et al., 1997) and BJP attacks during the 
NDA on anti-Hindu messages in the media, cinema and the arts that defied the BJP’s 
cultural nationalism platform (Hasan, 2007: 16; Marsh & Brasted, 2007).   
 
The circulation of mass imagery was coupled with a revolution in print media, which 
observers linked to the electoral rise of the BJP (Page & Crawley, 2001). It also 
encompassed Anderson’s “print capitalism” that creates and sustains a shared pan-
national consciousness (1991).  In turn, Jeffrey noted how, ‘coinciding with the growth 
of television and the political struggles over reservation and Ayodhya, circulation of 
Hindi dailies grew by 250 percent in ten years’ (2002: 292).  As part of this phenomenon 
linking Hindu organisations, ideology, imagery and the media, ‘”the ‘Hinduization’ of 
the press … led to the portrayal of the upper-caste Hindu’s view as the only and true 
reality”’ (Charu & Mukul quoted in Jeffrey, 2002: 291).  Adding the intellectual influence 
of the English language media when used by political analysts and elites, the power of 
the media for the promotion of Hindutva became even more apparent.  Overall, 
commentators noted how the Sangh Parivar’s ‘media mastery and an eye for symbols’ 
(Lochtefeld, 1996: 105), established their political position and that of the BJP, and 




During the BJP-led NDA period, the normative basis of India’s domestic politics was in 
flux with the established norms of India’s security identity being contested with those 
entrenched within BJP policy.  Through attempts at institutional saffronisation via the 
promotion of its supporters and the introduction of its Hindutva-orientated policies, in 
office the BJP mounted an effective challenge to the traditional normative practices 
present within the Indian state.  These policies directly stemmed from their policy 
papers and manifestoes of the previous four decades.  Such observations confirm two 
of my key research premises.  First, there are multiple, composite and competing norms 
actively present within the Indian state, as shown by the interaction of norms between 
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those of India’s security identity and those of BJP policy.  Thus, we saw the pre-1998 
security identity’s anti-communal norm compete with the BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-
Christian norms during the 1998 to 2004 NDA government.  Furthermore, the BJP 
policy norm of anti-militancy (as externally-derived) contested with the security 
identity’s norm of anti-militancy (as internally-derived). 
 
Second, through this interaction and comparison, we were able to see both continuity 
and change in the two sets of composite norms during the NDA period.  Thus, the pre-
1998 norm of swadeshi then limited liberalization (from the security identity) became 
supplanted by the BJP norm of India-first swadeshi and calibrated globalization.  In turn, 
BJP norms of cultural nationalism and positive secularism resulted in the saffronisation 
of many state institutions towards a pro-Hindutva standpoint, challenging existing 
security identity norms of equality, secularism and plurality.  The extent of continuity or 
change with pre-1998 security identity norms appears at this stage to be dependent on 
their relative harmony or dissonance with BJP policy norms prior to 1998.  Thus, in this 
first case, their similarity with BJP norms allows for a nuanced evolution.  In the second 
case, their high level of dissonance implied a hardening of their differences.  Only by 
examining the norms present in post-NDA governments from 2004 onwards can this 
mutual relationship and impact be fully established (as will be carried out in Chapter 9).  
It appears however that the most contested norms are those which stem from 
ideological differences between the BJP and Congress.   
 
Also evident is the extent to which the BJP became established as a legitimate political 
force, and thus as a normative and mainstreamed feature of Indian politics.  By 
becoming the first coalition to serve their full term in office, the BJP-led NDA displayed 
stability, were a genuine alternative to Congress and ‘transformed the complexion of the 
political process in India’ (Harshe, 2005: 50).  Furthermore, towards the end of the 
NDA, observers noted how the BJP began winning state elections without explicit 
Hindutva policies (Elliott, 2003).  Such success was no longer limited to the traditional 
Hindu belt of northern India, instead the BJP had become ‘a “normalized” component 
in the regional party structure of most states in eastern and southern India … moreover 
the Sangh Parivar has begun … to permeate social structures in these non-core regions’ 
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(Gillan, 2002: 36).  A settled political presence and increasing saffronisation had thus 
both become normalized elements of India’s domestic political scene by 2004.   
 
The BJP’s advantageous electoral positioning within a modernising, globalizing, and 
media-dominated middle class strengthened their mainstream acceptance.  
Commentators also talked of a commensurate shift of ‘the centre of gravity of Indian 
politics to the right’ (Vanaik, 2002: 322), especially concerning capitalism, positive 
secularism and the nuclear tests.  Additionally, BJP policies recast Hindu India’s 
relationship to its Muslim and Christian minorities.  These shifts questioned the 
legitimacy of Congress’ normative secular basis but also seemingly demanded that 
Congress and India’s leftist parties become less socialist in orientation (Momen, 2005: 
254).  Reflecting their emergence as a political tool in the 1980s, under the NDA 
communal (and therefore anti-secular) politics therefore became an accepted part of 
Indian politics for all parties (Interview A13, 2008; Interview A14, 2008)29.  As closer 
election results and coalition governance made voter support more critical, this 
acceptance increased.  It must also be remembered that state complicity in communal 
violence was evident decades before Gujarat in 2002 (Engineer, 1994: 835), with Gujarat 
actually just confirming it as one of India’s ‘centrifugal impulses’ (Dixit, 2004b: 114).   
 
These observations draw us to a deeper conclusion as to the BJP’s impact on the 
political source of India’s security identity, namely that of adding substance and 
producing a gear shift in India’s security practice.  Thus, while many of the trends above 
were present before the ascendancy of the BJP-led NDA government in 1998, it was 
only during the NDA that they became more fully assertively established and 
entrenched - in effect, more normalised.  This proto-normalization most noticeably 
applies to the validation of the BJP’s political legitimacy, India’s political centre ground 
shifting to the right and the affirmation of India’s ‘communalised commonsense’ 
(Sarkar, 1993: 164).  Importantly though, apart from the security identity norm of 
nuclear ambiguity, no other norm from the pre-1998 security identity was 
comprehensively overturned.  Thus, the influence of the BJP’s cultural nationalist, 
positive secularist, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian norms was dependent upon them 
                                                
29 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008; interview with a leading Indian academic, 
Delhi, May 6 2008. 
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being in (and maintaining) a position of power.  The next chapter investigates how the 
pre-1998 norms from both India’s security identity and BJP policy interacted within the 
physical source during the NDA period.  It will also continue the themes of the BJP-led 





‘Confronting, Engaging, Consolidating: 
the BJP and India’s Neighbours’ 
 
‘”let us fight it out face to face … 
we have fought thrice, let there be a fourth war”’ 
(Advani quoted in Bowers, 2004: 31) 
 
‘we know where we have come from … 
the better we understand each other, the more we can do together’ 
(Vajpayee, 2003: 7) 
 
‘(to engage) with our civilisational neighbourhood’ 
(Interview B34, 2008)30 
 
Did India’s relations with her neighbours continue or change under the BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 1998 to 2004?  What permitted or tempered any 
differences in the normative security practice of India during this period?  Here, I analyse 
how the norms structuring India’s security identity and BJP policy pre-1998 within the 
physical source of India’s security identity interacted during the NDA government.  This 
analysis encompasses one of my core research arguments that views security as a holistic 
entity occurring between the domestic and the international.  It is in this space that 
composite norms compete and coalesce, and is where we can see evidence of norm 
continuity and change.  This space also links together all three sources of India’s security 
identity, confirming their interdependent relationship, while emphasising the multiple 
sources that simultaneously construct a state’s security practice.  The starting basis of this 
analysis is the summary of the two sets of (often competing and converging) norms 
derived from India’s security identity and BJP policy until 1998, which can be found in 
Table 7.1 below. 
                                                
30 Interview with a BJP ideologue, Delhi, November 10 2008.  Please refer to the Bibliography to see the 




INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY BJP POLICY 
  
 
: Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, 
suspicion / LoC “accepted” 
: China: continued territorial 
threats / ongoing suspicion 
: regional hegemon – reciprocity 
then benevolence 
: tacit IOR dominance 
 
 
: protect the Hindu Rashtra  
: Akhand Bharat – explicit policy 
to regain Kashmir 
: but pragmatic engagement with 
Pakistan and China 
: natural regional hegemon 
: control / protect the IOR 
  
 
Table 7.1: Physical Norms in India’s Security Identity & BJP Policy until 1998 
 
In keeping with its domestic profile, the BJP was able to dominate the NDA coalition 
from 1998 to 2004 and ‘the small circle of policymakers’ (Basrur, 2002: 50) central to 
making foreign policy.  Almost immediately, the BJP instituted India’s National Security 
Council (NSC) to centralize and oversee the running of India’s security policy.  The NSC 
consists of a main group of ministers (and a National Security Advisor) reported to by 
the Strategic Policy Group, the National Security Advisory Board and a Secretariat 
represented by the Joint Intelligence Committee.  The NSC’s structure and constituents 
are shown in Figure 7.1 below.  Broadly, the Strategic Policy Group undertakes periodic 
Strategic Defence Reviews of India’s short and long-term security threats, the National 
Security Advisory Board (NSAB) provides the long-term prognosis and analysis of 
Indian security, and the Secretariat analyzes intelligence data from the Intelligence 




Figure 7.1: India’s National Security Council 
(from Tellis, 2002: 11) 
 
Of the main ministerial group, all the posts were held by BJP leaders during the NDA 
apart from that of Defense Minister, which was given to George Fernandes of the 
NDA’s Samata Party.  The External Affairs Minister was Jaswant Singh until July 2002, 
then Yaswant Sinha.  The new position of National Security Advisor was given to 
Brajesh Mishra, a highly experienced career diplomat who became the key security 
confidante of the NDA’s Prime Minister (Interview B25, 2008)31.  Such dominance, even 
with some attempts at consensus building (see Mohan, 2003: 264), gave the BJP (and 
hence any Sangh Parivar associates) de facto control of external relations and policy.  The 
overwhelmingly regional outlooks of the other NDA coalition parties who had little or 
no foreign policy perspectives, underlined this control.  The BJP fulfilled an established 
manifesto promise by initiating the NSC but in effect, according to a think-tank head, 
continued a process initiated by former Prime Minister VP Singh (Interview B10, 2008)32.  
 
The chapter is split into three major sections.  The first section deals with India’s 
relations with Pakistan from 1998 to 2004, and focuses upon the cycle of conflict and 
negotiation emblematic of this period, before identifying certain points of change in their 
                                                
31 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008. 
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relationship.  Section two investigates India’s interaction with China, noting an 
accelerated period of engagement through deepening economic and military ties.  The 
third section then analyses BJP policy towards South Asia as a whole, as well as growing 
relations with Myanmar and South East Asia - in particular highlighting the expansion of 
India’s security horizons.  The chapter ends with some conclusions on how underlying 
assertiveness and pragmatism in BJP policy norms towards India’s neighbours, helped to 
improve (in particular) relations with Pakistan and China. 
 
7.1) - CONFRONTING PAKISTAN: 
 
For the BJP, their pre-1998 policy concerning Pakistan revolved around norms of 
protecting the Hindu Rashtra and an explicit policy to regain Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir (to achieve Akhand Bharat).  Cultural nationalist and anti-Muslim norms from 
the political source fed into these rationales.  Conversely, according to a leading Indian 
academic, there was also a norm of pragmatic engagement in order ‘to map out a 
foreign policy which would at least neutralize Pakistan’ (Interview A13, 2008)33.  In turn, 
in India’s security identity up until 1998, norms of a cycle of conflict, negotiation and 
suspicion, as well as “acceptance” of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir had been 
prominent.  From this basis, some degree of dissonance between these norms could be 
expected during the 1998 to 2004 NDA regime.  Accordingly, observers noted how for 
the BJP concerning Kashmir, ‘only a hawkish attitude and international pressure will 
compel Pakistan to end … (its) interference’ (Basrur, 2002: 185).  In addition, in an 
increasingly communal India, the ‘desire to hold on to Kashmir (had become) less a 
result of moral principle and more an imperative of statecraft’ (Ganguly, 1996).  It was 
thus feared that a BJP government would exacerbate the risk of conflict with Pakistan.   
 
However, the BJP were also free of much of the historical baggage and associations 
carried by Congress - namely their secular norms and the Nehru/Gandhi dynasty being 
Kashmiri Pandits, all of which had made it difficult to ‘bury the ghost of Partition’ 
(Interview B32, 2008)34.  As such, an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official 
                                                
33 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
34 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, November 8 
2008. 
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noted how Congress were regarded as being ‘over-conscious’ (Interview B1, 2008)35 of 
alienating Muslim voters, making any resolution concerning Kashmir hard to achieve.  
In contrast, a senior Indian journalist argued that the BJP were freed from such 
constraints by being much clearer than Congress as to their policy intentions (Interview 
B3, 2008)36.  Coupled with their general Hindutva credentials, according to another 
journalist, the BJP’s projected image as the party of national security could also give 
legitimacy to any peace efforts in a way unimaginable for Congress (Interview B5, 
2008)37.  Indeed, more moderate voices in the BJP (most prominently Prime Minister 
Vajpayee) wanted to finally resolve the Kashmir issue in order to raise India’s global 
profile.  During the NDA, these voices were countered by more militant BJP elements 
(along with those in the wider Sangh Parivar) who wanted to fulfill a strict Hindutva 
agenda. 
 
The Conflict and Peace (Re)Cycle 
 
In broad terms, India’s relations with Pakistan continued to oscillate wildly between 
conflict and peace initiatives during the NDA period.  This cycle was punctuated by acts 
of terrorism, which India increasingly blamed on Pakistani laxness in countering Islamist 
groups, possibly with some ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) complicity (Private 
Correspondence 1, 2009)38.  While the collective frequency of these events was perhaps 
the highest at any point in Indo-Pakistani relations, by 2004 the cycle was resulting in 
India having tentative normalizing relations with Pakistan.  Such developments were 
helped by greater levels of Indo-Pakistani back-channel diplomacy instituted under the 
BJP (Interview B11, 2008)39, as well as Brajesh Mishra’s meeting with the head of 
Pakistan’s ISI - the first such senior level meeting for fourteen years (Dixit, 2004b: 289).  
A simplified timeline of the period’s major events can be found in Table 7.2 below. 
                                                
35 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
36 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
37 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
38 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
39 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 






Pokhran / Chaghai Hills nuclear tests May 1998 
Lahore Declaration February 1999 
Kargil war May-July 1999 
Kandahar hijacking December 1999 
ceasefire with Hizbul Mujahideen July 2000 
Indian ceasefire in Kashmir November 2000 
Agra peace summit July 2001 
attack on Indian Parliament December 13 2001 
constant near war situation December 2001 to late 2002 
Composite Dialogue re-initiated May 2003 
meeting with Kashmiri separatists October 2003 - January 2004 
LoC ceasefire (India and Pakistan) November 2003 
peace talks in Islamabad January / February 2004 
  
 
Table 7.2: Timeline of Events between India and Pakistan 
(May 1998 - February 2004) 
 
In the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests, the BJP’s anti-Muslim policy norms and 
opposition to Pakistan spread into much of their public rhetoric concerning the success 
of the tests.  Thus, Advani declared that ‘”Islamabad should realise the change in the 
geo-strategic situation in the region … any other course will be futile and costly for 
Pakistan”’ (quoted in Inderjit, 1998).  More belligerently, the BJP’s Tourism and 
Parliamentary Affairs minister, Madan Lal Khurana, stated that ‘”if Pakistan wants to 
fight another war with us, they should tell us the time and place”’ (quoted in Tension 
Rises, 1998).  Analysts also saw the testing of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile in April 1998 
(with an optimum range of 1,500 kilometres) as the trigger for the tests (Ganguly, 1999: 
171), along with Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons project that had been in place since 
the 1980s (Bhattacharjea, 2001: 429).  In response to domestic pressures, Pakistan 
carried out its own nuclear tests at Chaghai Hills in Baluchistan on May 28 and 30 1998.   
 
Reactions to the tests were diverse, with some observers claiming a greater sense of 
realism between the two sides, particularly as their nuclear threshold was now so low 
given their proximity (Interview B10, 2008)40.  The tests also appeared to add a sense of 
maturity and responsibility to India-Pakistan affairs and an impetus to normalize 
relations (arguments supported by Waltz, 2003), particularly in the face of almost 
unanimous international opprobrium.  In contrast, pro-nuclear hawks believed that 
                                                
40 Interview with a think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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India could win any nuclear conflict - wiping out Pakistan and remaining relatively intact 
(Interview A5, 2008)41.  A lack of understanding concerning the impact of nuclear 
weapons sustained these arguments (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)42, as well as the 
rhetoric of some BJP leaders.  Furthermore, the nuclear tests conversely gave a ‘”freer 
rein to unconventional military options”’ (Krepon quoted in Gellner, 2003: 140), 
particularly low-intensity conflicts and continued infiltration across the LoC. 
 
These factors were the context of the Lahore talks of February 1999, which went 
against both public sentiment and BJP logic, as it ‘almost seems like if you are going 
over there, you are begging them … showing a certain weakness in our system’ 
(Interview A19, 2008)43.  Such actions challenged established norms from within India’s 
pre-1998 security identity and asserted BJP policy norms of pragmatic engagement.  
After Vajpayee’s highly publicized “bus diplomacy” to Pakistan and his speech vowing 
not to reverse Partition (Dixit, 2004b: 260), the resultant Lahore Declaration promised 
to intensify dialogue and to resolve all issues including Kashmir.  Widely lauded by 
MEA officials and senior military commanders respectively as ‘a critical symbolic 
gesture’ (Interview B35, 2008)44 and a ‘remarkable and unique’ (Interview B6, 2008)45 
achievement, Lahore appeared to be a fundamental watershed in India’s relations with 
Pakistan.  It was also the first time in 10 years that the two countries had signed a joint 
agreement (Singh, 1999b).   
 
The optimism of Lahore and Vajpayee’s ‘dialogue of reassurance’ (Interview B4, 2008)46 
was broken by the 1999 Kargil war.  Initiated by Pakistani soldiers dressed as freedom 
fighters, a limited conflict was fought between the two sides in Kashmir from May to 
June 1999 (Malik, 2007).  The incursions resulted in domestic pressures from the Sangh 
Parivar and India’s strategic community for an extension of the conflict into Pakistan 
(Tellis, 2001: 80).  Such rhetoric was reciprocal, with Indian and Pakistani officials 
exchanging nuclear threats thirteen times in five weeks during the conflict (Bidwai & 
                                                
41 Interview with a senior strategic analyst and former member of the National Security Advisory Board 
(NSAB), Delhi, May 2 2008. 
42 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
43 Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008. 
44 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary, Delhi, November 10 2008. 
45 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008. 
46 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary, October 17 2008. 
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Vanaik, 1999: vii). While resisting this rhetoric, Vajpayee also refused to accept any 
ceasefire until Pakistan had withdrawn from Indian territory, something that contrasted 
with the policy of Congress-led regimes in earlier conflicts (Interview B3, 2008)47.  After 
a limited conflict, India claimed total victory by removing Pakistani forces from India, 
won international admiration for limiting the fighting to the Kargil sector and convinced 
the international community that Pakistan was the dangerous aggressor.  Such 
behaviour did not however fulfill more hard-line Hindutva expectations (Interview B8, 
200848). 
 
The BJP’s counterintuitive restraint continued after Kargil, most prominently with the 
handling of the Kandahar hijacking (that began on December 24 1999), when their 
release of political prisoners in exchange for hostages prompted criticism from the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Baber, 2004: 707).  In turn, in July 2000, Hizbul 
Mujahideen - the biggest militant group in Kashmir, declared a unilateral cease-fire and 
expressed its desire to open negotiations for the first time with the Indian government.  
Although these talks broke down, in November 2000 India announced its first-ever 
unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir - again ‘an unprecedented development’ (Bose, 2001: 43).  
While these events confirmed the norm of conflict and negotiation present within 
India’s security identity, they also harmonized with the BJP policy norm of pragmatic 
engagement (although to the detriment of other norms such as re-establishing Akhand 
Bharat).  Members of India’s strategic community accurately saw such actions as 
evidence that the BJP ‘thought outside the box’ (Interview B3, 2008)49 and were serious 
about resolving the Kashmir issue (Dixit, 2004b: 263-5).   
 
This pragmatism continued in May 2001, as the BJP called off India’s ceasefire with 
Pakistan but then surprisingly invited Pakistan’s General Musharraf for a summit in 
Agra from July 15 to 16 2001.  This invitation was ‘a significant shift’ (Baral, 2002: 290) 
in India’s Pakistan policy that did not rely on Pakistan stopping aiding and abetting 
terrorism in Kashmir.  Despite what analysts saw as Vajpayee’s ‘magnanimity’ (Interview 
B10, 2008)50, internal divisions in the BJP over Pakistan’s unwillingness to state “cross-
                                                
47 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
48 Interview with a think-tank head, Delhi, October 21 2008. 
49 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
50 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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border terrorism” in an agreement (rather than “terrorism”) led to the collapse of the 
talks (Baral, 2002).  Such divisions helped to underline how norms (both within and 
without of BJP policy) were competing for prominence in the NDA’s foreign policy 
behaviour.  Other pressures were also evident at Agra - particularly from the United 
States (US) to get President Musharaff to attend and for the two sides to reach a deal - 
pressures that BJP officials stated earlier Indian governments had not rebuffed but 
which the BJP-led NDA did (Interview A15, 2008)51.  Thus, we can again see how 
norms of pragmatic engagement were becoming more prominent in India-Pakistan 
relations during the BJP-led NDA. 
 
Forcing the Issue 
 
The failure of the Agra summit was quickly exacerbated by two acts of terrorism in 
India at the end of 2001.  First, a suicide bomb attack on October 1 on the provincial 
legislature of Indian-administered Kashmir killed 38 people.  Then on December 13, 
terrorists launched an attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi killing 7 
people.  Both these events took place in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 
attacks on New York and growing US-led moves towards an international “war on 
terror”.  Amid accusations that Pakistan had harboured the groups responsible for the 
attacks, the bilateral advances made at Lahore were scaled back (including cutting bus 
and train links, and for the first time since 1971 recalling the Indian ambassador).  
Vajpayee’s belief in making Pakistan give up its support of terrorism (Interview B6, 
2008)52 - itself a core threat to the Hindu Rashtra - fed into BJP impatience as he declared 
‘”we do not want a war but war is being thrust upon us”’ (quoted in BJP National 
Executive 29.12.01, 2005: 63).  In turn, the Sangh Parivar wanted ‘a “permanent lesson” 
taught to Pakistan’ (Vanaik, 2002: 327). 
 
Subsequently, India carried out its largest troop movements (Operation Parakram) since 
the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war in ‘a strategy of preclusive defense’ (Sáez, 2003: 187).  BJP 
threats towards Pakistan also continued, such as Advani’s call for the “hot pursuit” of 
terrorists into Pakistan (Basrur, 2002: 42).  Tensions simmered throughout 2002 
                                                
51 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
52 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008. 
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(supported by the state-sponsored attacks on Muslims in Gujarat) and then a militant 
attack on an army base in Jammu in May 2002, which killed 34 people, sparked a full-
blown crisis.  This attack provoked heavy artillery and machine-gun exchanges across 
the LoC, buoyed by demands from Vajpayee for ‘”a decisive battle”’ (quoted in Sáez, 
2003: 189).  With both sides carrying out nuclear missile tests in October 2002, the 
threat of escalation increased (Interview B38, 2008)53.  In addition to pooja (worship) 
being performed by Hindu saadhus (holy men) before troop deployments, scientists were 
concocting remedies from the Arthashastra in an attempt to make India’s soldiers 
invincible (Rahman, 2002).  It appeared that established BJP and Hindutva policy norms 
of assertively protecting the Hindu Rashtra and achieving Akhand Bharat were now 
gaining ascendancy in India’s security practice under the NDA. 
 
Facing what seemed to be an imminent nuclear conflict that threatened its hunt for 
Osama bin Laden, the war on terror and its troops in Pakistan, the US maintained 
pressure on both sides to peacefully resolve their differences.  This pressure made India 
regard US policy towards Pakistan as contradictory and as Brajesh Mishra stated, ‘”how 
can we talk with cross-border terrorism still going on? … when the US … urges us to 
talk, that is a double standard on terrorism”’ (quoted in Bowers, 2004: 31).  Such 
comments led observers to conclude in June 2002 that threats of escalation were ‘in fact 
a well-thought-out attempt by India to end Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Kashmir’ 
(Zakaria, 2002).  This strategy successfully linked Pakistani involvement in Kashmir to 
both international terrorism and nuclear weapons within international (predominantly 
US) foreign policy mindsets (BJP National Executive 24.12.02, 2005: 40).  Furthermore, 
a senior MEA official confirmed that there was ‘absolutely no plan to have war’ 
(Interview B1, 2008)54 during this period.  It appeared that BJP norms of belligerence 
against Pakistan had been used as a tool for political gain, rather than as an end in 
themselves. 
 
In October 2002 the India reassessed its high border mobilization, and realized that ‘the 
policy of “coercive diplomacy” was no longer providing a balance of benefit’ (Bowers, 
2004: 26).  Despite continued terrorist attacks in early 2003, such as the massacre of 24 
                                                
53 Interview with a senior Indian newspaper editor, Delhi, November 14 2008. 
54 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
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villagers in Nadimarg on March 23, Vajpayee began moves to defuse tension with 
Pakistan, and re-established communication and diplomatic links on May 6 2003.  These 
moves marked the re-initiation of the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan, aimed at 
resolving all areas of dispute between India and Pakistan from territory and water rights 
to terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as economic and commercial cooperation.  The 
BJP were noted by various members of India’s strategic community for being more 
generous than previous Indian governments on the Composite Dialogue’s structure 
(Interview B14, 2008)55 and for making it more ‘institutionalised’ (Interview B3, 2008)56.  
As a result of these measures (and further Track II diplomacy), Pakistan offered an 
unprecedented ceasefire along the LoC in Kashmir, which India reciprocated in 
November 2003.  The ceasefire ended thirteen years of hostility across the border. 
 
These developments led to the meeting on January 6 2004 of Musharraf and Vajpayee in 
Islamabad, where Pakistan was hosting the annual SAARC summit.  The meeting 
resulted in the Islamabad Declaration whereby Pakistan publicly committed to stop 
terrorism, representing a critical watershed in India-Pakistan relations (Interview B6, 
2008; Interview B14, 200857).  This meeting also led to formal peace talks in Islamabad 
from February 16 to 18 2004, with both sides agreeing to hold further negotiations in 
June 2004 following the next Indian general election.  Furthermore, since October 2003 
BJP leaders had twice met leaders from Kashmir’s separatist All-Party Hurriyat Conference - 
the highest-ever level talks between the two sides (Advani, 2005: 49-50).  Such events 
were aided by the 2002 Kashmir elections, widely recognized as the fairest in decades 
(Ganguly, 2006).  By 2004 BJP policy norms had added pragmatism to the normative 
cycle of conflict and negotiation present in India’s pre-1998 security identity, often by 
instrumentally using (rather than implementing or establishing) other norms, such as 
trying to forcefully regain Kashmir or being explicitly anti-Muslim. 
 
                                                
55 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government, Delhi, October 23 2008. 
56 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
57 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008; interview 
with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance government, 
Delhi, October 23 2008. 
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7.2) - CHINA: ACCELERATED CONTINUITIES: 
 
BJP policy norms towards China before their ascendancy to government in 1998 were 
much like those with Pakistan; to protect the Hindu Rashtra but also to have pragmatic 
engagement that focused away from territorial disputes to enhance regional trade and 
interaction.  These norms appeared to compliment those norms from India’s security 
identity prior to 1998 of seeing China as a continued territorial threat mixed with 
ongoing suspicion.  By 1998 there was also an increased sense of China encircling India 
through its emergent “string of pearls” policy aimed at securing Chinese influence from 
Hong Kong to Sudan (Interview B4, 200858; Pehrson, 2006).  Ongoing border disputes, 
historical animosities and economic competition fed this threat.  Many analysts began to 
see the India-China relationship as a classic realist contest based upon a growing 
regional power struggle (for various perspectives, see Garver, 2001, 2002; Malik, 2001; 
Lee, 2002, Mohan, 2003; Dabhade & Pant, 2004).  Conversely, the BJP-led NDA 
entered an already developing and fledging strategic dialogue between the two sides as 
shown by their increased interaction (including multiple reciprocal visits and 
agreements) in the 1990s.   
 
Compared to previous Congress-led governments, the BJP also had some important 
advantages.  Firstly, in his role as Foreign Minister in the Janata government of 1977-
1980, Atal Vajpayee had ‘strategically visited China’ (Athwal, 2008: 24) at the time of the 
Sino-Vietnamese war, helping to unblock communications between Delhi and Beijing.  
Vajpayee’s reputation as a hardliner also helped in negotiations (Interview B12, 2008)59.  
Secondly, the BJP did not have any direct (political) historical baggage concerning India’s 
1962 humiliation against China as it occurred under a Nehru-led Congress regime.  
Therefore ‘the BJP, unlike the Congress Party, (did) not suffer because of defeat in the 
border war and c(ould) … adopt flexible means on the border issue’ (Du, 2001: 160).  
Furthermore, improved relations with China had potentially significant economic and 
political benefits that could facilitate the BJP’s (and the security identity’s) pre-1998 norm 
of becoming a great power.  Creating strong borders through the resolution of any 
border disputes would aid such an aim. 
                                                
58 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary, Delhi, October 17 2008. 




Nuclear Maturity and Deepening Ties 
 
The Pokhran II tests appeared to mark a severe downturn in the India-China 
relationship.  Not only had the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared 
China to be India’s “enemy number one” preceding the tests but after the tests, in a 
letter to US President Clinton, Vajpayee cited China as central to the test’s rationale 
(Indian’s Letter to Clinton, 1998).  Therefore, it was their unresolved border issues, as 
well as ‘emulation, strategic competition and the China-Pakistan nexus’ (Ahrari, 1999: 
434) that were the tests’ major motivations.  Such pointed criticism led to a strong 
Chinese reaction and a diplomatic campaign to isolate New Delhi, as their official 
disharmony and distrust increased.  In addition, China used its rotating presidency of 
the UNSC to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1172 condemning the nuclear tests.  
China also cancelled the planned November 1998 Sino-Indian Joint Working Group 
(JWG) meeting in Beijing. 
 
Such condemnation and isolation induced Indian officials to retract their statements and 
to ‘seek rapprochement’ (Jing-Dong, 2007: 132) with China, revealing a certain ad hoc 
nature intrinsic to the NDA’s foreign policy in 1998.  By June 1998 officials declared 
that the Indian bomb was not “country specific” and by late 1999 that it was not even 
“threat specific” (Perkovich, 1999: 420; Vanaik, 2002: 325-326).  Then in June 1999, 
during the Kargil crisis with Pakistan, Jaswant Singh traveled to China (the first visit by 
an Indian External Affairs Minister in eight years) to open a security dialogue between 
the two sides.  The visit was a turning point in Sino-Indian relations and set out an 
agenda for renewed (and regular) exchanges and visits.  This process was confirmed by 
the reciprocal visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxun to New Delhi in July 
2000.  Furthermore, observers began remarking how the 1998 nuclear tests had 
produced a strategic clarity between India and China by exposing Indian motivations, 
removing previous nuclear ambiguities and injecting maturity into their relationship 
(Jing-Dong, 2007).  Previously established JWGs also resumed meeting after the 1999 
Security Dialogue was initiated. 
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Furthermore, Chinese analysts noted that the Pokhran II tests had given India 
‘creativity, power and self-confidence’ (Du, 2001: 159).  In turn, the nuclear tests were 
regarded as ‘part of a(n) [Indian] grand national strategy (present) since independence’ 
(Jing-Dong, 2007: 996).  Here, we can see how the ascendancy of the BJP’s norm of 
pragmatic engagement with China was aided by the removal of the norm of nuclear 
ambiguity from the security identity.  This observation confirms the interdependence of 
norms within India’s security practice.  Improved diplomatic ties continued as Indian 
President KR Narayanan visited China in May to June 2000.  The visit saw the 
announcement of a four-point engagement proposal - namely to increase bilateral 
personnel visits, to expand trade and economic cooperation, to strengthen cooperation 
and coordination in international affairs and to properly handle historical issues (Rajan, 
2007: 152).  As a result of this visit, economic, scientific and border negotiations 
resumed between the two countries, marked by visits to India by Li Peng in January 
2001 and Premier Zhu Rongzi in January 2002 (the first such visit in 10 years).  
Tensions remained however, such as in January 2001 when India tested the nuclear 
capable and ‘China-specific’ (Interview B5, 2008)60 Agni-II, and in November 2002 
when Vajpayee became the first-ever Indian head of state to describe China as a 
competitor (Nanda, 2002). 
 
The most substantial diplomatic developments during this period came in 2003 when 
Fernandes (in April) and Vajpayee (in June) visited China.  As the first trips by either an 
Indian Defense Minister or an Indian Prime Minister to China in over a decade, for the 
BJP these visits represented a concerted effort to essentially ‘unfreeze the relationship’ 
(Interview A20, 2008)61.  This period marked a substantial number of important 
agreements between the two sides, as shown in Table 7.3 below - most notably the 2003 
Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation (their highest-
ever level document). 
                                                
60 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 




DATE EVENT / AGREEMENT 
  
June 1999 India-China Security Dialogue established (meets annually) 
May 2000 China-India Eminent Persons Group (CIEPG) set up 
(composed of former diplomats, scholars and scientists - meets on 
September 17-18 2001, May 28-29 2002, February 13-14 2004) 
January 2002 5 Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed (on tourism, 
water conservancy, space, science, culture)  
January 2002 Counter-Terrorism Mechanism established (meets again April 
2002, June 2003) 
June 2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive 
Cooperation / 9 MoUs (including border trade at Nathula) / Joint 
Study Group (JSG) established on Economic Relations and 
Trade, Science and Technology (secretarial level) / Special 
Representatives appointed (secretarial level / for border issues) 
October 2003 first ministerial level discussions in Beijing on border issues62 
(meets again in Delhi, January 11-12 2004) 
  
 
Table 7.3: Significant India-China MoUs and Agreements 
(June 1999 - October 2003) 
 
During the 2003 visit, Beijing and New Delhi also forged a consensus on a wide range of 
bilateral, regional, and global issues, and found convergence on ‘the development of a 
fair and equitable international political and economic order’ (Jing-Dong, 2007: 133).  
Overall, Vajpayee’s visit was seen by China as ‘”a major diplomatic move … reflecting 
India’s strategic orientation towards improving its relations with its neighbours”’ 
(Ambassador Zhou Gang quoted in Rajan, 2007: 153).  Assertive and proactive BJP 
norms (as were apparent in their Pakistan policy) were again in evidence, as was 
unfreezing dialogue by not focusing on any single issue such as disputed borders.  For 
the NDA, the 2003 visit sent a message of seriousness from India about India-China 
relations to China, the region and the world, which challenged existing pre-1998 security 




India-China engagement during the NDA saw developments concerning the two states’ 
shared, and heavily disputed, borders.  For the BJP, such developments were possible 
because Vajpayee had created a ‘comfort level … and dialogue with China’ (Interview 
                                                
62 Between Brajesh Mishra (Indian National Security Advisor) and Dai Bingguo (Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Minister). 
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A15, 2008)63.  Therefore, for the first time, Beijing and New Delhi exchanged maps on 
the middle sector of the disputed border area (covering the Himachal Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh boundaries with Tibet) in November 2001.  Then, in June 2003, China 
recognized Nathula as an entry and exit point in Sikkim.  At the same time, two border 
trading posts were established; one in the Tibetan town of Renqinggang and the other at 
Changgu in Sikkim.  The latter post signaled (for the first time) China’s de facto 
acceptance of India’s sovereignty in Sikkim.  In return, India conceded to Chinese 
sovereignty in the Tibet Autonomous Region, reversing claims made by previous Indian 
governments (Dixit, 2004b: 268) and also importantly, Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) policy 
norms. 
 
Overall, border negotiations were helped by the appointment of Special Representatives 
in 2003, which made the issue political rather than bureaucratic - a significant ‘step up’ 
(Interview B22, 2008)64 from previous Indian governments.  Such developments also 
fulfilled a BJP manifesto promise.  An ex-MEA official did however note that the 
recognition of Sikkim was a ‘pin drop’ (Interview B1, 2008)65 compared to wider border 
issues.  Indeed, other India-China border disputes (the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh 
and Arunachal Pradesh) gained less ground in this period.  China therefore continued to 
pose a territorial threat to India.  However, ideas for an east sector-west sector land 
swap did begin to gain greater credence from 1998 to 2004 due to the success of the 
Sikkim-Tibet recognition swap (Interview B4, 2008)66.  Concerning India’s other 
territorial dispute (with Pakistan over Kashmir), China was now more neutral and had 
been cautious during the Kargil conflict to appear to support either side (Guihong, 
2006: 99).  China-Pakistan relations continued however (including arms transfers), 
which Indian and Chinese leaders tried to de-link from their negotiations. 
 
Heightened diplomatic engagement between India and China was also accompanied by 
rapidly growing economic ties during this period (for details see Gandhi, 2007; Rahman 
& Andreu, 2006; Smith, 2007).  The 2003 visit was critical to facilitating this growth, 
                                                
63 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
64 Interview with a senior journalist, Delhi, October 28 2008. 
65 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the 
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
66 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat 
in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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widely perceived as ‘win-win’ (Sibal, 2003: 89).  Spurred on by their business supporters 
(Private Correspondence 1, 200967; Vajpayee, 2003), the BJP realized that much could 
be gained through mutual economic growth and access to markets.  Such rationales also 
came from BJP policy norms of India-first swadeshi and calibrated globalisation, as well 
as making India a global power but negated the BJP’s policy norm of fearing outsiders.  
In addition, securing India’s borders could be helped by greater cross-border trade, 
particularly in India’s northeast and adapting Chinese-inspired special economic zones 
(SEZs).  Although the latter were not so successful (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)68, 
there were India-China exchanges on agricultural productivity, rural industrialization, 
export promotion, tourism and proposed natural gas pipelines.  By 2004, India was the 
largest steel exporter to China (Ramesh, 2005: 94), as their mutual trade grew 






























Figure 7.2: India-China Trade Levels (1999-2004)69 
(Das, 2007: 180; Huibao, 2003: 66; Pant, 2005: 97) 
 
The accelerated continuities and links between the two countries continued into the 
field of military interaction, further underlining the BJP’s norm of pragmatic 
engagement with China.  Military exchanges emphasized in particular the ‘diversification 
of bilateral relations’ (People’s Daily, 2003: 54) and a growing convergence of interests.  
In November 2003 there were high-level military exchanges between China and India, 
                                                
67 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
68 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
69 Data for 2001 was not available. 
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as well as joint naval exercises and cross-border army base visits (Athwal, 2008: 110; 
Das, 2007: 182-4).  Part of these exchanges involved India giving China its counter-
terrorism experience, which the latter applied in Xinjiang (Rajan, 2007: 161).  In the 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR), there was naval cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and the 
Malacca Straits to protect Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and trade routes 
(especially from piracy).  In contrast to previous regimes, these developments and 
linkages were far more institutionalized under the BJP.  India and China also recognized 
shared attitudes towards the US and the world order, with both sides opposing 
hegemony and proposing a multi-polar future (Garver, 2002: 15).  The BJP norm of 
pragmatic engagement appeared to be the new lingua franca in India-China relations. 
 
7.3) - CONSOLIDATING THE PERIPHERY: 
 
The assertiveness associated with BJP policy towards Pakistan and China from 1998 to 
2004, was also in evidence in their interaction with the smaller peripheral states of South 
Asia.  This factor seemed particularly prominent when looking at the pre-1998 norms 
within India’s security identity of being the regional hegemon (based upon reciprocity 
then benevolence) plus tacit dominance of the IOR.  Indeed, BJP policy norms of India 
being the natural regional hegemon and protecting the IOR clearly harmonized with 
these pre-1998 security identity norms.  Furthermore, the BJP continued trends from 
the pre-1998 security identity of being ‘obsessive in its apprehensions about the smaller 
neighbours developing extra-regional equations’ (Dixit, 2004b: 57).  Importantly though, 
the BJP regarded the Gujral Doctrine as not adequate enough to ‘convert hostility into 
friendship’ (Arora, 2005: 315), preferring mutuality and a return to reciprocity.  More 
generally, according to an ex-MEA official, relations with South Asia were given a lower 
priority than with Pakistan or China (Interview B28, 2008)70. 
 
Good relations with her neighbours were however central to India’s internal security - 
particularly in helping these states resist supporting terrorism in India, be it either 
Naxalites or north-east separatists (on this topic, see Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Dixit, 
2002; Lall, 2006).  BJP spokesperson references to having ‘very ordered relations with 
                                                
70 Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
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our neighbours’ (Interview A15, 2008)71 reflected these security concerns.  During this 
period, the term neo-Curzonian also emerged to describe the foreign policy perspective 
held by BJP politicians such as Jaswant Singh and KC Pant.  Such a perspective is 
‘premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagement with 
all major powers’ (Mohan & Khanna, 2006).  It also emphasised economic cooperation 
and institutional links as the main forms of interaction with neighbouring states.  These 
changes marked advances from the prior Curzonian view of denying outside powers 
influence in South Asia and now extended to include South East Asia in India’s 
“neighbourhood”.  Thus, what had been present in India’s pre-1998 security identity had 
developed and evolved.  Finally, India’s relations with its immediate region formed the 
core of an adherence to Kautilya’s “circle of states” logic - an idea that also resurfaced 





In general, the BJP-led NDA followed the security precepts of previous Congress 
regimes of dominating India’s smaller neighbours through its greater landmass, 
population and GDP.  In particular, the policy of regarding Nepal as a strategic buffer 
against China continued as did policies to prevent Nepal helping Naxalites in India 
(Pant, 2005: 107).  These efforts had extra significance as Nepal was the world’s only 
Hindu state.  The BJP also encouraged its other neighbours to remove militant bases 
used for attacks on India, predominantly those in Bhutan and Bangladesh (Interview 
B28, 200872; Mishra, 2004c: 254).  An Agreement was signed with Bhutan in late 2003 to 
flush out ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) militants and, in both cases, JWGs 
instituted prior to 1998 continued.  Furthermore, the NDA remained protective of its 
regional dominance, for example preventing Bangladesh from signing a ‘force-stationing 
agreement’ (Jing-Dong, 2001: 989) with the US.  These actions backed up the BJP 
policy norm of India as the natural regional hegemon. 
 
                                                
71 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
72 Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
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Several ideas were mooted during the BJP-led NDA for a South Asian Union built upon 
existing South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member nations - 
ideas in common with their pre-1998 policy.  Partly aimed at achieving a regional ‘peace 
dividend’ (Vajpayee, 2004), such an institutional configuration would be based upon 
open borders, free trade regulations and a common currency.  However, observers duly 
noted the existing diplomatic, political and economic difficulties of arranging such a 
‘grand regional council in India’ (Jalal, 1999) particularly between India and Pakistan.  
Despite its SAARC (and Indian Ocean Rim - Association for Regional Cooperation 
(IOR-ARC)) memberships, Rubinoff additionally remarked that ‘India has been a 
follower rather than an initiator of (multilateral) activities … (its) principal objective … 
has been to ensure that the organisation can only deal with unimportant matters’ (2000: 
289).  Such comments suggested that control of South Asia remained the NDA’s 
overriding concern, as did the norm of India as natural regional hegemon.   
 
The most important developments for India with any of its smaller neighbours from 
1998 to 2004 occurred with Myanmar.  India-Myanmar relations in the mid-1990s had 
been characterized by Nehruvian principles and estrangement due to Myanmar’s 
military junta crackdown on pro-democracy supporters.  Under the NDA this policy 
was reversed to resume what the BJP saw as ‘the correct relationship’ (Interview B27, 
2008)73, despite Myanmar still being led by General Than Shwe.  This reframing 
occurred through ‘a policy of constructive engagement’ (Mohan, 2007: 112), which was 
also a strategic response to China’s growing influence in Myanmar.  Such a policy 
summed up the BJP’s neo-Curzonian agenda of purposefully projecting their security 
concerns out beyond their borders.  Additionally, strategists increasingly realized 
Myanmar’s geographical position as the only effective route for India into South East 
Asia, and demanded Indian attention regardless of its political circumstances - an 
awareness that reflected the BJP’s policy norm of realpolitik.  The presence of large 
numbers of people of Indian origin (PIO) in Myanmar and their economic links back to 
India were also part of this policy’s rationale. 
 
Increasing economic links between the two sides were a critical part of this deepening 
engagement, particularly the building of critical infrastructure to ‘increase external 
                                                
73 Interview with a former head of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
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connectivity’ (Mohan, 2002).  During a visit in 2002 Jaswant Singh announced a project 
to connect India by road to Thailand via Myanmar.  This deal bought additional 
‘substance and synergy to India’s Look East strategy’ (Batabyal, 2006: 185) by explicitly 
physically linking South and South East Asia together.  Other agreements included 
initial plans in early 2004 to build a port at Dawei, in order to help India protect its 
growing energy needs and energy security.  Such plans were made in conjunction with 
increased Indian purchases of Myanmar gas, which had begun in 2001 (Lall, 2006: 437).  
These purchases complimented India’s access to Nepalese and Bhutanese hydro-electric 
power (through the Kurichhu Project which was finished in 2002) and Bangladeshi gas - 
assets not always fully exploited by India (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)74. 
 
Military cooperation was the final aspect of the India-Myanmar relationship to develop 
during the NDA.  High-level military-to-military links resumed in 2000 (the first since 
1988) along with the carrying out of joint military operations in shared border areas.  
Central to such contacts was cooperation on cross-border terrorism (a mutual problem 
for both sides) with Myanmar promising to ‘flush out Indian insurgent camps’ (Lall, 
2006: 435).  Tackling cross-border smuggling also saw several joint developments with 
Indian officials training their Myanmar peers in anti-narcotics and anti-arms smuggling 
techniques.  Overall, such cooperation was envisaged to promote ‘greater trade in the 
region, with the border opening up gradually, (hence) leading to more local prosperity’ 
(Lall, 2006: 433).  While these interactions greatly improved India-Myanmar relations, 





In South East Asia, the BJP expanded India’s South Asian dominance.  This new 
modality was defined by Yaswant Sinha as ‘“institutionalizing positive asymmetry in 
favour of our neighbours”’ (quoted in Muni & Mohan, 2004: 317).  Positive asymmetry 
made an ideological fit with Hindutva’s Akhand Bharat through its emphasis on a 
(physically) greater India, which had a greater influence and reach beyond the usual 
                                                
74 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
75 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009. 
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confines of South Asia.  The critical difference with the Gujral Doctrine was that 
Vajpayee, Singh and Mishra ‘gave a security cast to the policy, and Indian defense and 
security links … began to proliferate after 1998’ (Garver, 2002: 21).  Positive asymmetry 
could also enable India to gain ‘strategic “release” from the region’ (Bajpai, 2006: 198) 
and away from constraining border and territorial preoccupations.  Spreading her 
influence beyond South Asia would additionally confirm India’s position as the region’s 
natural hegemon.  This engagement was to be proactive and assertive whereby ‘”escalate 
and negotiate” was the new Indian mantra’ (Athwal, 2008: 15). 
 
The BJP’s policy emphasized India’s cultural and ethnic (especially Hindu) heritage in 
South East Asia, reasserted and extended India’s Look East policy and confirmed a 
relative strategic neglect of West Asia.  The BJP-led NDA perceived this policy to be 
different from that of Congress-led governments, as they displayed a greater receptivity 
to (mainly eastern) regions outside of South Asia.  Congress had not shown such 
receptivity, for example refusing to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) at its creation in the 1960s as it was regarded to be a US-inspired piece of 
Cold War security architecture.  In turn, BJP officials noted how Nehru’s combination 
of agnosticism and secularism had neglected India’s historical and cultural links with 
South East Asia (Interview B27, 2008)76.  Instead, Vajpayee visited Laos, Cambodia, 
Indonesia and Vietnam during the NDA.  The BJP’s injection of security into these 
regional relationships also reflected a particular emphasis on the common fight against 
transnational terrorism, ties which could help improve India’s security.  
 
Central to successful engagement with South East Asia were India’s links with ASEAN.  
This importance was shown after the Pokhran II tests, when Jaswant Singh visited most 
of the ASEAN capitals in July 1998.  The tour succeeded with ASEAN only moderately 
censuring India’s actions (Batabyal, 2006: 191-192).  After extensive diplomatic activity, 
India became a summit-level partner of ASEAN in 2002, matching the status of China, 
Japan, and South Korea.  The relationship was consolidated by the first ever India-
ASEAN summit in November 2002 (in Cambodia), which followed the India-ASEAN 
Business Summits held in New Delhi and Hyderabad in October 2002.  These 
interactions represented how South East Asia was, for the BJP-led NDA, ‘”one of the 
                                                
76 Interview with a former head of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
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focal points of India’s foreign policy, strategic concerns and economic interests”’ 
(Vajpayee quoted in Acharya, 2006: 305).  To bolster their relationship, India announced 
tariff concessions for the less developed countries in the region (mainly Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos).  The process also involved a joint India-ASEAN Vision 
2020 Statement. 
 
In 2003, at the second India-ASEAN summit in Bali, India acceded to the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation on Southeast Asia, and signed the Joint Declaration for 
Cooperation on Combating International Terrorism and the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (to create an India-ASEAN Regional Trade and 
Investment Area (RTIA) by 2011).  Collectively, these agreements represented ‘step(s) 
forward in the implementation of its [India’s] Look East strategy’ (Batabyal, 2006: 192), 
continuing but also heightening norms present from India’s security identity prior to 
1998.  Furthermore, they acted as counter initiatives against the increasing (economic) 
influence of China in South East Asia.  The role of the IOR also played into these 
agreements in terms of trade and energy security, and reflected BJP policy norms of 
controlling and protecting the IOR.  Overall, trade between India and ASEAN 
increased from US$5.6 billion in 1998 to US$14.5 billion in 2004 (Zhao, 2007: 125).   
 
The greater projection of Indian security into the IOR rested upon naval deployments 
and maritime diplomacy, particularly the protection of trade routes to the east and 
energy supplies from the west.  This importance underlined how, according to an ex-
MEA official, 90% of Indian trade (Interview B2, 2008)77 and 70% of her oil needs 
(Pant, 2005: 112) were dependent upon sea access.  Indeed, the NDA began referring to 
the IOR as India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reflecting the BJP policy norm of 
explicitly controlling and protecting the IOR.  The establishment of the Far Eastern 
Strategic Command on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in August 2001 backed up 
this view, as did India having the largest submarine fleet and the only aircraft carriers 
among the IOR’s littoral states (Athwal, 2008) - capabilities which (indirectly) fulfilled a 
BJP manifesto promise.  Such prowess was displayed through the India Navy’s 
successful interception of the hijacked Japanese Alondra Rainbow in 1999.  Naval 
                                                
77 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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exercises with South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and the US underlined 
these capabilities and the IOR being part of what an ex-MEA official now deemed to be 
India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’ (Interview B2, 2008)78.  
 
Other greater extra-regional links were also in evidence during the NDA.  In March 
2000, India signed a joint protocol on defence cooperation with Vietnam that included 
the ‘sharing of strategic threat perceptions and intelligence’ (Scott, 2007: 128).  In 2002, 
India also signed accords with Cambodia.  On an institutional level, the signing of the 
Vientiane Declaration on November 10 2000 saw the creation of the Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC) Forum.  Consisting of India, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 
and Thailand the Forum focused on mutual tourism, culture and education, as well as 
improving transport and communication infrastructures.  Importantly, it acknowledged 
how for India the ‘Mekong countries provide strategic accessibility into the heartland of 
Asia-Pacific’ (Batabyal, 2006: 189), again highlighting how greater extra-regional ties 
helped to secure BJP policy norms of being South Asia’s natural hegemon and 
becoming a global power.  The BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) 





Apart from their underlying assertive and proactive nature, many of the BJP policy 
norms that informed NDA policy from 1998 to 2004 effectively harmonized with those 
from India’s security identity pre-1998.  Thus, we observed how BJP norms of 
pragmatic engagement coalesced with prior security identity norms of a cycle of conflict 
and negotiation with Pakistan, and ongoing territorial threats and suspicion with China.  
Rather than competing, these norms became complimentary - and contradicted other 
BJP policy norms of trying to regain Kashmir and fearing all outsiders.  In turn, there 
was little difference between BJP and pre-1998 security identity norms concerning 
India’s regional position or the IOR, suggesting relative harmonization.  Thus, an 
analysis of the norms interacting within the physical source of India’s security identity 
                                                
78 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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during the NDA showed multiple sources of security coalescing rather than competing 
for pre-eminence within India’s security practice. 
 
The NDA’s foreign policy behaviour within the physical source of India’s security 
identity did however show that some BJP policy norms were present but were being 
used for strategic effect.  Thus, during India-Pakistan relations from late 2001 to late 
2002, we saw the use of the BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-militancy (as externally-derived) 
norms to coercively confront Pakistan and to achieve outside (US) recognition of 
Pakistani complicity in terrorism (BJP National Executive 24.12.02, 2005: 40).  
Importantly, rather than being ends in themselves, these norms enabled the BJP to be 
both assertive in its conduct of India’s security practice and also free of much of the 
historical baggage carried by earlier Congress regimes.  Indeed, it was the combination 
of these (normative) traits that made Pakistan and China more amenable to dealing with 
a BJP-led India (Interview B5, 2008)79.  Furthermore, BJP assertiveness carried on their 
entrenched norm of protecting the Hindu Rashtra and reconfigured their Akhand Bharat 
norm to now indicate the extent of India’s strategic (and economic) influence and 
stability, rather than its purely geographic scope (Interview B30, 2008)80. 
 
Through this harmonization and coercion, the NDA achieved discernible advances with 
all its neighbours.  Thus, via unparalleled peace processes and ceasefires with Pakistan 
(and anti-India militants), the BJP endeavoured to go beyond the Pakistan-centric 
myopia typical of the 1970s and 1980s (Chari, 1987; Wright, 2007) in order to help free 
India from its regional constraints.  Often these advances were, according to a former 
MEA official, due to Vajpayee’s ability to overcome militant Sangh Parivar elements 
(Interview B12, 2008)81 or being free from Congress’ historical international relations 
baggage.  Equally with China, the benefits of interdependence outweighed continued 
enmity as both sides deepening their interaction despite ongoing border disputes.  Both 
these relationships added extra resonance to India’s normative great power aspiration, 
although observers noted how the 1998 tests had now made India and China explicit 
strategic rivals (Vanaik, 2002: 335).  For BJP affiliates, this change was a major long-
                                                
79 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
80 Interview with a former think-tank director and strategic analyst, Delhi, November 7 2008. 
81 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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term shift in Indian foreign policy (Interview B5, 2008)82.  Finally, through its 
heightened engagement with the South Asia, Myanmar and South East Asia, the NDA 
injected security precepts into these relations and extended India’s security horizons.     
 
As in Chapter 6, our analysis has noted how the assertiveness and pragmatism 
underlying many BJP policy norms harmonized with, but also substantiated, many of 
the norms already present within India’s security identity.  This substantiation stemmed 
from the BJP’s historical policy norms and their behaviour during the NDA, rather than 
any significant structural or systemic developments in South Asia.  The BJP pushed 
their normative policy agenda rather than being dictated to by events.  In turn, part of 
this substantiation rested upon a policy of ‘all-dimension diplomacy’ (Jing-Dong, 2001: 
984-985) that demanded greater Indian global interaction in order to speed up her 
economic and social development, and to improve her regional security.  Chapter 8 
investigates how this broadening of India’s (physical) security horizons continued under 
the BJP into the wider (perceptual) global environment.  It also analyses if the NDA 
were able to keep on adding greater substance to India’s security identity and hence 
produce a lasting gear shift in India’s normative security practice.   
 
                                                





the BJP and India’s Global Relations’ 
 
‘the greatest meaning of the tests is that 
they have given India shakti, they have given India strength, 
they have given India self-confidence’ 
(MEA, 1998b) 
 
‘”it will be wrong to think of our position as 
pro-US, or pro-Iraq, or pro-west, or pro-third world, or 
pro-this or pro-that … we are pro-India”’ 
(Sinha quoted in Jain, 2007: 142) 
 
‘India has moved from being totally moralistic 
to being a little more realistic’ 
(Singh [Jaswant], 1998: 47) 
 
How did internal sources of foreign policy influence India’s security practice beyond its 
immediate neighbours in South Asia?  Are domestically derived norms linked to 
international politics (rather than vice versa)?  Here, I answer these questions through 
an analysis of how the norms structuring India’s security identity and BJP policy until 
1998 interacted in the perceptual source of India’s security identity during the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) period.  As we shall see, BJP policy norms had a major 
impact on India’s security practice and, in some ways, altered the normative basis of 
India’s security identity.  The BJP’s electoral success also came at a time of international 
flux and readjustment for India, especially with the decline of bipolarity and emergent 
globalization.  Thus, while links with Russia remained in place, there were new 
possibilities for global engagement, especially with the end of the Cold War politics that 
had dictated much of the United State’s (US) involvement in South Asia.  Such 
possibilities had not been fully realized by Indian governments prior to 1998 but would 
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be grasped by the BJP-led NDA.  Table 8.1 below outlines the composite norms 
structuring both India’s security identity and BJP policy norms before 1998. 
 
  
INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY BJP POLICY 
  
 
: ahisma / idealism 
: autonomy / non-alignment  
: great power aspiration 
: nuclear ambiguity 
: West Asia: explicitly pro-
Muslim then balanced 
: US: distrust / anti-western 
 
 
: assertive  
: realpolitik / realism 
: global power / UNSC 
: pro-nuclear weapons 
: West Asia: explicitly pro-
Israel and balanced 
: US: distrust / pro-capitalist 
  
 
Table 8.1: Perceptual Norms in India’s Security Identity & 
BJP Policy until 1998 
 
8.1) - FROM OUTLIER TO MAINSTREAM: 
 
BJP policy until 1998 within the perceptual source of the security identity revolved 
around norms of India becoming a global power and obtaining a permanent United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto, coupled with being pro-nuclear weapons.  
These norms respectively displayed harmony and dissonance with norms established 
prior to 1998 in India’s security identity - namely a general great power aspiration and 
nuclear ambiguity.  Chapter 6 has already established how concerning the latter, this 
norm was effectively overturned with the 1998 nuclear tests.  An assertive and muscular 
outlook, mixed with realpolitik and realism, further informed BJP policy norms in the 
perceptual source.  These norms went against ‘Nehru’s idealistic romanticism’ (Singh, 
1999a: 35) - personified by the BJP through non-alignment and ahisma - both of which 
were prominent in India’s early security identity.  They did however appear to 
compliment India’s often-assertive foreign policy under Nehru (the post-1947 
incorporation of several princely states, conflict over Kashmir, the invasion of Goa and 
challenging China across the Himalayas).  Observers also noted how a ‘new aggressive 
and belligerent (elite) Indian nationalism’ (Vanaik, 2002: 322) informed BJP policy 
norms.  Furthermore, a pragmatism ‘mantra’ (Interview B18, 2008)83 - as seen in NDA 
                                                
83 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, October 27 2008.  Please refer to the 
Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
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policy towards India’s neighbours in the physical source of India’s security identity - was 
also a critical influence on BJP policy. 
 
With the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 
impending ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India felt 
isolated from the group of great (nuclear) international powers by 1998.  As Jaswant 
Singh argued, this situation amounted (for the BJP in particular) to a “nuclear apartheid” 
that cast South Asia and Africa outside of the ‘nuclear security paradigm’ (1998: 48; see 
also Pande, 1996: 5-24).  It was discriminatory, putting India ‘in a position of inferiority 
by structures of power over which they ha(d) little influence’ (Walker, 1998: 511) and 
often associated India with Pakistan (Vajpayee, 2000: 41).  Within this context, from 
1974 there had been calls from India’s strategic enclave of analysts and academics to 
resume testing.  Although India had the appropriate scientific-military nuclear 
infrastructure in place, it was often only US pressure (and intelligence) that stopped any 
new tests.  By 1998, BJP supporters declared that ‘the genuine demands of national 
defence cannot be made hostage to international approval’ (Pant, 2005: 91).  Finally, an 
academic observer remarked that even if they had been discovered by the US, ‘the BJP 





Pokhran II was shrouded in secrecy with preparations for the tests camouflaged, done 
at night or to coincide with satellite blind spots, while India’s scientists dressed in army 
fatigues (Bhatia & Bhandari, 2008; Fair, 2005: 44).  In addition, the plans were kept 
secret from most of the NDA as well as the Indian army (Interview B10, 2008)85.  As 
the BJP-led NDA entered office, US President Clinton asked for a “strategic pause” in 
testing.  In response, BJP leaders assured US officials that it only planned to undertake a 
“strategic review” (Mohan, 2005: 90).  Further still, Advani told US envoy Bill 
Richardson that the ‘BJP knew the difference between “campaign rhetoric and the 
pragmatic demands of governing”’ (Fair, 2005: 43-44).  Successfully carrying on the 
                                                
84 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
85 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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nuclear tests via this ‘organised deception’ (Joshi, 1998; Vajpayee, 1998b), indicated how 
the BJP had learnt from the experiences of previous Indian governments (and hence 
India’s normative security practice) and were willing to defy international opinion. 
 
Internationally, a central BJP rationale for the nuclear tests was to promote the image of 
a powerful, resurgent and dynamic India to the world.  Therefore, the tests not only 
defied the international community but were also about restoring national confidence 
and pride - India ‘believe(s) that it does not get the respect and prominence it deserves 
… (it) feels out of place, forced to compete in a game it does not like, following rules 
made up by someone else’ (Zakaria, 1998).  Furthermore, for a former Indian 
ambassador to the US, the tests forced the world to engage with India, by showing that 
India was willing ‘to take on the world establishment if necessary to protect its national 
security interests’ (Interview B21, 2008)86.  Challenging the world’s conception of India, 
forcing global engagement and clarifying India’s (previous) nuclear ambiguity were also 
ways to assertively implement BJP policy norms of India as a global power.  
Internationally, Pokhran II was therefore an ‘essential building block’ (Pant, 2005: 85) in 
this implementation. 
 
Explicit realpolitik and realism driven rationales also underpinned the testing, certainly 
from the viewpoint of BJP strategists whereby ‘the enhancing of national power is the 
strategic objective of nation states’ (Pant, 2005: 85).  The 1998 tests helped to sustain 
core Indian security identity norms of maintaining autonomy and independence but 
eschewed norms of idealism and, to an extent, ahisma.  In particular, BJP leaders talked 
of enhancing India’s ‘strategic space’ (Sinha, 2003: 62), while party resolutions noted 
how the tests had ‘immunize(d) our country against blackmail by any hostile power’ 
(BJP National Executive 04.04.03a, 2005: 22).  Testing also showed the prominence of 
the BJP’s assertive (and muscular) norm concerning India’s security practice, and a 
willingness to ‘do everything it takes to preserve India’ (Vajpayee, 2000: 43).  The NDA 
continued the (pre-1998 Indian security identity) norm of being pro-nuclear 
disarmament, but used their acquisition of nuclear weapons as a new point of leverage 
(Cohen, 2002: 169) in non-proliferation debates.  Controversy over the real atomic 
                                                
86 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008. 
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yields of the tests underpinned the general symbolic and leveraging value of Pokhran II 
(Perkovich, 1999: 430-5). 
 
BJP policy norms concerning UNSC recognition also became more prominent post-
Pokhran II, with a permanent seat now seen as ‘not a quest … (but) India’s rightful due’ 
(Singh, 2000a).  The BJP believed that the 1998 tests had put India in the top tier of the 
global hierarchy and that existing non-proliferation structures had to be redefined 
(Interview B2, 200887).  Furthermore, public rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons as 
India’s ‘due’ (MEA, 1998a) emphasized this normative perception, oft invoking - for an 
ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official - similarities with Indira Gandhi after the 
1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) (Interview B25, 2008)88.  Underpinning such 
themes of continuity (as opposed to change), the BJP-led NDA were quick to talk of 
India’s nuclear heritage and the ‘same [nuclear] policy tenets that have guided us for five 
decades’ (Vajpayee, 1998b).  Overall, according to a senior security official in the NDA, 
we can see some harmonization between norms within India’s security identity and BJP 
policy but with a presence in the latter of a stronger ideological [Hindutva] motivation 
(Interview B11, 2008)89.   
  
BJP beliefs in an emergent and strong India were underpinned by recognition of India’s 
increased economic power and international significance by 1998.  The BJP argued that 
‘India has the strength to withstand and survive sanctions’ (BJP National Executive 
21.08.98b, 2005: 27) and had discussed this point before the nuclear tests (Interview 
A15, 2008)90.  In turn, not only could India withstand the pressure of sanctions, but 
India’s financial linkages to international corporations and other countries would protect 
them from complete economic isolation.  Indeed, while the US and Japan issued 
sanctions, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom (UK) did not.  Such an 
approach was both a new assertion of India’s strategic power and autonomy, and 
(according to an ex-MEA official and a strategic analyst) conversely a gamble that paid 
                                                
87 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, October 17 2008. 
88 Interview with a senior ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official and former ambassador, Delhi, 
November 3 2008. 
89 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
90 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008. 
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off (Interview B2, 2008; Private Correspondence 1, 2009)91.  Sustained diplomacy by 
Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra post-Pokhran II, also enabled India’s viewpoint in all 
these countries (and elsewhere) to be understood.  It was thus the actions of the BJP-led 
NDA that had changed the international (perceptual) environment, not vice versa. 
 
Restoring India’s Place 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the dwindling significance of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), in the early 1990s India was regarded by one of India’s leading 
strategic thinkers as an outlier state without any meaningful international impact 
(Interview A7, 2008)92.  The BJP’s foreign policy aimed to counter such a trend by 
‘integrating India into the global political and economic mainstream’ (Mishra, 2004c: 
256).  Pokhran II sustained these aims and mixed with other established BJP policy 
norms, such as protecting the Hindu Rashtra and making India a global power.  Further 
still, the tests challenged the image of India as being ‘a low performing, badly 
administered state’ (Advani, 2005: 68) with a dysfunctional democracy.  For security 
officials in the NDA, now other states had to ‘rethink about India’ (Interview B11, 
2008)93 and how to engage with the state.  By questioning the dominant global nuclear 
consensus (and being the first country to proclaim a new nuclear status since China in 
1964), Pokhran II had thus ‘brought India into the global strategic mainstream’ (Athwal, 
2008: 66).  This result personified the assertiveness of the BJP-led NDA, leading a 
military observer to see the 1998 tests as a ‘paradigm shift’ (Interview B10, 2008)94 in 
India’s normative security practice. 
 
High levels of Indian diplomacy also came to characterize India’s mainstream re-
integration, as the BJP endeavoured to maintain their normative push to make India a 
global power.  Thus, NDA and MEA officials began to overcome India’s regional 
fixation (Interview A19, 2008)95 via a policy of ‘total diplomacy’ (Sinha, 2004a: 188) with 
                                                
91 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, October 17 2008; private correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, 
November 30 2009. 
92 Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008. 
93 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
94 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
95 Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008. 
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all states.  Through this approach, and the catalyst of the 1998 tests, India aimed to 
inculcate new and deeper relationships.  An ex-MEA official and an ex-military officer 
also separately noted a new ranked hierarchy in Indian diplomacy, with greater attention 
given to the P5 powers [those with permanent vetoes in the UNSC] and second tier 
powers such as Japan, Australia, France, Germany and the EU (Interview B2, 2008; 
Interview B26, 200896).  This ranking differed from the pre-1998 security identity that 
gave equal status to all countries, regardless of (current or potential) political and 
economic relations.  Such developments also signaled to other states ‘that India’s 
strategic frontier may not be coterminous with its political borders’ (Cohen, 2002: 44) - 
itself a sign of its increasing international influence and reflective of the enlarged 
neighbourhood we witnessed in Chapter 7. 
 
Overall, a leading Indian academic regarded the NDA as more accomplished at 
diplomacy than earlier governments (Interview B31, 2008)97, perhaps courtesy of the 
BJP’s entrenched policy norms for being assertive and pragmatically engaging with other 
countries.  This success was particularly apparent at the Seattle (1999) and Doha (2001) 
World Trade Organization (WTO) summits, when working in multilateral combination 
with other BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) countries.  Indian diplomacy’s new 
primacy also related to the BJP’s self-projection as India’s party of national security.  
Unlike any party (or government) before them, the BJP put foreign policy on the 
political agenda - regarding it as part of India’s ‘national will’ (Advani, 2005: 12) and 
thus made it a domestic and election issue.  By seeing diplomacy as a tool to collectively 
achieve (core BJP) policy norms (from being a global power to protecting the Hindu 
Rashtra and India’s regional hegemony), for a senior NDA official, the BJP succeeded in 
adding a new dimension of strategic evaluation into Indian foreign policy (Interview 
B11, 2008)98. 
 
Apart from the introduction of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National 
Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the BJP-led NDA bought about other substantial 
                                                
96 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, October 17; interview with think-tank head and former Indian Army officer, Delhi, 
November 3 2008. 
97 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 7 2008. 
98 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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changes to the overall organisation of Indian security’s apparatus.  Thus, in 1999 the 
NDA carried out a comprehensive review of national security (the first since 
independence).  This review was not only a BJP manifesto promise but also resulted in 
India’s first-ever integrated command and control structure for defence staff, and the 
co-ordination of India’s armed forces under the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).  
Other steps included the introduction of a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) under 
the authority of the Prime Minister and the National Security Advisor, as well as a 
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) to appoint India’s Commander-in-Chief.  As 
shown in Figure 8.1 below, the actual amount spent on military expenditure increased 
by 47% during the NDA.  However, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) it averaged the same as the 1990s as a whole (see Figure 4.2) at 2.9% (SIPRI, 
2010) - suggesting no new (forceful) spending approach (and thus continuities) from 



























Figure 8.1: Indian Military Expenditure, Excluding Nuclear (1998-2004) 
 (SIPRI, 2010) 
 
On August 17 1999, the NSAB unveiled India’s draft nuclear doctrine.  The main 
elements of the doctrine were a no-first-use policy, non-use of nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear weapons states, a moratorium on nuclear tests and working towards 
universal nuclear disarmament (Pant, 2007: 249).  Conservative in nature, the doctrine 
displayed a commitment to using ‘strategic nuclear assets as instruments of retribution 
in case deterrence fails’ (Tellis, 2001: iii) rather than as tools of assertion.  Observers 
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thus noted how ‘India’s evolving nuclear doctrine is likely to be conducive to - rather 
than subversive of - strategic stability in South Asia’ (Tellis, 2001: 104), reassuring the 
US in particular.  The doctrine created the image of India as a responsible nuclear 
power, although for some often using a western lexicon inappropriate (or not fully 
understood) in the Indian context (Interview B35, 2008)99.  Building upon the 1999 
draft, India’s nuclear command structure was made public on January 4 2003. 
 
8.2) - “NATURAL ALLIES”: 
 
Emblematic of its diplomatic surge based upon a ranked hierarchy, the 1998 to 2004 
NDA represented a period of heightened interaction in Indo-US relations.  Apart from 
their residual normative distrust of outsiders (which harmonised with a norm of US 
distrust present in India’s security identity before 1998), the BJP were seen as being 
traditionally pro-American (Dixit, 2004b).  This belief was based, according to an ex-
MEA official, upon core BJP policy norms of a pro-capitalist leaning (Interview B1, 
2008)100, as well as wanting to assert India as a global power.  US dominance of the 
global system after the Cold War validated the potential of such a relationship, whereby 
the US was a necessary partner with which to achieve the BJP’s ambitions of a resurgent 
India.  Buoyed by perceived common democratic foundations, BJP leaders saw the two 
countries as ‘natural allies in the quest for a better future’ (Vajpayee, 1998a). 
 
Yet by the early 1990s, India’s strategic community had largely regarded the US as a 
benign power that was neither harmful nor favourable to Indian interests.  Indeed, 
Indo-US relations were regarded as a low priority.  While there had been some mutual 
diplomatic activity in the aftermath of the Cold War, two asymmetries were apparent - 
‘anti-Americanism on the Indian side and paucity of interest in the relationship on the 
US side’ (Bajpai, 2006: 209).  However, the nuclear tests of 1998 with their incumbent 
defiance of global (US-led) anti-proliferation controls ‘played a catalytic role in bringing 
the two democracies together’ (Mishra, 2005: 79).  Despite initial sanctions there was a 
slow, consistent and deepening level of strategic cooperation between the two sides 
                                                
99 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 
Delhi, November 10 2008; private correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, 
November 30 2009. 
100 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of 
the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
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during the NDA period (for various accounts, see Das, 2005; Gaan, 2007; Ganguly et 
al., 2006).  These developments formed part of BJP attempts to strategically lift India 
away from South Asia towards a greater global role, and challenged the normative basis 
of how India could be a great power (as per India’s pre-1998 security identity).  
 
American Anger and Secret Talks 
 
Furious at their deception by the BJP, the US’s immediate reaction to the 1998 tests was 
to issue new sanctions against India under the Glenn Amendment.  US officials stated 
that ‘”India is not going to blow its way onto the Security Council as a permanent 
member”’ (Rubin quoted in Jain, 2007: 104).  Emblematic of this stance, the US 
supported the Chinese-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 4 1998 
against proliferation in South Asia.  During Clinton’s subsequent visit to China, the 
“Sino-US Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia” of June 27 1998 further 
condemned the tests and called on India (and Pakistan) to accede to the NPT.  Such 
events roused fears in India of a Sino-US pact towards South Asia.  Furthermore, 
Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton citing China as the reason for the tests was leaked to the 
New York Times, insulting India’s elite (Interview B2, 2008)101.  These factors created a 
‘psychological and material fall-out in the subcontinent’ (Mansingh, 1999: 127) between 
India and the US. 
 
The nuclear tests had however forced US attention onto South Asia - particularly given 
India’s significance as the largest military (and now nuclear) power between the US’s 
two major military presences in the Persian Gulf and East Asia.  Likewise, Pakistan’s 
own tests placed the region under greater scrutiny, as did (according to a former Indian 
ambassador) negative US reactions to the BJP’s nationalistic and jingoistic Hindutva 
(Interview B21, 2008)102.  India’s nuclear tests severely undermined the Indo-US 
relationship but were also the spur for serious dialogue between high-level envoys from 
both sides.  Initiated by India, there were eight rounds of talks between two envoys 
(Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh) from June 12 1998, which remained unreported in 
the Indian and US media.  Lasting eight months, it was the longest sustained dialogue 
                                                
101 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign 
relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
102 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008. 
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between high-level Indian and American officials since 1963.  The talks would ‘liberate 
India’s nuclear policy and American policy (towards India)’ (Athwal, 2008: 3), as well as 
reverse (previously harsh) Japanese and Australian attitudes towards India’s new overt 
status. 
 
Against the backdrop of discussions on nuclear proliferation (with the US urging India 
to sign the CTBT), Kashmir, economics and the US’s sanctions that had been in place 
since 1974, the talks transformed a difficult relationship between the two sides into a 
cooperative one.  In effect, for a former Indian ambassador to the US the talks 
prevented relations ‘from boiling over’ (Interview B21, 2008)103.  Critically, the US 
accepted the new significance of India in terms of its economy, nuclear capabilities, 
stable democracy and large middle class.  The ‘new willingness of both sides to pursue a 
non-ideological approach to bilateral relations opened the path to greater security 
cooperation’ (Ganguly, 2003), as the BJP’s realism norm superseded the idealism norm 
present within India’s pre-1998 security identity.  Additionally, there was also an 
appreciation that ‘humiliating the most pro-US Indian foreign policy team in a very long 
time would strengthen Nehruvian arguments about US perfidy’ (Garver, 2002: 29).  
Here the pro-capitalist and pragmatic engagement norms within BJP policy (while 
dissonant with norms in India’s pre-1998 security identity) were important factors in 
deepening Indo-US engagement.  Misgivings over US ties with China also underpinned 
these sentiments.   
 
The responsible attitude of India towards its new capabilities, coupled with the Talbott 
/ Singh talks, appeared to pay dividends during the Kargil conflict.  For the first time, 
the US intervened in New Delhi’s favour in any Indo-Pakistani clash, telling Pakistan to 
withdraw its forces back over the Line of Control (LoC).  While taking place to prevent 
any (nuclear) escalation of the conflict, such an intervention was regarded as significant 
by Indian observers (Dixit, 2004b: 40; Jain, 2007: 106-9).  Furthermore for a senior 
security figure in the NDA, Clinton’s actions showed that US behaviour did not have to 
be against Indian interests, underlined the US’s strategic interest in India and 
represented a more neutral stance towards South Asia as a whole (Interview B11, 
                                                
103 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008. 
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2008)104.  Vajpayee’s restraint, shown by not retaliating against Pakistan, also made US 
officials ‘”gain new respect (for India)”’ (Inderfurth quoted in Jain, 2007: 114).  
Allowing US involvement additionally indicated a willingness by the NDA to relax 
India’s traditional normative opposition to any internationalization of the Kashmir 
conflict.  Continued US-Pakistan ties (particularly military aid) would however temper 
all these developments, especially when the US designated Pakistan as a major non-
NATO ally during this period. 
 
In March 2000, Clinton visited India - the first sitting US president to do so for twenty 
two years and the first formal state visit since Eisenhower in 1959.  Through the Agreed 
Principles of March 21 2000, both sides resolved ‘to create a closer and qualitatively new 
relationship’ (Vajpayee & Clinton, 2000: 137).  Thus, dialogues and forums on 
terrorism, Asian security, technology, trade and democracy were announced, and regular 
high-level summits planned between the two leaders.  Overall, these actions 
institutionalized dialogue between India and the US, forming the basis of a nascent 
security architecture.  Clinton’s ‘perfunctory five hour stopover in Pakistan’ (Kux, 2002) 
after his five day visit to India seemed to confirm Washington’s more neutral tilt in the 
sub-continent.  Vajpayee reciprocally visited Washington in September 2000.  These 
exchanges made India more visible on the US’s radar (Singh, 2000b), as US officials 
talked of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, not focusing on Kashmir and seeing India 
as a key global player of the 21st century (Jain, 2007: 125, 228, 117).   
 
From Clinton to Bush 
 
While Clinton’s engagement with India had been based upon friendship and 
normalisation but with core (and international system-based) benchmarks (signing the 
CTBT, joining the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), displaying strategic restraint 
and having export controls), new US President Bush had no such conditions 
(Hathaway, 2003: 9-11).  Instead, India was now simply strategically relevant to the US - 
seen by some as a U-turn in US foreign policy (Interview B2, 2008105; Drezner, 2007).  
                                                
104 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
105 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign 
relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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For an ex-MEA official, deepening relations were also helped by Bush’s rejection of the 
CTBT, fears of Pakistani nuclear proliferation via the AQ Khan network and seeing 
India as potentially useful against China (Interview B1, 2008)106.  Marking this change, 
US and BJP defense officials (Donald Rumsfeld and Jaswant Singh) met in April 2001 - 
the first such high-level meeting since 1995.  In addition, new talks between Kanwal 
Sibal and Kenneth Juster were part of a continued effort to deal with Indo-US 
divergences over non-proliferation and advanced technology transfers.  These 
complementarities all represented ways in which the BJP-led NDA could further fulfill 
their (and Indian security identity) policy norms of India as a global power. 
 
India’s reaction to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on New York confirmed the 
importance of these norms within the security practice of the NDA government, and 
almost immediately their leaders offered India’s ‘”unconditional and unambivalent”’ 
(Hathaway, 2003: 7) support.  Building upon India’s own experiences of terrorism (BJP 
National Executive 02.11.01, 2005), the BJP recognized ‘that a decisive moment in 
world affairs had arrived and should be seized firmly’ (Mohan, 2002: 144).  Declaring its 
support of the US could also help counter Pakistan’s support of terrorism and secure 
Indo-US relations.  India’s support was ‘an unprecedented offer’ (Garver, 2002: 41), 
openly opportunistic and went against the decades-old security identity norms of non-
alignment and anti-Americanism.  In response, the US removed some of its sanctions 
dating from 1974.  Importantly however, some Indian support (particularly to allow US 
bases in India) was stopped by domestic Lok Sabha opposition, revealing the limits of a 
new government to completely overhaul foreign policy and the residual strength of its 
established policy norms.  
 
The BJP’s reaction to 9/11 served to increase cooperation and dialogue between 
Washington and New Delhi, as President Bush stated that ‘”my administration is 
committed to developing a fundamentally different relationship with India”’ (quoted in 
Hathaway, 2003: 19).  The US became more considerate of Indian sensitivities - making 
Indian (and BJP) officials more reassured, especially concerning terrorism (Interview 
                                                
106 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of 
the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
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B29, 2008)107.  Furthermore, as the world’s attention fixed on South Asia, India emerged 
as a stable country in an increasingly unstable neighbourhood.  Democracy helped to 
seal the new security links, with Indian officials seeing the two countries as ‘twin towers 
of democracy’ (Sinha, 2004a: 20), while President Bush remarked ‘”a billion people in a 
functioning democracy … isn’t that something?”’ (quoted in Mohan, 2007: 107).  In 
1999, India had also become one of the ten founding members of the Community of 
Democracies (MEA, 2001).  Norms of democratic rule in (the political source of) 
India’s security identity thus also helped to bolster Indo-US engagement. 
 
While the BJP (and indeed the US government) had taken advantage of 9/11 to further 
their own interests, further synergies apart from terrorism and democracy became 
increasingly apparent.  Of particular note were the BJP’s links to India’s modern, pro-
capitalist, media-driven culture that contrasted with the socialist vision that the US 
traditionally had of India.  Moral links to Israel and Taiwan as multi-ethnic, multi-
religious democracies surrounded by one-party states, added to BJP views of the US ‘as 
less an imperialist bully than a fellow democracy and a strategic partner’ (Kaplan, 2001).  
The BJP had also replaced any trace of the non-alignment norm within India’s security 
identity with one of being unaligned, announcing its mainstream integration and new-
found global importance.  Overall, as a senior MEA official at the time remarked; the 
‘US realized that there is no way that India could be ignored’ (Interview B32, 2008)108.  
All of these developments additionally normalized more positive conceptions of the US 
in India, laying the basis for the ‘qualitative and quantitative expansion of Indo-US 
cooperation’ (Dixit, 2004b: 40). 
 
Pressure for heightened Indo-US engagement also came from the US’s sizeable Indian 
diaspora.  Indian-Americans were substantial contributors to US technology and 
industry, while the US-India Business Council (founded in 1975) promoted Indo-US 
economic links, along with the Indo-US Friendship Council.  On Capitol Hill, there 
were large influential India caucuses in the House and the Senate, as well as an active 
US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC).  However, a senior MEA official 
                                                
107 Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence 
agency], Delhi, November 6 2008. 
108 Interview with a former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, November 
8 2008. 
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stated that (despite hiring four firms (including Verner Liipfert) and former 
Congressmen like Stephen Solarz during the NDA) lobbying was kept to a minimum, as 
growing US links meant that ‘India doesn’t need to lobby’ (Interview B21, 2008)109.  
Due to their economic (pro-capitalist) status, the largely middle class Indian-American 
diaspora were also largely sympathetic to the BJP.  Hindutva discourses concerning the 
resurgence of a strong, proud India fed into these sympathies, bolstered by media 
outlets such as the JAIN (Joint American Indian Network).  The BJP’s introduction of 




Public opinion surveys in 2002 reflected the new relationship, with the percentage of 
respondents saying the US has vital interests in India increasing from 29% to 65% since 
1998, the largest increase for any country (Mishra, 2005: 81).  These increases were 
accompanied by deepening economic links, aided according to ex-MEA officials by the 
NDA’s quicker implementation of economic reforms compared with previous Indian 
governments (Interview B1, 2008; Interview B4, 2008)110.  India was also regarded by 
many US strategists as resembling China in the 1980s - ‘a giant awakening from a long 
economic slumber’ (Kripalani et al., 2002).  Indo-US trade was ‘”as flat as a chapatti”’ 
(Blackwill quoted in Sáez, 2003: 196) in the late 1990s and the potential mutual benefits 
were clear.  Furthermore, the BJP saw the US as necessary for continued Indian 
economic growth to bolster its policy norms of India as a global power, to benefit its 
middle class voter base and to allow for more infrastructure and military growth.  Indo-
US trade nearly doubled during this period, as the US became India’s largest trading 
partner (see Figure 8.2 below). 
 
                                                
109 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008. 
110 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of 
the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008; interview with leading think-
tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], 































Figure 8.2: Indo-US Trade Figures (1998-2004) 
 (MEA, 2010a; MEA, 2010b) 
 
Counter-terrorism also became an area of Indo-US cooperation during the NDA.  For 
the BJP, the 9/11 attacks on the US and those on the Indian Parliament on December 
13 2001 were part of ‘one global arc of terrorism’ (Sinha, 2003: 61).  Further still, 
according to BJP policy norms, terrorism represented an external threat to the Hindu 
Rashtra that prevented the creation of Akhand Bharat.  On December 26 2001, the US 
reciprocated this perspective by putting Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba - two 
militant Pakistani Islamic groups that India blamed for much of the trouble in Kashmir 
- on its list of terrorist organisations.  In turn, India gave logistical support to Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, including over-flight clearance, refuelling, 
medical assistance and berthing facilities, and escorted US warships through the Malacca 
Straits.  Extensive Indian donations to help reconstruct Afghanistan added to the 
perception of India as a stable “strategic flank” against Pakistan and Afghanistan.  To 
coordinate these efforts, over fifteen Indo-US institutional fora were established during 
the NDA plus several agreements signed (see Table 8.2 below).  These efforts were a 




DATE EVENT / AGREEMENT 
  
July 1999 Indo-US Extradition Treaty effected (signed June 25 1997) 
January 2000 Indo-US JWG on Counter-Terrorism instituted (meets 
biannually) 
March 2000 US-India Working Group on Trade, and the US-India 
Financial and Economic Forum instituted 
June 2000 inaugural session of the India-US Commercial Dialogue 
October 2001 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
January 2002 Indo-US General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA) (on sharing information on classified 
technology) 
October 2002 1st (India-US) Global Issues Forum (meets annually) 
November 2002 High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) instituted (for 
technology, space and nuclear cooperation) 
January 2004 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) instituted (on the 
“Trinity issues” of civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programmes 
and high technology trade plus a dialogue on missile defence) 
  
 
Table 8.2: Significant Indo-US Fora and Agreements 
(July 1999 - January 2004) 
 
While the war on terrorism ‘”transformed US-India relations”’ (Blackwill quoted in 
Kux, 2002), the convergence of mutual interests also continued militarily through 
numerous joint exercises.  These included Indian and American paratroopers in Agra in 
May 2002 (Cope India-02) and the two countries’ air forces in Alaska in 
September/October 2002 (Geronimo Thrust).  The Indian and US navies also jointly 
patrolled the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, escorting merchant vessels and 
combating piracy.  Continued meetings by the Defence Policy Group (DPG), set up as 
part of the 1995 Agreed Minutes, also led to the institution of the Military Cooperation 
Group (to coordinate military exercises and exchanges), the Security Cooperation 
Group (to coordinate sales and licensing), and the Joint Technical Group (to coordinate 
Research and Development - R&D).  As the US reduced its 1974 sanctions, the first 
Indo-US arms deals for forty years were undertaken.  Pentagon officials spoke of a 
‘”diplomatic revolution”’ (quoted in Hathaway, 2003: 11) in military-to-military relations 




8.3) - AN EXPANDING STRATEGIC NEIGHBOURHOOD: 
 
Reflective of its notions of India’s extended neighbourhood, the BJP wished to expand 
India’s strategic reach away from the confines of South Asia.  This viewpoint built upon 
having increased control and protection of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as well as 
deepening ties with South East Asia - as shown in the physical source of India’s security 
identity.  Within the perceptual source, pre-1998 BJP policy concerning West Asia was 
based upon explicitly pro-Israel norms and being balanced toward the region as a whole.  
These norms had a degree of dissonance with those of India’s pre-1998 security identity 
that were initially explicitly pro-Muslim and then more balanced.  Although Indo-Israeli 
ties had finally been established in the early 1990s, BJP leaders promised a more 
unambiguous relationship and according to an ex-MEA official at the time, even met 
Israeli leaders shortly before coming into power (Interview B1, 2008)111.  Furthermore, 
when Vajpayee had been Foreign Minister during the 1977-80 Janata Party government, 
Israel’s Foreign Minister - Moshe Dayan - had secretly visited India.   
 
The BJP-led NDA also assertively looked for non-traditional partners to bolster their 
normative aim of India being an emerging global power.  New partners helped raise 
India’s international image and helped to attract greater trade levels, thus giving greater 
stability to India’s political and economic growth.  The ranked international hierarchy 
that emerged during the NDA played on these instincts, as Indian diplomacy sought to 
improve relations with Central Asia and Iran, find new partnerships with Australia and 
the EU, and maintain old partners, most notably Russia.  The BJP’s realpolitik norm 
bolstered these rationales, confirming ‘India’s movement away from Nehruvian 
concepts of nonalignment and international moralism toward a hardheaded realism that 
proclaimed India’s far-ranging strategic aspirations’ (Blank, 2003: 145).  In particular, 
greater diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific was regarded as phase two of India’s Look 
East policy, marking continued harmonization with the heritage of India’s pre-1998 
security identity.  Multi-directional engagement also amalgamated BJP policy norms of 
Akhand Bharat into a more perceptual than geographical conceptualization.  
 
                                                
111 Interview with former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the 




Based upon oil politics, foreign remittances by Indians living in the region and a fear of 
alienating India’s Muslim voters, Advani argued that ‘”India’s [pre-1998] Israel policy 
(had) bec(o)me captive to domestic policy and therefore an unstated veto’” (Indian 
Express, 2000), a view supported by some ex-MEA officials (Interview B1, 2008)112.  
Freed from such domestic constraints and also seeing several mutual commonalities 
(Israel was a nuclear power outside of the NPT and CTBT, and was ruled by the 
religious nationalist Likud party from 2003), the BJP sought to implement its normative 
policy belief to have open Indo-Israeli relations.  The residual anti-Muslim BJP policy 
norm complemented these perspectives.  The BJP had ‘no hang up’ (Interview B11, 
2008)113 about engaging with Israel and in September 1999 Brajesh Mishra traveled to 
Israel, followed in June and July 2000 by Advani and Jaswant Singh.  Collectively, these 
visits laid the foundations for a new and ‘long-term security relationship between India 
and Israel at the political leadership level’ (Pradhan, 2004: 23). 
 
Ariel Sharon became the first ever Israeli Prime Minister to visit India on September 8-
10 2003, taking Indo-Israeli relations to a new high.  The visit saw six agreements signed 
between the two countries covering the fields of environment; health co-operation; drug 
trafficking; visa free travel for diplomats, officials and service personnel; education; and 
cultural exchanges.  Indian and Israeli officials also enhanced cooperation on technology 
and infrastructure issues; biotechnology development; telecoms; and the civilian use of 
outer space (Interview B5, 2008)114.  Overall, the visit ‘heralded a new phase of assertive 
independence in India’s foreign policy, … bade farewell to past rhetoric and ideological 
baggage and opted for interest-driven realism’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 192).  Deepening 
Indo-Israeli relations marked a ‘sea change in relations between the two states’ (Pant, 
2004: 60), as BJP policy norms effectively challenged (and surmounted) those norms 
present within India’s established pre-1998 security identity.   
 
                                                
112 Interview with former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the 
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
113 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
114 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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Furthermore, the NDA was much more neutral towards West Asia, particularly 
concerning Israeli policy towards Palestine and Gaza.  Such a foreign policy position 
went ‘beyond the past comprehensive alignment with the Arab world in its disputes 
with Israel to a long overdue even-handed approach to the region’ (Muni & Mohan, 
2004: 328).  NDA officials even noted how Israel wanted India to be its interlocutor in 
negotiations with Iran (Interview B14, 2008)115.  While Congress had been responsible 
in the early 1990s for creating diplomatic ties in bilateral relations, under the BJP-led 
NDA Indo-Israeli relations were unapologetic and had ‘gathered substance’ 
(Kumaraswamy, 2003: 200).  The BJP policy norm of explicitly pro-Israeli links was so 
thoroughly implemented that it replaced previous norms within India’s security identity, 
leading observers to conclude that the NDA had had ‘an irreversible impact’ (Interview 
B5, 2008)116 on Indo-Israeli relations.  Further still, by 2004 the NDA had established a 
durable relationship that enjoyed widespread support in India. 
 
This new substance was critically manifested through heightened military links and arms 
sales.  Israel sent weapons to India during both Kargil and Operation Parakram (Pant, 
2004: 65), while in 1999 there was the first ever visit by an Indian Army Chief to Israel.  
India’s increasingly favourable US links also helped relations, with the US green-lighting 
Israel’s sale of Phalcon airborne warning and control system (AWACs) to India - itself 
regarded as ‘a pivotal moment’ (Riedel, 2008) in Indo-Israeli relations.  BJP and MEA 
officials noted how the US circumvented their own Congressional controls by telling 
Israel to trade (US-)restricted arms with India (Interview A20, 2008; Interview B1, 
2008)117.  Indo-Israeli military relations were further institutionalised during this period 
through the regular consultations (every six months) of their defence secretaries.  By 
2004, Israel was India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia, representing over $10 
billion in annual trade (Athwal, 2008: 215).  In turn, India’s non-military trade with 
Israel went up from $202 million in 1992 to $1.27 billion in 2002 (Pant, 2004: 66). 
 
                                                
115 Interview with a senior national security official during the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) government, Delhi, October 23 2008. 
116 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
117 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008; interview with a former 
senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security 
Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008. 
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Particularly post-9/11, counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing also became an 
important element in the Indo-Israeli relationship.  This interaction was based on shared 
perceptions whereby ‘both nations saw each other as hapless victims of rising Islamic 
terrorism … worse, they were favoured with only limited sympathy from the 
international community’ (Banerjee, 2006: 249).  An Indo-Israeli JWG on counter-
terrorism was set up in 2000.  Furthermore, Israeli’s intelligence agency (Mossad) gave 
Advani a demonstration of its resources during his June 2000 visit, while in October 
2000 Israeli counter-terrorism experts visited Kashmir (Pradhan, 2004: 81).  Both sides 
also shared intelligence on Pakistani militancy.  Moreover, India wanted to learn 
determination and strength from Israeli counter-terrorism experts, in order ‘”to produce 
a stock of political will and killer instinct … without which terror can only be fought 
without hurting the enemy”’ (General Mehta quoted in Banerjee, 2006: 253).   
 
Greater Indo-US links also helped foster greater Indo-Israeli links in this period, based 
upon their shared ‘natural logic’ (Mishra, 2004b: 250) concerning terrorism, democracy 
and nuclear proliferation.  In May 2003 at the American Jewish Committee (AJC), 
Mishra called for a ‘”triadic alliance”’ between the three sides (quoted in Bidwai, 2008: 
89).  Moreover, improved ties with Israel acted ‘as an important political and a 
psychological platform for India because of its enormous influence in US political and 
strategic affairs’ (Athwal, 2008: 215).  Co-dependence was also seen to help India garner 
Israeli support for a permanent seat of the UNSC.  Furthermore, Indian-American 
lobbyists helped to develop ties through their ‘growing coordination’ (Muni & Mohan, 
2004: 329).  In particular, the Indian diaspora in the US began modeling their lobbying 
activities on those of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) - the 
premier Israeli foreign policy lobbying body.  All of these links further entrenched the 
norm of now explicit (and lasting) Indo-Israeli links into India’s security identity.   
 
New and Improved Partnerships 
 
BJP pragmatism and a desire to extend India’s strategic horizons in a new vision of 
Akhand Bharat supplemented their diplomatic efforts to raise India’s profile and status in 
the world.  Typical of this effort, in 2002 there were forty one international summit 
visits at the Foreign Secretary level or above (Sinha, 2003: 80).  Balance was also a core 
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part of this diplomacy, with an ex-MEA official noting how (for example) visits to Israel 
were tempered by summits in Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Interview B25, 
2008)118.  Cognisant of them having the largest overseas Indian community (and being 
an important source of remittances), the NDA were much more active in cultivating ties 
with Gulf countries than previous Indian governments had been (Interview B13, 
2008)119.  Closer ties with these states also drew them away from internationally 
supporting Pakistan, helping the BJP to isolate the latter and providing new leverage for 
resolving any India-Pakistan disputes.  Such pragmatism was a new form of Indian 
diplomacy and adhered to ‘a trend that most of the great powers have adapted … (and) 
will be a permanent imperative’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 329).   
 
With Iran the NDA continued to have strong diplomatic ties, and established a JWG on 
economic and security relations during a May 2000 visit by Jaswant Singh to Tehran.  
Vajpayee’s visit in April 2001 then resulted in the Tehran Declaration, which launched a 
strategic dialogue between the two.  Common anti-Taliban, pro-Northern Alliance and 
anti-terrorism positions concerning Afghanistan bolstered this dialogue.  January 2003 
then ‘took Indo-Iranian relations to its zenith’ (Pradhan, 2004: 39), when Iran’s 
President Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day parade.  The visit also 
saw the signing of the New Delhi Declaration on bilateral economic cooperation 
including science and technology, information technology, education and international 
terrorism.  Then, in March 2003 there were Indian-Iranian navy engagements in the 
Arabian Sea, which - much to the US’s chagrin - coincided with the US greater military 
presence in the region prior to the invasion of Iraq.  Arms sales were also discussed 
between the two sides, along with Iran agreeing to Indian access to Iran’s military bases 
in the event of war with Pakistan (Ehrari, 2003). 
 
In turn, Central Asia was regarded as an essential part of India’s ‘”immediate and 
strategic neighbourhood”’ (Sinha quoted in Muni & Mohan, 2004: 326).  The NDA 
maintained Indian diplomatic initiatives taken in the early 1990s to gain a political and 
economic (particularly pharmaceutical) presence and to secure access to the region’s 
                                                
118 Interview with a senior ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official and former ambassador, Delhi, 
November 3 2008. 
119 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, October 22 2008. 
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natural gas and oil reserves (Joshi, 2004: 210; Sinha, 2004b).  For BJP ideologues, other 
aims included limiting Pakistani influence, providing access to an increasingly unstable 
Afghanistan and advocating Indian membership of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) (Interview B27, 2008)120.  Bilateral and trilateral agreements (often 
with Iran) in this period backed up these motivations, as did achieving a diplomatic 
presence in every Central Asian state.  The first Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)121 summit in Almaty on June 4 2002 
solidified these links, especially the Almaty Act on combating terrorism and promoting 
dialogue.  Central Asia was additionally seen as ‘the land bridge between India and 
Europe’ (Sibal, 2004a: 269).  Overall, an ex-MEA official who worked in the region 
noted deep continuities, with ‘no ripple of change’ (Interview B7, 2008)122 under the 
BJP-led NDA. 
 
After the post-Cold War Soviet meltdown, India’s historically close relations with Russia 
were revived during the NDA, confirming their established normative engagement and 
again marking continuities with the norms of India’s security identity.  These links also 
fulfilled a BJP manifesto promise.  Through regular high-level meetings (including the 
visit to India of Russian President Putin in 2000 - the first since Yeltsin in 1993), several 
bilateral declarations were made in this period.  The most significant events, agreements 
and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) are summarized in Table 8.3 below.   
                                                
120 Interview with a former head of BJP Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
121 Established in 1996, CICA members are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Palestinian National Authority, the Republic of 
Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.  Observers include the United Nations (UN), the 
OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Indonesia, Japan, Ukraine and the 
US. 
122 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 




DATE EVENT / AGREEMENT / MOU 
  
June 1998  nuclear reactor deal 
December 1998 Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement (lasts until 2010) 
October 2000 Declaration of Strategic Partnership 
February 2001 Indo-Russian Strategic Agreement  / 1st China-India-Russia 
Trilateral Academic Conference (meets annually) 
November 2001 Moscow Declaration 
September 2002 1st Trilateral Meeting of Foreign Ministers of India, Russia 
and China (meets again in September 2003, then annually) 
December 2002 Delhi Declaration / JWGs set up on Afghanistan and 
Combating International Terrorism / multiple MoUs (on 
trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation) 
  
 
Table 8.3: Significant Indo-Russia Agreements and MoUs 
(June 1998 - December 2002) 
 
In particular, the 2000 Declaration of Strategic Partnership, cemented a shared vision of 
a multi-polar world and was accompanied by the largest ever Indo-Russian defense deal 
- amounting to over $4 billion (Ganguly & Scobell, 2005: 107).  The 2002 Delhi 
Declaration also enshrined their shared interests in Central Asia and their close military-
political relationship, all of which helped India to develop ‘a serious power projection 
capability’ (Blank, 2003: 145) in the region.  Overall, India continued to gain a ‘strategic 
edge’ (Chenoy, 2008: 52) from its relationship with Russia concerning Kashmir, energy 
security, Central Asia and China.  In 2002, the two sides signed a deal securing Indian 
access to natural gas in Sakhalin, and in 2003 their two navies held full-scale exercises in 
the IOR.  All these measures aided NDA diplomacy to strengthen India’s role in the 
world and to extend its (global) strategic engagement. 
 
During the NDA period, the BJP also began a second phase of the Look East Policy.  
This policy now ‘”extend(ed) from Australia to East Asia ... (and) mark(ed) a shift from 
trade to wider economic and security issues”’ (Sinha quoted in Scott, 2007: 130).  The 
second phase drew upon India’s significant positioning in the IOR and the perceived 
neo-Curzonian arc of influence from the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.  Such 
ideas played into BJP policy norms of controlling the IOR as a way to increase India’s 
global standing.  India’s geo-political position was also increasingly important in an age 
of globalization.  The first ever India-Australia Strategic Dialogue was held in New 
Delhi in August 2001 while in June 2003 Yashwant Sinha visited Brazil, the first ever 
visit by an Indian Foreign Minister.  In turn, the 2003 Declaration of Brasilia created the 
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India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), increasing their trilateral trade and 
military relations.  This evidence of NDA diplomatic engagement again suggested a 
substantiation of India’s global diplomatic presence and desired global status.  For a 
former Minister of External Affairs, engagement with African states was however not as 
substantial during the NDA as under previous or latter governments (Interview B24, 
2008)123. 
 
Relations with Japan also increased in this period and resulted in the Japan-India 
Strategic and Global Partnership of 2000 and the India-Japan Comprehensive Security 
Dialogue in 2002.  Japan-India military-to-military consultation and deepening economic 
links bolstered these relations, especially in relation to China.  Elsewhere, there was an 
intensification of India’s relations with the EU based upon ‘shared values of democracy, 
pluralism and liberalism’ (Sibal, 2004a: 273).  These relations expanded with the first 
annual India-EU summit in 2000 and included shared issues such as economics, 
terrorism, migration, conflict resolution and global power balances.  These links 
revolved around co-operative multi-polarity and India as one of the world’s (emergent) 
poles (along with the EU, Russia, China and the US).  India continued to contribute to 
international peacekeeping, and by 2003 had sent 67,000 troops to 37 of the UN’s 56 
operations (Sibal, 2004b), increasing her profile in the international community.  India 




BJP policy norms affected the conduct of India’s security practice during the NDA 
period.  The analysis of the interaction of these norms has shown both how internally-
derived sources of foreign policy influence India’s security practice, and also how 
domestic norms are linked to international politics (rather than vice versa).  These 
norms were domestically derived and at times expressed clear harmony and dissonance 
with norms established in the perceptual source of India’s security identity pre-1998.  
We were thus able to see how BJP norms of India as a global power and distrusting the 
US harmonized with similar established security identity norms.  Conversely, BJP norms 
                                                
123 Interview with a former Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs 
Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister], Delhi, October 31 2008. 
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of being pro-nuclear weapons and explicitly pro-Israel and balanced (in West Asia), 
displayed dissonance with traditional security identity norms of nuclear ambiguity and 
being explicitly pro-Muslim then balanced.  Concerning nuclear weapons, Indo-Israeli 
relations and India’s apparent ‘strategic embrace of the US’ (Bidwai, 2008: 88), core BJP 
policy norms surmounted (and replaced) the traditional normative behaviour typical of 
India’s pre-1998 security identity. 
 
These changes were often facilitated by the BJP’s core norms of assertiveness, 
pragmatic engagement and making India a global power - all of which enabled the NDA 
to add substance to policies that had often been only embryonic prior to their arrival in 
power.  Thus, as a senior figure in India’s strategic community commented - in asserting 
their established foreign policy goals, the BJP were willing to ‘pull the trigger’ (Interview 
B6, 2008)124.  The BJP made explicit what had been frequently implicit under previous 
Congress regimes.  This intent was certainly evident with the 1998 nuclear tests, which 
represented ‘a long-term choice and a clear break from the past’ (Ahrari, 1999: 432) and 
laid the basis for India’s mainstream re-integration, rising international profile, greater 
pro-western orientation and strategic convergence with the US.  Moreover, the BJP’s 
general foreign policy behaviour in the security identity’s perceptual source added new 
elements of realism and realpolitik to India’s normative security practice.  As a senior BJP 
figure reported, ‘“one either changes the policy to suit the environment or changes the 
environment to suit the policy … the nuclear tests helped us change the environment”’ 
(quoted in Nuclear Tests Helped, 2003). 
 
Apart from influencing the practice of Indian security, we have also seen how multiple 
norms interact across the three sources of the security identity, confirming again that 
they are both interconnected and interdependent.  Further still, such an analytical 
approach has successfully stressed the primacy of ideational over material factors, by 
showing that norms do influence the practice of Indian foreign policy.  Indications of 
India’s foreign policy behaviour learning and developing were also evident during the 
NDA, especially in the conduct of the 1998 tests but also the broadening of India’s 
diplomatic relations and India’s diversifying strategic neighbourhood.  Hence, with 
                                                
124 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008. 
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Israel the BJP were ‘willing to break new ground’ (Interview B29, 2008)125.  In turn, for a 
senior Indian academic heightened Indo-US relations became ‘the new commonsense’ 
(Interview A17, 2008)126.  A norm-based approach argues that these changes were 
because the BJP ‘embraced a very different set of intellectual precepts to guide India’s 
foreign and defense policies’ (Ganguly, 2003), rather than being influenced by the 
international system.  The BJP-led NDA was proactive rather than reactive in its foreign 
policy. 
 
Of further importance is that many of the changes invoked during the NDA were not 
dynamic changes in direction but a gear or level shift that produced acceleration along 
the same trajectory (Interview B3, 2008)127.  Thus, India got closer to being a global 
power, became more explicit in some of its relations and acted more overtly with several 
of its policies.  In these ways, the BJP-led NDA added substance to India’s normative 
security practice, introduced new characteristics and behaviour but left its core essence 
unchanged.  Such ideas underline the primacy of India’s security identity for mitigating 
change but also its ability to evolve, suggesting an ongoing and organic process.  
Furthermore, it highlights a dynamic synergy in India’s security practice that is 
absorptive of multiple normative influences from across India’s domestic political 
spectrum.  The next chapter will collate the impact of the BJP on each of the sources of 
India’s security identity, and assess the long-term effect of these impacts.  This 
assessment will be achieved by analyzing India’s security practice (and hence security 
identity) during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments that succeeded the 
NDA in 2004. 
 
                                                
125 Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence 
agency], Delhi, November 6 2008; interview with a senior journalist, Delhi, October 21 2008. 
126 Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008. 
127 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
 199 
Chapter 9:  
 
‘Aftermath: 
2004, 2009 and the Evolution of India’s Security Identity’ 
 
 ‘Atalji’s tenure is an era of statesmanship, stability 
and development … it marks the evolution of India as a global force, 
an economic power, a crucial diplomatic player and a nuclear power’ 
(BJP National Executive 04.04.03a, 2005: 20) 
 
‘we will maintain our tradition of an independent foreign policy, 
built on a national consensus  
and based on our supreme national interests’ 
(Singh [Manmohan], 2004a) 
 
‘India’s approach to the world is naturally a function of our values, 
civilisational heritage, historical experience, and geography’ 
(Mukherjee, 2008) 
 
There were distinct examples of normative continuity, contestation and change within 
India’s security identity during the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government from 1998 to 2004.  But did the BJP-led NDA result in lasting 
developments concerning how Indian security is practiced?  Here, I analyse the period 
after the NDA left power in 2004 to assess whether or not the BJP had an enduring 
impact on the nature, consistency and underlying normative basis of India’s security 
identity.  As the post-2004 period saw the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) victorious in two Lok Sabha elections in 2004 and 2009, such an approach is well 
suited to these aims.  My analysis also helps us to assess the role that the BJP-led NDA 
played in the development, substantiation and evolution of India’s security practice.  
These themes are particularly apparent when investigating how emergent trends in 
India’s pre-1998 security identity (such as communalism and realpolitik) became 
established, entrenched and thus normalized during the NDA and beyond. 
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To aid my analysis of the post-2004 period, I use three groupings (harmonized 
continuities, contested dissonances and substantive changes) to highlight the impact of 
the 1998 to 2004 NDA on the entrenched pre-1998 norms underpinning India’s 
security identity.  Harmonized continuities mark where the norms from India’s pre-1998 
security identity and from pre-1998 BJP policy coalesced and effectively combined into 
shared, common norms.  Contested dissonances show where the norms from India’s 
pre-1998 security identity and those of BJP policy pre-1998 remained dichotomous, 
underlining entrenched normative differences.  Finally, substantive changes represent 
where pre-1998 BJP norms replaced norms from India’s pre-1998 security identity, 
essentially reorienting its normative basis.  Collectively, the harmonized continuities 
show normative consensus between India’s security identity and BJP policy norms; the 
contested dissonances show where the BJP-led NDA challenged but was constrained by 
existing security identity norms; and the substantive changes indicate where the BJP 
significantly altered how India conducts its security practice.  After an initial prognosis, I 
investigate if the norms in each of these groupings remained in place during the 
Congress-dominated UPA governments from 2004 onwards. 
 
9.1) RE-ARRANGING THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: 
 
The interaction of norms between those of India’s pre-1998 security identity and pre-
1998 BJP policy norms resulted in discernible harmonization, dissonance and change 
during the BJP-led NDA from 1998 to 2004.  As shown by Figure 9.1 below, 
harmonized continuities were present concerning swadeshi, as pre-1998 security identity 
and BJP norms combined through a shared focus on the diplomatic saliency of 





Figure 9.1: The Political Source of India’s 1998-2004 Security Identity 
 
Shared norms concerning anti-militancy also effectively combined by portraying 
militancy as stemming from both internal and external sources, as the BJP successfully 
emphasized Pakistan’s role but domestic threats from Naxalism and separatists 
continued.  Clear contested dissonances were present with pre-1998 norms of equality / 
tolerance and secularism / plurality being pitted against the BJP’s cultural nationalism 
and positive secularism.  Although these BJP norms gained pre-eminence during the 
NDA as the party promoted its Sangh Parivar supporters, this normalization appeared to 
be heavily dependent upon the BJP being in power, and thus seemed likely to be 
overturned in the event of an electoral defeat.  These norms displayed the highest 
degree of dissonance with those of India’s security identity during the NDA. 
 
Figure 9.1 also appears to highlight three important substantive changes.  Firstly, the 
pre-1998 norm of (socialist) democracy was replaced by a norm of (multi-faceted) 
: (socialist) democracy 
: equality / tolerance 
: secularism / plurality 
: swadeshi then limited  
liberalization 
: anti-communal 
: anti-militancy (as internal) 
: cultural nationalism 
(Indianisation / Hindutva) 
: positive secularism 
: India first swadeshi / calibrated 
globalization 
: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian  
: anti-militancy (as external) 
pre-1998 Security Identity pre-1998 BJP Policy Norms 
 
Harmonized Continuities 
swadeshi / limited liberalization WITH  India-first swadeshi / calibrated globalization 
anti-militancy (as external) WITH  anti-militancy (as internal) 
Contested Dissonances 
equality / tolerance VS  cultural nationalism 
secularism / plurality VS  positive secularism 
Substantive Changes 
(socialist) democracy REPLACED BY (multi-faceted) democracy 
anti-communal REPLACED BY communal (not just anti-Muslim / Christian) 
+ foreign policy becomes critical to electoral politics 
1998-2004 Security Identity 
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democracy.  As such, the NDA established the BJP’s political legitimacy as they served 
a full term in office and hence reoriented Indian democracy away from its socialist roots 
to something more multi-faceted and composite.  Secondly, the pre-1998 anti-
communal norm was replaced by a communal norm, although not in a specifically anti-
Muslim or anti-Christian manner.  This replacement occurred because the BJP 
legitimized communal politics through the NDA, inspiring what had been a nascent 
trend before 1998 to become a core norm within India’s security identity.  Finally, the 
BJP-led NDA added a new norm to the political source of India’s security identity - that 
of making foreign policy an election issue.  As the foremost concern in their own 
manifestoes since the 1960s, during the NDA foreign policy became of vital 
significance to India’s domestic electoral politics.  In the following three sections, I 
analyse whether each of these substantive changes continued their new normative 




Despite predictions from the majority of India’s political analysts of a guaranteed 
renewed mandate, and being ‘poised for a great leap forward’ (BJP National Executive 
11.01.04, 2005: 208) the BJP lost the 2004 Lok Sabha elections.  As Table 9.1 below 
shows, Congress significantly ameliorated their 1999 election performance by gaining 31 
seats while the BJP lost 44. 
 
   
 SEATS WON NATIONAL VOTE (%) 
ELECTION BJP CONGRESS BJP CONGRESS 
     
1999 182 114 23.75 28.30 
2004 138 145 22.16 26.53 
2009 116 206 18.80 28.55 
   
 
Table 9.1: BJP and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1999-2009) 
 (Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
 
From this basis Congress went on to form the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with 
11 coalition partners.  To gain a majority, the UPA became dependent on the support 
of the Left Front (consisting of 4 Communist parties) and made Manmohan Singh 
India’s new Prime Minister.  The comparative strength of the UPA and NDA in 2004 is 
shown in Table 9.2 below. 
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 SEATS WON NATIONAL VOTE (%) 
ELECTION NDA UPA NDA UPA 
     
1999 270 156 31.10 28.30 
2004 181 218 33.30 35.40 
2009 159 262 24.63 48.30 
   
 
Table 9.2: NDA and UPA Lok Sabha General Election Results (1999-2009) 
 (Electoral Commission India, 2010) 
 
The BJP’s loss was partly ascribed to the failure of the NDA’s “India Shining” 
campaign, which led to a polarization of rich and poor voters (Thornton & Thornton, 
2006: 406).  More voters were also concerned with their immediate water, road, 
electricity and job needs rather than with the BJP’s emphasis on India’s economic 
growth that mainly benefited the middle classes (Varshney, 2007).  The rise of low-caste 
parties (such as the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party) was also of importance, as 
was voter backlash concerning the Gujarat pogroms of 2002.  Within the Sangh Parivar, 
activists cited the neglect of core Hindutva ideology as the cause of the defeat, 
ideological dilution due to coalition demands and leadership differences between 
Advani and Vajpayee (Jaffrelot, 2005; Shastri et al., 2009). 
 
As Tables 9.1 and 9.2 also show, these trends were compounded in the 2009 Lok Sabha 
elections with the BJP losing a further 22 seats, while Congress gained 61 - figures that 
corresponded to the respective losses and gains for the NDA and UPA.  With 262 
seats, the UPA were only 10 seats away from a majority and gained the seats of several 
low-caste parties to renew their mandate128.  In addition, analysts noted how the rise of 
caste-based politics fragmenting the BJP’s voter base, as did the emergence of the Third 
Front of mainly Communist parties.  Despite their loss, the influence of the 1998-2004 
BJP-led NDA was important concerning the 2004 and 2009 results as it had proved the 
political legitimacy of a non-Congress-dominated coalition, which then validated future 
political possibilities for other groupings in Indian politics.  The BJP thus redefined the 
nature of Indian democracy away from a norm of (socialist) democracy to (multi-
faceted) democracy.  While Congress almost reversed the coalition trend in India 
politics present since the 1980s, in 2009 Indian democracy had matured into an entity 
                                                
128 These seats came from the Janata Dal (Secular), the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the 
Samajwadi Party plus several other independent candidates. 
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consisting of multiple parties, a maturation which redefined the traditional normative 




The BJP’s political rise and political validation through the 1998 to 2004 NDA resulted 
in a further substantive normative change whereby the pre-1998 security identity’s anti-
communal norm was replaced by a communal one.  Thus, something that had been a 
trend before 1998 became legitimized by a communal party (the BJP) as they entered 
India’s political mainstream and served a full term in government.  As a leading 
intellectual noted, post-2004 there has been a ‘normalization of the BJP and its way of 
thinking’ (Interview A17, 2008)129, particularly concerning India’s growing media-
influenced middle class and India’s continued neo-liberal economic growth.  Congress 
attempts to attract such voters compounded this shift, as it effectively plays ‘a paler 
version of saffronised politics’ (Vanaik, 2002: 341).  If one also accepts that the BJP’s 
contribution to Indian politics has been a hatred of Muslims, Islamic parties and 
Pakistan (Interview A11, 2008)130, then the previous anti-communal norm is even more 
redundant.  In this way, the electoral rise of Hindu nationalism ‘altered the balance of 
power between Hindus and Muslims that had persisted since Partition’ (Nasr, 2005: 
193), by providing a communal-orientated political grouping capable of successfully 
countering Congress’ secular and inclusive heritage. 
 
Furthermore, the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA allowed those groups associated with it to 
firmly establish their political positions.  Thus, Sangh Parivar activists spread their 
influence through the national and local institutions of government across India.  In 
particular, Jaffrelot noted how ‘”the saffronisation of the state and society has made 
progress in the last 15 years … the Hindu Rashtra is in the making along the societal lines 
the RSS has always valued”’ (quoted in The Times of India, 2009).  Through their active 
discrimination against Muslims, Christians (in particular Sonia Gandhi on account of her 
                                                
129 Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008; interview with a senior Indian 
academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.  Please refer to the Primary Sources in the Bibliography to see the full 
list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
130 Interview with a leading think-tank head, Delhi, May 5 2008. 
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Italian roots - see Naithini, 2008; Interview B39, 2008131) and the lower castes 
(themselves becoming a bigger target in light of their electoral success), these groups 
entrenched the shift from an anti-communal to communal norm in India’s security 
identity.  Pankaj Mishra, a leading Indian intellectual, describes how this development 
has ‘”infected India’s state and civil society with illiberalism”’ (quoted in Outlook, 2008).  
The involvement of Sangh Parivar activists in domestic terrorism against Muslims in 
2008 (and potentially earlier) further compounds this perspective (Marpakwar & Hafeez, 
2008). 
 
Foreign Policy becomes Critical to Electoral Politics 
 
A new norm was also inculcated in India’s security identity during the NDA; that of 
making foreign policy critical to electoral politics.  BJP policy norms concerning making 
India strong, focusing on India’s economic growth, the 1998 nuclear tests and linking 
outside forces (primarily Pakistan) to India’s domestic terrorism, bought foreign policy 
into India’s domestic politics (Interview B1, 2008)132.  The BJP-led NDA also portrayed 
itself as the party of national security (BJP National Executive 22.06.04, 2005: 6), and 
gained (domestic and international) plaudits for the Pokhran II nuclear tests and its 
refusal to have a ceasefire during the 1999 Kargil war until Pakistan withdrew from 
Indian territory (Interview B3, 2008)133.  Direct links between the 1998 nuclear tests and 
India’s subsequently improved global (especially US) relations, along with a greater 
focus on economic growth, transformed India’s foreign and domestic policy debates 
(Mohan, 2003).  The UPA maintained the National Security Council (NSC), the 
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the position of National Security 
Advisor134. 
  
In addition, economics played an increasingly important role in foreign policy 
calculation, especially concerning energy security, with India looking likely to become 
                                                
131 Interview with a BJP activist, Bhopal, November 30 2008. 
132 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008. 
133 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
134 After Brajesh Mishra, J N Dixit was National Security Advisor from May 27 2004 until his death on 25 
January 2005.  He was succeeded by M K Narayanan who served until 24 January 2010.  The present 
incumbent is Shiv Shankar Menon. 
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the world’s third largest energy consumer by 2030 (Dormandy, 2007: 122).  The growth 
of India’s middle class since the mid-1990s also necessitated this new importance and 
confirmed the elevated primacy of foreign policy issues in the domestic political realm.  
The establishment of the new norm of foreign policy as a domestic political issue was 
thus underlined after 2004 by India’s continued economic growth (see Figure 9.2 
below), which averaged 8.49% from 2004 to 2008 and outstripped the annual average of 






























Figure 9.2: Annual Indian GDP Growth (2005-2008)135 
 (World Bank, 2010) 
 
The presence and significance of this new norm in India’s security identity was clearly 
shown during the summer of 2008 when the Communists withdrew their support for 
the UPA coalition in response to the government’s support of a nuclear deal with the 
US.  Here what was regarded as an international imperative for India impinged on the 
UPA’s domestic position and threatened to topple the government.  Such events also 
show how the Congress-led UPA continued the BJP’s policy of effectively co-joining 
India’s foreign and domestic politics.  Collectively, this new norm was contiguous with 
India’s emergence as a global player - something which figures prominently in the other 
substantive normative changes that occurred in the further two sources of India’s 
security identity. 
 
                                                
135 Figures for 2009 not available at time of writing. 
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9.2) ASSERTING INDIA REGIONALLY: 
 
Within the physical source of India’s security identity, the BJP-led NDA government 
showed a degree of norm continuity and change (but little contestation) with pre-1998 
Indian security identity norms.  As shown in Figure 9.3 below, the interaction of pre-
1998 security identity and pre-1998 BJP policy norms resulted in several harmonized 




Figure 9.3: The Physical Source of India’s 1998-2004 Security Identity 
 
Several of the competing norms between the BJP and India’s security identity prior to 
1998 resulted in clear harmonized continuities during the BJP-led NDA.  Thus, norms 
concerning India’s regional position in South Asia (regional hegemon - reciprocity then 
benevolence and natural regional hegemon) became shared, as did the NDA’s position 
on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) - as tacit IOR dominance harmonized with control 
/ protect the IOR.  We also saw how the normative cycle of conflict, negotiation and 
: Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, 
suspicion / LoC “accepted” 
: China: continued territorial 
threats / ongoing suspicion 
: regional hegemon - reciprocity 
then benevolence 
: tacit IOR dominance 
: protect the Hindu Rashtra  
: Akhand Bharat – explicit policy to 
regain Kashmir 
: but pragmatic engagement with 
Pakistan and China 
: natural regional hegemon 
: control / protect the IOR 
pre-1998 Security Identity pre-1998 BJP Policy Norms 
 
Harmonized Continuities 
regional hegemon - reciprocity then benevolence WITH  natural regional hegemon 
tacit IOR dominance WITH  control / protect the IOR 
Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, suspicion WITH  protect the Hindu Rashtra 
LoC “accepted” WITH Akhand Bharat – explicit policy to regain Kashmir  
Substantive Changes 
Pakistan and China: territorial threats REPLACED BY pragmatic engagement 
+ core BJP norms to the fore - being assertive/proactive, India as a global power 
 
1998-2004 Security Identity 
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suspicion, which was typical of India’s relations with Pakistan prior to 1998, continue 
under the BJP-led NDA and combine with the BJP’s policy norm of protecting the 
Hindu Rashtra.  This last combination came about as the BJP saw protecting the Hindu 
Rashtra in terms of providing India with greater regional stability, greater economic 
growth and a less Pakistan-centric policy, rather than as a geographical goal. 
 
This understanding towards Pakistan impacted upon the BJP’s explicit policy norm of 
regaining Kashmir, as it effectively harmonised with the pre-1998 security identity norm 
of “accepting” the Line of Control (LoC).  While surprising, this norm was de-
emphasized by the BJP in its attempts at a peace agreement with Pakistan, and was 
highly influenced by their need to present India as a responsible power (especially 
during Kargil in 1999 and Operation Parakram from 2001-2).  The NDA coalition also 
prevented the BJP from pursued this norm either politically or constitutionally.  The 
NDA period additionally displayed evidence of substantive change, as pre-1998 security 
identity norms concerning continued territorial threats from Pakistan and China were 
replaced by a norm of pragmatic engagement, whereby for the BJP ‘peace with China, 
peace with Pakistan were … essential’ (Interview A20, 2008)136.  Other core BJP foreign 
policy norms substantiated this approach as being assertive / proactive and making 
India into a global player came to characterize and dominate how the NDA conducted 
its regional relations.  In the following sections, I analyse whether these substantive 
normative changes continued to dictate India’s regional security practice in the post-
NDA era. 
 
Edging Towards Normalcy 
 
When the BJP-led NDA left office in May 2004 India-Pakistan relations were on an 
upswing, with Pakistan publicly committing to stop terrorism through the Islamabad 
Declaration of January 2004, and promising further peace talks with India in June 2004.  
Ceasefires, peace talks and fair elections had also helped to ease violence in Kashmir, 
and personified the assertive and proactive diplomacy of the BJP.  More importantly, 
this improvement was sustained under the successor UPA government, and shortly 
after they came to power President Musharaff dropped demands for a plebiscite and 
                                                
136 Interview with a senior analyst in the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, May 9 2008. 
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‘abandoned what had been the core of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy for more than fifty 
years’ (Luce, 2006: 234).  The November 2003 LoC ceasefire also held, both sides 
reduced the number of troops on their shared border and the Composite Dialogue 
continued, along with negotiations on a planned Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.  These 
events improved relations through the multi-pronged (non-Kashmir-specific) diplomacy 
established by the BJP-led NDA, and as an ex-MEA official noted, reversed a trend that 
had ‘deformed Indian foreign policy’ (Interview B35, 2008)137.   
 
India-Pakistan relations continued to improve during the first UPA government - the 
major agreements and events of which are shown in Table 9.3 below.  More regular 
visits (such as Musharraf’s to Delhi in April 2005) and more frequent meetings (often 
on the sidelines of multi-lateral meetings) by the two states’ leaders also helped to 
improve relations.  In turn, between 2003 and 2007, trade between the two countries 
increased from $200 million to $1.6 billion (Zaman, 2008), and from 2004 to 2008 the 
number of people traveling between the two countries increased twenty-fold (Kumar, 
2008: 9). 
                                                
137 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign 




DATE EVENT / AGREEMENT 
  
January 2005 first meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Study Group (JSG) 
on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
April 2005 bus line between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad re-established 
(for the first time since 1956) 
October 2005 after a 7.6 Richter scale earthquake, the LoC is opened at 5 
points to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
November 2005 mutual ceasefire declared in the Siachen region 
September 2005 India renews high-level contact with moderate leaders of the 
All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir 
May 2006 Agreement to open the LoC to trade through a Srinagar-
Muzaffarabad truck service & a second bus service 
July 2006 Mumbai bomb attacks (India accuses Pakistan of complicity) 
September 2006 India-Pakistan Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up as 
Musharaff and Singh meet at NAM in Cuba 
February 2007 Baglihar dam dispute settled (after 25 years & in favour of India) 
February 2007 Agreement signed to reduce risk of accidental nuclear war 
March 2007 first Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism meeting  
October 2008 Pakistan admits responsibility for all wars with India 
November 2008 Mumbai bomb attacks (India accuses Pakistan of complicity - peace 
process “paused” by India) 
November 2009 Pakistan charges 7 men with the 2008 Mumbai attacks 
  
 
Table 9.3: Significant India-Pakistan Agreements / Events 
(January 2005 - November 2009) 
 
Back-channel talks structured by feasible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 
progressed so well that by 2005-06 the Pakistani government ended its support for 
armed groups operating against India.  Although not always sustained, talks with both 
Pakistan and Kashmiri militants, resulted in a steady decline in violence (Kronstadt, 
2008: 65-66), as the two sides edged towards normalcy in their relations.  While not as 
coercive as the BJP-led NDA (for example after the December 13 2001 Indian 
Parliament attacks), the UPA accepted the NDA’s policy position towards Pakistan 
(Interview A13, 2008; Interview A14, 2008)138.  In turn, the UPA did not shirk from 
publicly condemning Pakistan complicity concerning terrorism in India (thus confirming 
the UPA’s acceptance of the harmonized norm of anti-militancy (as internal and 
external)).  These perspectives married with that of a BJP official who stated that ‘you 
may not become friends but you can at least try … unless you have peace on your 
borders you can’t have the right basis for economic development’ (Interview A20, 
                                                
138 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008; interview with a leading Indian academic, 
Delhi, May 6 2008. 
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2008)139.  The UPA had thus continued the ‘logic of Vajpayee’ (Mohan, 2005: 280) 
concerning Pakistan.  They also underlined the UPA’s desire to bolster India as a global 
power, again reflecting how a core BJP norm had become prominently established into 




Building upon what analysts saw as an ‘Indo-Chinese rapprochement’ (Kundu, 2005: 
230) under the NDA, the new UPA government continued with the norm of pragmatic 
engagement towards China within India’s security identity.  Mainly focusing upon 
economics, maintaining parity in South Asia and de-emphasising their border issues, the 
Congress-led UPA ‘converged on an approximately similar China policy … (of) engaged 
balance’ (Zhang, 2006: 95; Interview A13, 2008140).  This policy compounded the 
normative presence of a pragmatic policy towards China, and embraced a relationship 
that had become of growing importance under the BJP-led NDA.  Of particular 
significance was the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement of April 2005, 
reflecting for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) ‘the consensus that bilateral 
relations transcend bilateral issues and have acquired a global and strategic perspective’ 
(MEA, 2009).  During this visit, Chinese Premier Wen replicated statements made during 
the NDA that Sikkim is ‘”an inalienable part of India”’ (quoted in Singh, 2005b).  Table 
9.4 lists the major Agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) between 
the two states in the post-NDA period. 
                                                
139 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008. 




DATE AGREEMENT / MOUS 
  
April 2005 Signing of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for 
Peace and Prosperity & the Agreement on Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles (first-ever on border issues) 
/ India-China Joint Economic Group set up 
January 2006 India-China Energy Dialogue initiated (repeated in 2007), MoU 
signed to enhance Cooperation on Oil and Natural Gas 
May 2006 Annual Defence Dialogue MoU signed (joint military exchanges 
& exercises, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy & search-and-rescue) 
June 2006 China-India Free Trade Area (FTA) ratified (on disputed border) 
July 2006 MoU signed on strengthening relations and co-operation 
between the Indian and Chinese parliaments / Nathula 
Pass opened (closed since the 1962 war) 
November 2006 Joint Declaration on intensifying co-operation (especially 
concerning energy security) 
November 2007 first annual Defence Dialogue 
December 2007 first joint military training exercise (in Kunming, China) 
January 2008 Shared Vision for the 21st Century joint document released, 
includes joint global economic strategy (including common 
action at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), on regional climate 
change, and on civil nuclear energy cooperation) 
December 2008 joint counter-terrorism exercises (in Belgaum, India) 
  
 
Table 9.4: Significant India-China Agreements / MoUs 
(April 2005 - December 2008) 
 
Regular state visits also bolstered relations, in particular by Chinese President Hu Jintao 
in November 2006 - the first by a Chinese President in 10 years, and by Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in November 2008.  Against a background of rapid mutual 
economic growth, analysts began to talk of “Chindia” (Gandhi, 2007; Rahman & 
Andreu, 2006; Ramesh, 2005; Tan, 2008).  India-China trade figures from 2004 to 2008 






























Figure 9.4: India-China Trade Levels (2004-2008)141 
(Godemont et al., 2009: 5; Ruisheng, 2008: 58-9) 
 
These discourses were bolstered by instances of joint India-China cooperation in 
multinational fora (Godemont et al., 2009: 2; Grant, 2008; Uberoi, 2008), joint military 
exercises (including Chinese troops in India for the first time since 1962) and 
collaboration on energy security and climate change.  With this growing inter-
dependence, India’s leaders declared there to be a ‘harmony of civilisations’ (Gandhi, 
2007) between India and China.  In turn, China’s Hu Jintao noted how ‘”China-India 
bilateral ties are now on a fast track”’ (quoted in Ruisheng, 2008: 58).  Issues still 
remained however concerning border issues - referred to by a senior Indian security 
figure as Beijing’s ‘cartographic games’ (Interview, B29, 2008)142, the Dalai Lama and 
Tibet, Chinese criticism over the Indo-US nuclear deal and China’s alleged “string of 
pearls” strategy to encircle the Indian landmass. 
 
Persistent Regional Domination 
 
Reflective of the shared norms held prior to 1998 by India’s security identity and BJP 
policy, which then harmonized during the BJP-led NDA, the UPA continued to regard 
India as South Asia’s natural hegemon and as the dominant force in the IOR.  
Concerning India’s neighbours in South Asia, the UPA enhanced relations through 
                                                
141 Figures for 2009 were not available at time of writing. 
142 Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence 
agency], Delhi, November 6 2008. 
 214 
greater bilateral trade - referred to by an ex-MEA official as ‘economic connectivity’ 
(Interview B28, 2008)143, as well as energy co-operation with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri 
Lanka (Dutta, 2008a).  Such measures were seen by many as a way to improve regional 
stability (Misra, 2008; Sikri, 2007; Thapur, 2008).  With Myanmar, observers noted how 
the UPA upheld the BJP-led NDA’s ‘new priorities’ (Lall, 2006: 424), especially 
concerning military ties, economic aid and arms sales.  In particular, India signed a 
series of MoUs on accessing Myanmar’s gas and oil reserves, hydroelectric power and 
stabilising India’s northeast (see Lall, 2008a: 20-30).  In September 2007, New Delhi 
refused to criticize Yangon’s crackdown on democracy protesters.  These developments 
comprehensively stepped up Indo-Myanmar relations as initiated under the NDA, and 
reflected the acceptance of new BJP policy norms of pragmatism and realism within the 
physical source of India’s security identity. 
 
Beyond South Asia, the “Look East” policy became more entrenched as the UPA 
heightened India’s interaction in the region.  Significant events included continued 
MGC and BCIM meetings and in July 2004 the first BIMSTEC Conference144, as well as 
India attending the first East Asian Summit145 in November 2005.  August 2009 saw the 
signing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India Free Trade 
Agreement.  For analysts, these developments indicated how India’s “Look East” policy 
had become ‘institutionalized’ (Limaye, 2005: 157).  The UPA also continued to see 
India’s ‘strategic footprint as a “super regional power”’ (Singh quoted in Zhao, 2007: 
138) in the IOR, and helped with humanitarian aid after the December 2005 tsunami 
and from autumn 2008 protected trade routes from Somali piracy146.  From 2004 
onwards, Indian navy vessels conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US, 
China, Japan and Russia, as well as most of the South East Asian states.  In 2005 India 
set up the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
which in 2008 became a joint command centre for all three of its armed services.  In 
                                                
143 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former 
ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008. 
144 MGC - Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Forum; BCIM - Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar; 
BIMSTEC - Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. 
145 The East Asia Summit (EAS) consists of the 10 countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Australia, China, 
India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. 
146 India also joined the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a regional initiative to enhance cooperation against piracy, as well as 
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). 
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April/May 2007, the Indian Navy participated in exercises in the western Pacific, while 
in June 2009 it was deployed for the first time in the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
9.3) - CONFIRMING INDIA’S NEW INTERNATIONAL STATUS: 
 
It is within the perceptual source that we see the highest number of substantive changes 
during the BJP-led NDA from the pre-1998 Indian security identity norms.  Although 
there were two harmonized continuities; great power aspiration with global power / 
UNSC and autonomy with assertive (whereby the NDA were far more proactive in 
declaring India’s international independence, for example with Pokhran II), the BJP 
appeared to have a fundamental effect on India’s security identity.  This effect is shown 
in Figure 9.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 9.5: The Perceptual Source of India’s 1998-2004 Security Identity 
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Substantive changes were in evidence throughout the perceptual source.  Change was 
most clearly seen via the 1998 nuclear tests whereby the pre-1998 security identity norm 
of nuclear ambiguity was replaced by one of being pro-nuclear weapons (or which 
through its overtness could be referred to as nuclear certainty).  In West Asia, the BJP 
norm of being pro-Israel and balanced replaced the pre-1998 security identity norm of 
being pro-Muslim then balanced, and represented the evolution of what had been a 
growing trend in the 1990s into an established guiding principle.  The BJP-led NDA 
also inculcated much closer Indo-US relations, as norms of distrust / pro-capitalism 
replaced that of pure distrust and anti-western sentiments.  Finally, pre-1998 security 
identity norms of ahisma / idealism / non-alignment appeared to be replaced by BJP 
norms of realpolitik / realism.  Reflective of these trends, the NDA’s National Security 
Advisor stated how ‘”India [now] takes decisions on the basis of national interest and 
no longer unquestioningly accepts the doctrines of non-violence and non-alignment”’ 
(quoted in Arora, 2005: 319). 
 
As we saw with the physical source, what was critical during the BJP-led NDA was a 
general ascendancy of core BJP norms into India’s security practice, whereby being 
proactive and pragmatic came to dictate foreign policy through the lens of making India 
a global power (Arora, 2005: 319; Interview, B4, 2008)147.  It was these norms that were 
collectively central to improved relations with the US, the 1998 nuclear tests and India’s 
turn towards multi-directional diplomacy.  The BJP-led NDA bought ‘context and 
substance’ (Kumar, 2008: 1) to the security principles of their predecessors, as Indian 
foreign policy resolutely moved from (Nehruvian) idealism to pragmatism and practical 
calculus.  Perceived by some analysts as part of something irreversible (see “crossing the 
Rubicon” - Mohan, 2003), the BJP-led NDA appeared to have produced a gear shift in 
India’s security practice.  Most critically, they ‘radically transformed India’s strategic 
status in the international community … (and) consolidated the new orientations in 
India’s foreign policy’ (Dixit, 2004b: 257).  The following three sections assess whether 
these transformations remained in place under the UPA government in the post-NDA 
period. 
 
                                                
147 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat 
in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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Indo-US Relations Transformed 
 
The UPA continued to deepen Indo-US diplomatic, economic and military interaction, 
based upon a ‘consensus between the Congress Party and … the BJP that US-Indian 
relations will be one of the central pillars of India’s foreign policy’ (Gwertzman, 2008; 
Interview B1, 2008; Interview B4, 2008148).  In turn, US officials accepted ‘India’s 
exceptionalism’ (Mohan, 2008: 143), a trend which also continued under new US 
President Obama from 2008.  Cooperation continued to focus on counter-terrorism 
training (especially after the 2006 Mumbai bomb blasts) and military exercises.  These 
links included naval exercises, such as the 2007 India’s newly-formed “Quadrilateral 
Initiative” with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore.  US arms sales to India also 
increased throughout the post-NDA period, and included warships and Hercules 
military transport aircraft (Kronstadt, 2008: 150).  The pro-capitalist (and non-anti-
western) norms of the BJP influenced deeper Indo-US relations (Interview B21, 2008)149 






























Figure 9.6: Indo-US Trade Figures (2004-2009) 
 (US Census Bureau, 2010) 
 
A critical part of the new India-US relationship concerned India’s nuclear capabilities.  
Under the 2005 joint US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation announcement, India 
                                                
148 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008; interview with 
leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian 
foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
149 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008. 
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agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear 
facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  This 
agreement gave India de facto nuclear recognition.  After being passed by the US 
Congress, it was then blocked from scrutiny in the Indian Parliament (after Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh survived a non-confidence vote in July 2008).  The IAEA 
then approved the safeguards agreement with India, and in September 2008 the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) granted India a waiver to give her access to civilian nuclear 
technology and fuel from other countries - developments that effectively allowed India 
to sidestep the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  In 
October 2008, the deal was legislated by the US, ending sanctions that dated from 1974.   
 
The Indian diaspora influenced the nuclear debates (Kirk, 2008) as the UPA completed 
a process that had begun under the NDA (Interview B1, 2008)150.  This process was not 
without its critics, especially concerning a perceived reduction in India’s strategic 
autonomy concerning Iran, China and Pakistan, and its views on a multi-polar world 
(Carter, 2006; Mehta, 2006: 157).  Close Indo-US relations did however become an 
established norm within India’s security identity, signaling the formation of a new 
consensus within India’s strategic community (Interview B24, 2008)151.  Conversely, 
commentators noted the ‘unprecedented’ (Sikri, 2007: 37) lobbying by the US for the 
nuclear deal with India, confirming the new mutual importance of this relationship.  
Overall, and as Shiv Shankar Menon152 commented, the improved India-US partnership 
had a transformational and ‘“positive effect … on our dealings with the rest of the 
world”’ (quoted in Kumar, 2006: 27).   
 
Analysts have also noted how India’s greater proximity to the US could also help India-
Pakistan relations (Mohan, 2008: 143) and aid India’s long-term UNSC ambitions (Kirk, 
2008: 298).  That this tilt towards the US continued under a Congress-led UPA (the 
same Congress who had inspired non-alignment and inculcated anti-Western sentiments 
since India’s independence), firmly indicated ‘the structural shift in New Delhi’s 
                                                
150 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008. 
151 Interview with a former Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs 
Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister], Delhi, October 31 2008. 
152 The Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs Minister or the Indian 
Foreign Minister] from September 1 2006 to July 31 2009. 
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worldview’ (Mohan, 2007: 152).  The various Joint Working Group (JWGs) instituted 
under the NDA also continued during the UPA.  Residual distrust still remains within 
India’s security identity however, especially concerning US policy towards Pakistan. 
 
Nuclear Weapons and Elevated Prestige 
 
The Pokhran II tests represented an irreversible development under the BJP-led NDA 
which pushed India onto the world stage and surmounted the norm of nuclear 
ambiguity that had been a core part of India’s security identity since 1947 (Gupta, 2007; 
Mohan, 2008).  The tests thus ‘repositioned India in the global scenario … as a strategic 
power’ (Singh, 2008).  Just by purely testing (Interview A11, 2008)153, the BJP-led NDA 
produced a fundamental evolution in India’s relations with the world, a change that the 
UPA were unable (and unwilling) to overturn.  While some observers regarded the tests 
as being based upon a ‘post-dated image of a major power’ (Interview B31, 2008)154, 
they irrevocably changed India’s international image as a moralistic and ex-colonial state 
(see Gordon, 1995: 337; Kumar, 2006: 26).  Instead, as India became a rising power able 
to influence international discourses, the new core security identity norm of nuclear 
transparency came to dictate its ‘foreign policy formulation’ (Lall, 2008b, 46).  As 
Manmohan Singh stated, ‘“[n]othing will be done that will compromise, dilute, or cast a 
shadow on India’s full autonomy in the management of its security”’ (quoted in 
Dormandy, 2007: 126).  In turn, Indian calls for universal nuclear disarmament lost 
their pre-1998 moral and idealistic legitimacy and have been surmounted by the new 
norm of nuclear transparency.  Indeed, Manmohan Singh remarked how (India’s) 
international relations are ‘based on realpolitik, not on sentiment, … (they) are not a 
morality play’ (Singh, 2005a). 
 
Through the 1998 tests and the subsequent rapid developments in Indo-US relations, 
under the UPA India become a de jure nuclear state despite being outside of international 
proliferation controls - all of which gave it a unique international status.  India’s 
domestic nuclear energy programme also benefited from the 1998 tests, as a decade later 
it had surmounted the international safeguards that had at one time restricted India.  
                                                
153 Interview with a leading think-tank head, Delhi, May 5 2008.  
154 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 7 2008. 
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Aiding India’s continued economic growth and energy security, the signing of civilian 
nuclear agreements with the US, France and Russia confirmed the success of this 
trajectory and firmly placed India in the group of established nuclear powers.  Under the 
UPA, India’s military forces also completed their “nuclear triad” and gained the ability 
to launch nuclear weapons from land, air and sea.  This ability put India on a par with 
the US, Russia and China, and with the latter made her a clear strategic rival.  India’s 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased in the post-NDA period (from 
2.9% in 2004 to 2.5% in 2007 - SIPRI, 2010), although it increased in actual dollar terms 




























Figure 9.7: Indian Military Expenditure, Excluding Nuclear (2004-2008)155 
(SIPRI, 2010) 
 
These rises were significant lower than during the BJP-led NDA, which practically 
doubled military expenditure (see Figure 8.2).  Such figures suggest a purposeful limiting 
of military expenditure by the UPA, although they were probably aided by no lengthy 
large troop deployments (such as Operation Parakram).  India was however still the 
world’s leading arms purchaser from 1999 to 2006 (Kronstadt, 2008: 46).  This 
increased expenditure also led to advances in space technology and in November 2007 
India established an aerospace command.  The subsequent simultaneous launch of a 
satellite and eight foreign nano-satellites in 2008 put ‘India on a par with top 
international space agencies’ (Tata, 2008: 24).  Such technology can be used against 
                                                
155 Figures for 2009 were not available at the time of writing. 
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Naxalites and other terrorists, has a potential weaponization capability and via 
international collaboration is a source of economic revenue and prestige (Dilley, 2008; 
Mohan, V., 2008).  In turn, for Indian observers, the technical achievement of India’s 
October 2 2008 Chandrayann moon mission ‘elevated India’s place in the world’ 




Building upon India’s elevating international status, the UPA continued the BJP-led 
NDA’s multi-directional diplomacy.  Aimed at achieving an ongoing extension of 
India’s strategic neighbourhood, the UPA wanted India to play a more active role on 
the world stage with a ‘commensurate expansion of responsibility … (in) the 
international system as a whole’ (Vijayalakshmi, 2008: 210).  Again, the UPA sustained 
norms in India’s security identity from the BJP-led NDA of being assertive, proactive 
and pragmatic - behaviour aimed at giving India ‘unprecedented strategic flexibility’ 
(Muni & Mohan, 2004: 332).  An ex-MEA official also noted a greater degree of 
synchronization during the UPA between India’s trade and foreign ministries, 
something that had started to improve during the NDA (Interview B2, 2008)156.  The 
NDA’s hierarchical approach to diplomacy also continued, as shown by the chief guests 
at India’s annual Republic Day parade that reflected India’s 21st century strategic 
interests (see Table 9.5 below). 
 
   
YEAR GUEST COUNTRY 
   
2005 King Jigme Singye Wangchuk Bhutan 
2006 King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Saudi Arabia 
2007 President Vladimir Putin Russia 
2008 President Nicholas Sarkozy France 
2009 President Nursultan Nazarbeyev Kazakhstan 
   
 
Table 9.5: Chief Guests at India’s Republic Day Parade (2005-2009) 
 
The UPA continued close Indo-Israeli relations that had become a core norm in India’s 
security identity during the BJP-led NDA.  Thus, the post-NDA period saw increased 
ties on satellite technology, mutual investment, pharmaceuticals and oil pipelines (Dutta, 
                                                
156 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign 
relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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2008b; Interview B5, 2008157) and an overall ‘determination to continue … 
strengthening relations with Israel’ (Pant, 2004: 62).  Israel also continued to be India’s 
second largest arms supplier after Russia (Riedel, 2008).  Importantly, the UPA ‘re-
aligned’ (Interview B1, 2008)158 Indo-Israeli relations away from being their primary 
focus on West Asia, and instead insisted on a fully balanced position.  Hence, ties with 
Kuwait, Oman and Turkey also increased.  In turn, Indo-Israeli ties were rarely reported 
on and few (if any) senior Israeli officials visited India (in part to assuage the UPA’s 
Communist allies).  A former MEA Foreign Secretary noted how there was little 
backlash from India’s Muslims concerning these ties, which made the new Indo-Israeli 
links more acceptable to Congress psyches (Interview B2, 2008)159. 
 
Reflective of this new balance, India’s ties with Saudi Arabia increased exponentially in 
the post-NDA period (Pant, 2006).  Relations also deepened with Iran, especially 
concerning gas imports (Lall, 2006: 427), although plans for an Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline appeared to be fading (BBC, 2009).  Other relationships under the UPA 
continued to be reflective of the multi-pronged diplomatic approach inculcated during 
the BJP-led NDA government.  With Russia, relations continued to revolve around 
‘complementarities in oil and gas, defence, nuclear, space … and technology’ (Sikri, 
2007).  The two states carried out joint military operations in 2007 and Russia 
supported India’s 2005 observer status with the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation 
(SCO).  Their escalating relationship marked a deep continuity between the NDA and 
UPA regimes (Chenoy, 2008: 59-60).  Annual India-China-Russia meetings also 
remained ongoing.  Overall, such international and regional engagement, centred upon 
economic growth and energy security, came to be known as the Manmohan Doctrine 
during the UPA. 
 
Strategic partnerships became the lingua franca of India’s international diplomacy under 
the UPA, and were announced with the EU (2004), Japan (2005), Saudi Arabia (2006), 
Vietnam (2007) and Kazakhstan (2009).  Such partnerships were backed up by regular 
bilateral summits, as well as agreements to cooperate in international fora and to 
                                                
157 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008. 
158 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former 
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008. 
159 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign 
relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
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increase trade levels.  By 2008, India was the EU’s largest trade partner (Kavalski, 2008), 
was attending annual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) and had European support for its 
UNSC ambitions (Interview A7, 2008)160.  The post-NDA period also saw the creation 
of explicit defence ties (for example) in South East Asia with Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam (Brewster, 2009a, 2009b; Jha, 2007; Suryanarayana, 2008), and 
with Australia and Brazil (Bonner, 2008; Hirst, 2008; Puri, 2007), including naval 
exercises.  These developments confirmed an acceptance of the BJP-led NDA’s Look 
East phase two policy.  The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) grouping initiated under 
the BJP-led NDA also became further instituted during the UPA, with the first IBSA 
Annual Summit Meeting in September 2006.  In turn, June 2009 saw the first annual 
BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) Summit.  Overall, Indian diplomacy maintained the 
gear shift inculcated during the NDA, as India’s ‘bandwidth of engagement … (became) 
wider than ever’ (Mukherjee161, 2006). 
 
Elsewhere, in 2007 India opened its first military base in a foreign country (in 
Tajikistan), and also carried out military exercises with Mongolia (Nomadic Elephant).  
Relations with other Central Asian states further intensified and confirmed the UPA’s 
continued efforts to attempt India’s strategic extension into Central Asia (Interview B4, 
2008)162.  India’s influence in Afghanistan also grew through increased infrastructure 
investment (Khosla, 2007; MEA, 2005), and exposed them to attacks by militants (most 
significantly on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008).  The UPA also initiated the 
first India-Africa Summit in April 2008 aimed at intensifying trade and energy security.  
These ties reflected India’s economic need for oil and gas, mimicked steps already 
undertaken by China, and led to similar relations with Venezuela and Chile.  This 
proactive security practice showed how the harmonized norm of autonomy mixed with 
assertiveness had continued under the UPA from the BJP-led NDA.  In short, India’s 
new leaders recognized that ‘we must also find ways of using international opinion as a 
force multiplier in addressing external challenges effectively’ (Singh, 2005). 
 
                                                
160 Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008.  Analysts also noted with pride the EU’s 
other strategic partnerships (with the US, Japan, Canada, China and Russia) that coupled with India’s 
multi-polar vision.  
161 Pranab Mukherjee was India’s External Affairs Minister from October 24 2006 until May 22 2009. 
162 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior 




The BJP-led NDA introduced persistent substantive changes to the norms structuring 
India’s security identity, which then continued in the post-2004 period.  While not quite 
producing a fundamental ‘paradigmatic shift in India’s polity’ (BJP National Executive 
27.10.04, 2005: 8), these new norms led to an effective gear shift in India’s security 
practice.  This gear shift was most obvious concerning the new assertive, proactive and 
(now mainstream) pragmatic norm centred upon making India into a global power.  
This norm continued to constitute Indian foreign policy even when the NDA had left 
office, and inspired the establishment of norms concerning the democratic basis of the 
India state, communalism, foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue, 
engagement with China and Pakistan, nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, a 
balanced West Asia policy and the use of realpolitik.  While open to interpretation and 
emphasis (for example how the UPA underplays Indo-Israeli links), these ongoing 
norms irrevocably changed - and added new substance - to each source within India’s 
security identity.  As such, there was an ‘essential continuity’ between the NDA and 
UPA governments (Mohan, 2005: 274).  
 
Importantly, because the UPA continued to determine state policy within these 
normative parameters, both the ascendancy and acceptance of these norms into India’s 
security practice was confirmed.  As a senior serving MEA official noted, there was no 
‘deceleration’ (Interview B23, 2008; Interview B22, 2008)163 of this new normative 
security practice after the NDA period ended.  Indeed, where the UPA accelerated 
interaction (and thus India’s normative behaviour) - for example with the US and 
China, or concerning multi-pronged diplomacy - their acceptance of these norms made 
them even more deeply entrenched.  By repeating and continuing with the same types 
of interaction, the UPA fulfilled the event type, frequency, harmony / dissonance 
indicators for norm measurement used to explain norm development, solidification and 
entrenchment (as per Table 2.1).  However, the impact of the BJP-led NDA on India’s 
security identity was far from uniform across the three different sources of India’s 
security identity.  As Table 9.6 below shows, there were clear discrepancies between the 
                                                
163 Interview with a former MEA spokesman and current Indian ambassador, Delhi, October 29 2008 (by 
telephone); interview with a senior journalist, Delhi, October 28 2008. 
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number of harmonized continuities, contested dissonances, substantive changes and 
new norms identified in each security identity source. 
 











     
POLITICAL: 2 2 2 1 
PHYSICAL: 4 0 1 1 
PERCEPTUAL: 2 0 4 1 
     
 
Table 9.6: Norm Behaviour in India’s Security Identity during the NDA 
 
In the political source, the meeting of norms from the pre-1998 security identity and 
BJP policy was the most contested during the NDA and the UPA.  While there were 
some substantive changes, these effectively evolved what had been embryonic prior to 
the BJP-led NDA.  The contested dissonances appear to stem from the fundamentally 
differing approaches taken concerning domestic and foreign policy by different political 
parties in India.  These dissonances underline the perennially contested nature of 
domestic politics whereby different parties must be, by their very nature, primarily in 
competition with each other.  It is thus unsurprising that the BJP were unable to 
inculcate any new lasting Hindutva-orientated norms, although they did successfully 
normalize foreign policy as a domestic political issue.  Concerning the physical source, 
we saw that the majority of norms coalesced into harmonized continuities, with only 
pragmatic engagement becoming a substantive change.  Even this one change reflected 
a trend which had been growing in Indian foreign policy prior to 1998, and which had 
been prominent at several key junctures (especially in 1965 and 1971).  This high degree 
of agreement emphasizes how India’s location and proximity to other states cannot 
fundamentally alter, and whose physical “characteristics” produce the most constant 
interests and threats.  The new norm of being overtly assertive and proactive in India’s 
search to be a global power, effectively complimented the one substantive change. 
 
Within the perceptual source of India’s security identity we can see the different 
competing pre-1998 norms resulting in several substantive changes and no contested 
differences.  Again, each of the substantive changes can be seen as an evolution along 
an already indicated trend or path, although with significant momentum and stimulus 
added by the BJP-led NDA.  This high degree of change shows that the norms in the 
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perceptual source are the most unfixed and flexible, and are not wholly reliant upon the 
political nature of the Indian state or India’s physical characteristics.  Instead, these 
norms are dependent upon how India is perceived by its leaders (and its constituent 
security community actors), and how they are able to influence the perceptions of India 
held by external states.  The 1998 nuclear tests clearly fit this categorization, as shown 
by their subsequent influence on India’s US, Israeli and global relations.  In turn, the 
perceptual source’s new norm of always viewing Indian security through the prism of 
India as a global power via multi-pronged diplomacy correlates with this perspective, as 
India’s leaders project their own national and security self-image to the world. 
 
International conditions (such as being post-Cold War and in a globalizing economy) 
may have aided this evolution, but it was the BJP who were the catalyst and “enabler” 
that proactively forced the gear shift in India’s security practice and behaviour.  In turn, 
different international events (such as 9/11) can be regarded as reaction points which 
the BJP’s leaders exploited to facilitate their national agenda for India.  The next chapter 
sums up these perspectives, unveils this thesis’ key findings, outlines avenues for future 
research concerning India and security identity/ies, and concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 10:  
 
‘Conclusions: 
(Indian) Security Identity and Future Trajectories’ 
 
‘we [India] have by our very practices something that 
… can be identified as our cultural indices of foreign policy’ 
(Interview A19, 2008)164 
 
‘every country is a product of its own history and experience, 
the way it behaves is moulded by the way it came into being’ 
(Sinha, 2003: 41) 
 
 ‘the world’s perception of India, its capacities 
and its strengths has changed irreversibly’ 
(Mukherjee, 2006) 
 
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 
witnessed profound changes concerning the development and evolution of India’s 
security practice.  These changes continued to be reflected in Indian security policy after 
the NDA left office in 2004 and have been maintained by successive Congress-led 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments.  Through the conceptualization and 
elucidation of the security identity analytical framework, we have been able to isolate 
this change (as well as deep-seated continuity) through the presence of specific norms.  
These norms have collectively structured Indian security and foreign policy since 1947, 
and became established through India’s international interaction, as well as through the 
beliefs and experiences of India’s security community.  By comparing the pre-1998, 
NDA and UPA periods, I have shown how ideational constructs of security provide an 
effective analytical framework of a state’s (India’s) security policy.  This framework 
enabled an analysis across different political generations and structural changes, largely 
independent of material or structural factors.   
                                                
164 Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008.  Please refer to the Primary 
Sources in the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis. 
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10.1) - KEY THESIS FINDINGS: 
 
My research on Hindu nationalism and the evolution of Indian security has led to the 
following four key findings –  
 
1) there has been a consistent normative approach to how Indian foreign policy 
has developed since 1947; 
2) different ideologies produce different security (domestic and foreign) policy 
norms; 
3) the BJP-led NDA inculcated several substantive changes to India’s security 
policy; 
4) these normative changes shaped security policy into the post-NDA period, and 
produced an irrevocable gear shift in India’s accepted and evolving security 
practice. 
 





In Chapters 2 and 3, I conceptualized a norm-based and identity-driven account of 
security (security identity) and used this analytical framework to determine a state’s 
(India’s) security practice.  The security identity framework links together the study of 
foreign policy, domestic identities and political parties in India by showing their shared 
emphasis on deep-seated beliefs and precedents.  This elucidation disaggregates three 
major sources present within the security identity framework - the political, the physical 
and the perceptual - in order to produce a compound and temporal appreciation of the 
target state’s security practice.  Using this analytical framework as part of a norm-based 
and largely (although not exclusively) constructivist research agenda, this research has –  
 
! recorded norm continuity and change in India’s security practice through the 
inputs, outputs and feedback inherent to the security identity framework; 
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! linked domestic norms to international politics (rather than vice versa); 
! demonstrated that security is a holistic, inter-relational and inter-dependent 
entity that is a product of the interaction between the domestic and 
international, occurring at the “/” between self/other; 
! illustrated the importance of self/other perceptions in International Relations 
(IR); and 
! advanced the strategic culture approach in IR away from militaristic (and often 




By isolating the different norms present within India’s security practice, I used the new 
security identity framework to show both continuity and change within India’s historical 
foreign policy behaviour.  Such an approach allowed for an analysis across wider 
structural changes and across different political parties and generations within India.  I 
applied this framework (and its incumbent operationalisation strategy) to analyse the 
development and entrenching of core (foreign and domestic) policy norms in –  
 
a) Indian security from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4); 
b) the BJP’s Hindutva ideology until 1998 (Chapter 5); 
c) the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA government (Chapters 6, 7 and 8); and 
d) the Congress-led UPA governments since 2004 (Chapter 9).   
 
This analysis of Indian security over time –  
 
! isolated a number of dominant composite norms present within India’s security 
practice; 
! emphasised multiple aspects, sources and locations of security simultaneously, and 
recognised that India’s security exists at the confluence of these sources; 
! produced a fuller ideational account of India’s security practice through the 
normative comparison and synthesis of differing political ideologies; 
! underlined how norm development is ongoing and underpinned by social 
learning; and 
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! showed that ideational factors can have primacy over material factors, especially 
how norm-based accounts overarch and encompass structural change. 
 
Research Literature Contribution 
 
The research for this thesis has yielded a collective overview of national security and 
foreign policy-making in modern post-colonial India.  Carried out across different 
political generations, parties and international events, I confirmed that there are 
different sets of (quite often overlapping) norms driving different identities, and that 
Indian security practice is absorptive, dynamic and elastic.  I also isolated variation 
across the three normative sources of India’s security identity.  These characteristics 
explained how the BJP-led NDA was simultaneously constrained by India’s pre-1998 
security identity but were also a catalyst for substantive change.  Thus, while its 
trajectory was maintained, the BJP produced a long-term gear shift in India’s security 
practice (on nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, greater regional pragmatism and 
the use of realpolitik).  Overall, I have made a contribution to the current literature on 
Indian security, by –  
 
! producing the first-ever analysis of BJP security policy before, during and after 
the NDA; 
! unveiling the discursive security consensus present within India’s security 
community (through the analysis of primary sources and extensive 
interviewing); 
! highlighting the multiple, composite and competing norms present within 
India’s security practice (from the security identity and BJP policy); 
! confirming the impact of internal policy sources on India’s external security 
practice; and 
! proving the validity of a norm-based account of India’s security practice. 
 
State versus Structure 
 
While the BJP-led NDA’s overall gear shift of India’s security identity is clearly visible 
in my analysis, what does this perspective imply for counter critiques that external 
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factors have determined changes in Indian foreign policy?  Internal factors (for 
example, a political party’s policy norms) are important for how a state constructs its 
foreign policy, both historically and contemporarily.  Through repetition and associated 
consensus, these factors then become established as core policy norms that influence 
how a state (India) regards and responses to international events.  In a similar fashion at 
an international level, there are also core shared beliefs (say on the end of the Cold War, 
nuclear proliferation or international terrorism), which have also become entrenched 
over time through repeated events and interaction.  Thus, just as a state can have its 
own normative security practice, there is in effect an external normative structure present 
within international relations.  It is the interaction of these different sets of norms 
(internal and external) that determines international relations, and in effect produces a 
global self / other dichotomy between states and the system.  The interaction of these 
inter-perceptions produces “inter-national” relations.  
 
Furthermore, through its co-constitutive basis, a norm-based analysis nullifies agent-
structure debates as the self / other dichotomy is co-dependent and based upon mutual 
causality.  We saw this in practice in the security identity framework through the 
interdependent nature of the three normative sources (especially the domestic / 
international dichotomy in the political source).  Hence, a norm-based research agenda 
shows that as much as (international) events are the main stimuli for the actions of 
states in the international system, it is states that are the primary drivers of their security 
behaviour.  Thus, the BJP-led NDA took advantage of confluent international events 
(such as 9/11), rather than allowing security policy to be dictated by them.  In the same 
vein, the foundations of the BJP’s gear shift were aided in the 1990s by India acquiring 
more resources as she moved away from a socialist-orientated economy and slowly 
embraced globalization (analogous to gaining a bigger and more powerful engine).  In 
addition, the decline of Pakistan and the elimination of the Soviet Union helped remove 
obstacles from India’s path, aiding the Indo-US rapprochement under the NDA.  Again, 
these changing structural factors did not drive policy-making but importantly coalesced 
with BJP policy norms and helped smooth the pathway to India finding a new 
international voice (and rearranged security policies) by the turn of the millennium.   
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These observations underline how foreign policy construction, and its transition to 
practice, is based upon engrained beliefs, interests and behaviours that primarily reflect 
the core normative trends associated with a certain specific state, not the wider general 
international structure.  While material factors (economic growth and subsequent 
military growth) and material concerns (trade and energy security) may inform policy, 
they do not wholly determine it.  Instead policy-making and policy-implementation is 
reliant upon the dominant narratives coming from multiple various ideational sources 
within a state.  As this thesis’ analysis of India’s interaction and international relations 
has shown, states do not necessarily have the same interests (even in response to shared 
structural conditions) but do have their own unique histories and self-images.   It is 
because of these distinctive (but not exclusive) perspectives that international relations 




I have highlighted how norms are at once fixed and flexible.  This duality is a reflection 
of the permanent long-term interests of a state (for example for India, maintaining 
foreign policy autonomy or gaining great power status) but also of how states adapt to 
contemporary conditions to maintain these same interests.  Such interests will be 
transferred across different generations by a state’s security community, often overriding 
domestic political changes (Interview B21, 2008; Interview B38, 2008)165.   As Kissinger 
notes, ‘”what passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the 
future”’ (quoted in Chari et al., 2008: 10), as prior interaction forms habits, precedents 
and expectations.  Concurrently, differences in style, nuance or leadership can become 
increasingly critical as underlying foreign policy principles are achieved.  Thus, we saw a 
greater general assertiveness in the BJP-led NDA’s approach to Indian security but also 
a simultaneous evolution of existing approaches resulting in, for example, the Look East 
phase two policy or the extended strategic neighbourhood policy.   
 
In these conditions, there has been essential continuity concerning Indian’s security but 
with a gear shift in priorities, whereby the menu or hierarchy of Indian security norms 
                                                
165 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the United States, Delhi, October 27 2008; interview 
with a newspaper editor, Delhi, November 14 2008. 
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has been changed.  This shift shows how security practice is constantly learning and 
evolving, not just for a state but also for political parties and other identities.  Thus, 
while we saw a number of substantive normative changes occur in India’s security 
identity - during the UPA, Congress themselves became more accepting of Indo-Israeli 
relations.  In turn, a former Indian Foreign Secretary noted how, nearly all parties 
(except the Left) now talk of India as a great power (Interview B4, 2008)166.  We also 
saw how BJP policy norms evolved as a result of being in power (for example, whereby 
Akhand Bharat lost its original purely geographic emphasis).  Such observations fit with 
Hindutva being viewed as a developing ideology based upon multiple and chosen 
symbols that is syncretic and strategic (Jaffrelot, 1993).  More generally, these 
observations confirm that norms innately adapt and evolve through accumulated 
experience and interaction.  Further still, when different norms from different identities 
also interact, some variety of norm / identity synthesis will occur.   
 
This last point not only refers to what we have witnessed concerning India’s security 
identity, BJP policy and UPA policy.  It also applies to individual leader identities too.  
Such a potential influence is clear concerning the shaping of Indian foreign policy by 
Nehru’s principles in the first decades of independence but also concerning the BJP’s 
Vajpayee.  Vajpayee (like Nehru) had been a Minister of External Affairs (from March 
1977 to July 1979) prior to becoming Prime Minister.  This attribute is far from unusual 
in India, and applies to the majority of Indian Prime Ministers167.  Such an attribute 
suggests a shared normative understanding of Indian security policy, and may have been 
a critical constraining influence between the NDA and previous regimes, especially if 
Vajpayee is regarded as a more moderate BJP leader (Dixit, 2004b: 296-309).  Indeed, an 
ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson noted internal MEA perceptions 
of Vajpayee as a Nehruvian (Interview, B23, 2008)168.  Thus, although they inculcated 
substantive changes in India’s security identity, the positioning of the BJP-led NDA’s 
Prime Minister within India’s security (consensus-making) community could also 
explain why more radical changes did not occur. 
                                                
166 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior 
diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008. 
167 Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Rajiv Gandhi, VP Singh, IK Gujral and 
Manmohan Singh all held the Minister of External Affairs post before acceding to the office of 
Prime Minister. 
168 Interview with an ex-MEA spokesperson, Delhi, October 29 2008 (by telephone). 
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10.2) - FUTURE RESEARCH: 
 
My findings have implications for work on International Security and Foreign Policy 
Analysis.  Critically, I have built a new framework of analysis that traces the influence of 
different beliefs and norms on a state’s foreign policy outlook and security interests.  
This security identity framework is formulated to show that there are multiple norms 
(derived from various political, religious and other identities) concerning how domestic 
and foreign policy is practiced, which then impact upon how a state’s leaders behave.  
As it deals with norms within a state-specific setting, the framework is readily 
transferable to other cases.  This transferability underlines its added practical importance 
to researchers in Area Studies and Territorial Studies.  Furthermore, the security identity 
approach deepens normative accounts of security, especially concerning constructivism 
and, to a degree, classical realism.  It thus makes a contribution to IR theory on the 
impact of domestic norms on a state’s security practice, as well as showing their ongoing 




If we have been able to determine India’s security identity, do other states also have a 
security identity?  What are the norms structuring these security identities?  Given its 
focus on political, physical and perceptual sources, the security identity framework is 
readily transferable to any state, and will allow us to ask what is exceptional about that 
state’s normative security practice.  It is the framework’s focus upon normative 
measurement (Table 2.1) and three empirical loci (Table 2.4) that enables such research.  
Although this thesis has been comparative of different periods in India’s security 
practice, future research pathways can also include state-to-state comparison.  Such 
comparisons can be carried out over the same historical period to isolate different state 
responses to the same (structural) events, and will help to further validate the strength 
of ideational accounts in IR.  This validation can help to further show states as unique, 
individual entities influenced by their own normative (and non-structural) assumptions.  
Such an approach would also allow for the comparison of (different) security 
communities present within different states. 
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Possible candidates for such potential comparative work could be India and China or 
India and the EU.  The first case could be used by researchers to understand the 
security practices of two states with vast populations and fast growing economies.  
Furthermore, it could be used to determine the common normative attributes of 
aspiring great powers (with possible applications to other cases such as Brazil or South 
Africa).  In turn, an India-EU comparison could be employed to look at two states 
emerging as important spheres of influence within a multi-polar world, and again 
indicate the presence of certain shared normative beliefs (especially concerning self-
perceptions of their place in the world).  Furthermore, the security identity framework 
can be used to carry out a comparative analysis of states within a certain region - for 
example how different states (say India, China, Japan, and the United States (US)) 
regard and contribute to Asian security practice, or how the historical experiences of 
different EU member states influence the European Security and Defence Policy 




Such future research could validate the general transferability of the security identity 
framework.  Using the framework for this new comparative research may also signify 
how it can be possibly adjusted and refined to be more indicative of an ideational 
account of a state’s security practice.  In particular, given their relative consistency 
across India’s security practice, the necessity of including norms concerning economic 
policy (swadeshi) can be debated.  Although normative in the sense of being a shared 
belief about a certain form of behaviour, such norms (especially in the current era) 
appear to be heavily reliant on external normative structures.  Contemporary debates on 
globalization, and to an extent neo-liberalism, correlate with such perspectives.  
Although maybe not pertinent to the security identities of all states, the removal of 
economic policy norms for the major powers (and candidate great powers) may be 
necessary given the dependence of these states on high rates of economic growth linked 
to global trading practices.  Such changes would only be refinements or adjustments 
rather than a fundamental overhaul of the security identity framework.  The use of 
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military growth figures could also be discussed, although I would argue that these are 
useful as behavioural indicators rather than absolutes.   
 
Comparative work can also help to develop the security identity approach by allowing 
for the analysis of issues specific to each of the three normative sources of the 
framework.  Such research could focus on purely political differences or territorial 
issues, in order to gain a great appreciation of normative change and continuity in very 
precise conditions.  This approach could enable the framework to be disaggregated 
further and especially to advance the study of strategic culture away from a purely 
militaristic to a greater ideational basis.  This advancement would not have to weaken 
strategic culture analysis but can embolden it by focusing more on normative precedents 
in behaviour rather than long-term projections.  Indeed, the better the past is 
understood, the better prepared scholars can be to understand current actions and 
future conduct.  A greater appreciation of political rhetoric informs such research, and 
as we have seen with the BJP, election manifestoes do matter - especially for those in 
opposition.  These benefits apply to policy-makers themselves (and a state or region’s 
security community), particularly concerning system-level responses to state decisions. 
 
* * * * * 
 
This thesis has produced new findings on the development, nature and potential 
trajectory of Indian security.  These findings underline the importance of studying how 
security is normatively produced and practiced within states, and the ideational factors 
which critically inform these processes.  Furthermore, the security identity framework 
has opened up viable and exciting pathways for future research.  I intend to follow one 
such pathway to look at China’s security identity.  Such research can show the historical 
experiences that have shaped a currently emergent, modern and developed China.  As 
with India, appreciating the background, roots and rationales of these experiences can 
lead to our better understanding of what will be a crucial identity for the world and IR 
in the twenty-first century.  It is hoped that such a study can also provide the basis for a 
potential comparative study between India and China.  While the material and economic 
fortunes of states may fluctuate over time, their national (security) identities will remain 
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Appendix 2: Research Notes 
 
 
This PhD project requires a strategy that effectively interweaves theory, data collection 
and data analysis through a comprehensive research design (Bechhofer & Paterson, 
2000: 52).  Epistemologically, my approach is interpretative, underscoring how key to 
‘social inquiry is the interpretation of meaningful human practices’ (Little, 1991: 68).  
This stance clearly fits with my theoretical focus upon the influence of norms and 
identities on a state’s [India’s] security practice.  My research strategy is also iterative, 
reflexive and deductive (Blaikie, 2001: 25) as I see current (material) explanations of 
India’s security behaviour as inadequate and I posit an alternative ideational account 
(security identity).  Having this alternative (theoretical) account also helps to 
operationalise my research design (Yin, 2003: 19).  Concerning ontology, my approach is 
largely based upon idealism which ‘asserts that reality is only knowable through … 
socially constructed meanings’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 23) and again corresponds to my 
focus on identity formation, interaction and behaviour.  
 
Data collection mirrored the three empirical loci (see Table 2.4) of political-rhetorical, 
temporal historical and reflexive-individual.  For the first locus, I acquired primary 
source documentation directly from BJP headquarters in Delhi (resulting in 9 volumes 
of resolutions, manifestoes and speeches by the BJS and BJP) and from online sources 
(primarily the MEA, the MoD and various Indian Embassies).  Collecting secondary 
literature, biographies and autobiographies involved using the Edinburgh University 
Library, as well as extended visits to the National Library of Scotland and the British 
Library.  Exhaustive literature searches using databases such as COPAC and JSTOR, 
aided this process.  Data collection guided and attuned my research to existing work, 
and provided the empirical (and theoretical) grounding of my research.  While 
undertaking language training in India, I also utilized the extensive library at the Lal 
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie - India’s premier 
civil service training institution.  
 
Conducting interviews was essential for investigating the dominant discourses 
concerning India’s security practice.  Interviews are generative in their ‘reprocessing and 
retelling of attitudes, beliefs, behaviour or other phenomena’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 
 289 
36) and were an appropriate source of knowledge concerning my investigation of norms 
and identities in India.  Taking a semi-structure approach - ‘intended to combine 
structure with flexibility’ (Legard et al., 2003: 141) - I initially used contacts from my 
supervisors and staff at Edinburgh, which I then “snowballed” to gain further contacts.  
I also made a list of appropriate contacts before going to India and went directly to BJP 
and Congress Party headquarters when in Delhi.  At every stage, I was clear about the 
objectives and purpose of my research, and the timing and length of each interview in 
order to garner trust and create legitimacy (Lewis, 2003: 62).  Undertaking six months of 
language training in Hindi also helped me to gain access to interviewees, as did being 
explicit about issues of anonymity and confidentiality (Grinyer, 2002; Lee, 1993: 102).   
 
The research’s empirical analysis is carried out through a combination of content and 
discourse analysis.  Content analysis offers ‘a means to survey the whole corpus of data’ 
(Silverman, 2002: 37) and identifies the primary themes (and therefore norms) essential 
to my project.  Discourse analysis helps to ‘examine the construction of texts and verbal 
accounts’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 35) and to compare text from each of the empirical 
loci.  The coding of data was done manually so as to gain a greater hands-on 
appreciation of its nuances and complexity.  Interviewing with over 60 individuals was 
carried out in two rounds (May 2008 and October to December 2008), and I analysed 
first round data before the second round in order to maximize my questioning and to 
pinpoint any empirical gaps.  In turn, triangulating findings from the three empirical loci 
allowed me to ‘overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-method, single-
observer, single-theory studies’ (Denzin, 1970: 313).  Suitable research training was 
gained through undertaking an MSc by Research prior to this PhD. 
 
The project’s theoretical and empirical focus also developed over the last four years.  It 
began as an analysis of “cultural fear” between India and Pakistan focusing on the 
attitudes of their army officers.  As access was deemed to be too problematic 
(particularly concerning Official Secrets Acts), this idea then developed into analyzing 
newspapers editors’ attitudes.  From here, notions of India’s cultural security identity 
emerged and led to the current project analyzing India’s security relations and its 
strategic community as a whole.  Appropriate supervision posed initial difficulties 
through a lack of expertise on Indian security (at Edinburgh and across the UK).  This 
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issue was resolved by developing links with Dr Crispin Bates (a historian at Edinburgh) 
and Dr Gareth Price (Head of Asia Programme, Chatham House).  Presenting papers at 
various national and international conferences (see the list below), as well as publishing 
several journal articles and book chapters, helped me to receive further feedback.  
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I was also rigourous and robust with my research design in order to achieve reliability - 
‘consistency of measures’ (Bryman, 2004: 70) - and validity - ‘whether an indicator that 
is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept’ (Bryman, 2004: 73). 
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